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Introduction 
India is a vast country with people of different 
languages, culture and history. Each State has its own peculiar 
needs and problems. Hence the States should have freedom of 
action and sufficient powers, legislative and executive, to 
sedure their progress without impairing the unity of the country. 
This is possible under a truly federal set up. 
In our country, unfortunately, the experience during 
the past twenty-five years after Independence is that the powers 
concentrated in the Centre have been so exercised as to inhibit 
the States and to deprive them of their initiative. 
There has been a strong tendency to work the Constitu-
tion as a unitary one treating the States as subservient to the 
Centre. It is a myth to say that Centre can be strong only if 
most of the powers are concentrated in the Centre. Thiru K, 
Santhanam, an elderly statesman, who was a member of the Consti-
tuent Assembly has critically examined the plea for strong Centre 
and says : 
a strong Centre is indispensable if India is not to dis-
integrate and dissolve in chaos. But I ... do not agree with 
those who equate strength with the range of formal constitutional 
powers. On the other hand, I am emphatically of opinion that by 
taking upon itself too many obligations in relation to the vast 
population spread over the length and breadth of India, the 
Centre will become incurably weak. It is only through concentra-
tion on essential All-India matters and by refusing to share the 
responsibility in such matters with the States, while giving 
complete autonomy to the States in the rest of the field of 
Government, the Parliament and the Central Government can be 
really strong. The tendency towards vague unhealthy paternalism 
which has come to envelop Indian Federalism as a result of the 
dominance of a single party during the first two decades of 
independence is as bad for the Centre as it is unpleasant and 
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Historical Background 
The Federal concept in India represented a decision which was 
taken in 1930 as a result of the necessity of including the 
Indian (Native) States within the Indian polity. 
The Simon Commission (1927-1929) and the Butler 
Committee (1927-30) both visualised, even though as a distant 
ideal, a federal union for the whole of India. The picture 
emerged with dramatic swiftness at the Round Table Conferences 
held in London (1930-32) with the delegates of British India and 
those of the Indian States alike unaniomously accepting a federal 
idea as the immediate solution to the Indian Constitutional 
problem. 
The Government of India Act, 1935 which represented the 
culmination of the discussions which started with the Round Table 
Conferences, provided for a federal polity in India. 
India undoubtedly was a unitary State until 1937, when 
the Government of India Act 1935 came into force. By the Act of 
1935, the British Parliament sought to set up a federal system in 
the same manner as it had done in the case of Canada, by creating 
autonomous units and combining them into a federation by one and 
the same Act. 
The Federation envisaged by the Act of 1935 was to come 
into force only after the Rulers, representing not less than half 
the aggregate population of the Indian States had signified their 
decision in favour of accession. The outbreak of the Second 
world War in 1939 abruptly terminated the negotiations, and on 11 
September 1939 a formal official announcement was made supending 
all work in connection with the preparation for the federation. 
The Constituent Assembly was set up under the Cabinet 
Mission's plan of 16 May 1946. Under this plan, British Indian 
and the Indian States together were to constitute a Union of 
India with jurisdiction over the subjects of foreign affairs, 
defence and communications and with powers necessary to raise 
finances required for these subjects. All subjects other than 
Union subjects and all residuary powers were vested in the 
provinces. The Indian States were to retain all subjects and 
powers other than those ceded to the Union. The objective 
resolution moved in the Constituent Assembly by Nehru on 13th 
December 1947, envisaged a Republic of India where in the various 
territories would possess and retain the status of autonomous 
units together with residuary powers and exercise all powers and 
functions of Government and administration save and except such 
powers and functions as were vested in or assigned to the Union 
or as were inherent or implied in the Union or resulted there-
from. 
With the British Government's announcement of 3rd June 
1947 of regarding the partitioning of the country, there was a 
decisive swing in favour of a strong central Government. 
Article 1 (l) of the Indian Constitution reads: "India 
that is Bharat, shall be a union of States". But a Union of 
States is not a unitary State though the word federal or federa-
tion does not occur any where in the Constitution, but the 
content of federalism has been incorporated in the articles of 
the Constitution. The word "Federal" seems to have been delibe-
rately ommitted on the plea that the tendency to disintegrated in 
our body-politic had been rampant since the dawn of history. 
Vi/hile introducing the draft Constitution on 4th November, 1948, 
Dr. Ambedkar said: "The word 'Union' has been used advisedly so 
that the Constituent parts may not have the freedom to get out". 
The Indian federal system was evolved out of an imperial 
unitary State; and the State in the Indian federation did not have 
the tradition of autonomy. The partition of the country had made 
the values of national unity and integrity more important than 
over before. The circumstances at the time of the Constitution 
persuaded our founding fathers to create a powerful union. 
The problems of independence, the partition of the 
country; the integration of native States, the need to repair the 
damage caused to the economy during the war and a score of other 
factors weighed heavily on the minds of the Constitution makers. 
The zeal for a federal form of Government, which originated in 
the 1935 Act, gave way to distinct towards more unitary features 
in the political structure. The States that were constituents in 
the beginning of the Union had possessed neither identity nor any 
individuality. But before the turn of the decade with inguistic 
reorganisation, the States with their distinctive individuality 
were born. When we adopted the Constitution, we had the 'alpha-
betical'. But by the passage of time the reorganisation of the 
States on linguistic basis has taken place and today the States 
are conscious of their identity. The evolution of the distinctive 
character of the States is a significant factor in the political 
development of this country. 
Our Constitution is so framed that it should work as a 
federal system but in times of war it is so designed as to work 
as though it were a nitary system. This was the view categori-
cally expressed by Dr. Ambedkar himself. 
The situation in which the framers of the Constitution 
looked at the problems was far different from the situation that 
obtained now. The overseeing role of the Centre is incompatible 
with the traditional ideals of federalism. By talking of a 
strong Centre we are just bypassing the real issue. The strength 
or stability of the apex of the federal pyramid is dependent on 
the base. Without a strong Centre and stable States where is the 
union? Those who talk a loud of a strong Centre ignore this 
reality. 
Weak State Governments do not automatically lead to a 
strong Union Government. The strength of the Union lies in the 
strength of the States. The Union and the Units both derive 
authority from the same source i.e. the Constitution — neither 
being the delegate nor the agent of the other. Since 1950, the 
Constitutional farme-work of the Union-State relations has 
remained unchanged but the character and substance of these 
relations have undergone substantial changes. The demands for 
the protection and articulation of regional diversities are urged 
with greater strength and they are likely to persist for long in 
the foreseeable future. 
The emerging situation in the States is that they are 
faced with increasing responsibilities with inelastic resources. 
This is the main cause for growing tensions in the socio-economic 
sphere. There is thus an imblance of function and resources. 
Lack of co-relationship between power and responsibility is the 
cause for friction. An enthusiastic assertion of popular will is 
possible only when the people feel the centres of decision to be 
well within their grasp. Excessive centralisation, neglecting 
local needs and aspirations may prove to be a short-cut to dis-
integration on account of the excessive bureaucracy which it 
necessarily involves. 
The Indian Federal Republic began with a contradiction 
•while the Constitution established a Federal System of Government, 
the political party-system existing at that time was unitary and 
highly centralised. The weakness in the development of politics 
in India was the failure to evolve sound conventions and the 
creation of an impartial image of the federal authority. The 
evolution of the party-system has been unhelpful for the orderly 
development of federal arrangement. Pattern of Union-State 
relations depends on the relative power positions of the major 
political parties. 
The prevalence of the one party predominance in the 
Indian political system during the first two decades of indepen-
dence made it possible to resolves inter-state and Union-States 
disputes within the framework of the dominant party's decision-
making process. But the situation has changed radically in 1967 
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when most of the non-Congress parties found themselves at the 
helm of the various State Governments. 
The inter-party conflicts assumed the shape of inter-
governmental conflicts. Since the fourth General Elections a new 
configuration of political forces emerged. This had a profound 
impact upon the institutional pattern of Union-State relations. 
Constitution 
Part of the Constitution of India deals with the Union and its 
Territories. Article I describes name and territory of the 
Union, as India, that is, Bharat shall be 'Union of States'. 
Jurists, political scientists, political parties and the judges 
of the Supreme Court of India are of the unanimous view that 
India is a 'Federation of States'. 
The most important requirement of a federal constitu-
tion is the distribution of the legislative power between the 
Union and the States. The Union and States should be independent 
of each other in their respective spheres. Both the Union and 
States derive their powers from the same source, that is, the 
Constitution, The wellrknown authority on constitutional law 
Mr. K.C. Wheare defines the Federal principle as, "the method of 
dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are 
each, within a sphere, coordinate and independent", Mr, A.V. 
Dicey, the well-known authority in his treatise Law of the 
Constitution defines the essence of developed federalism as, 
"the supremacy of the Constitution — the distribution among 
bodies with limited and coordinate authority of the different 
powers and government — the authority of the courts to act as 
interpreters of the constitution". He further started. 
The distribution of powers as an essential feature of 
federalism. The object for which a federal state is 
formed involves a division of authority between the 
national government and the separate States. The 
powers given to the nation form in effect so many 
limitations upon the authority of the separate states, 
and as it is not intended that the central government 
should have the opportunity of encreaching upon the 
rights retained by the States, its sphere of action 
necessarily becomes the object of rigorous definition. 
Federalism postulates the distribution of governmental 
authority legislative, financial, executive and judical between 
the union government and the state governments. 
The subject of Union-State relations has now acquired 
vital importance and has become crucial to the preservation of 
Unity and Integrity of India within the framework of the Consti-
tution. The integrity and sovereignty of India must, however, 
emerge from a conscious effort towards harmonisation of the 
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distinct linguistic, ethnic and cultural groups that inhabit our 
great country. Unity must mean harmony. It must reflect the 
totality of the multi-facet personality of India. Parliamentary 
democracy with a federal base can alone provide such a meaningful 
structure. The struggle for freedom from colonial bondage united 
them. That golden thread of unity created by freedom struggle 
still runs throughout the length and breadth of India. 
For the last two decades the States were making demands 
for greater powers, for making 'States Autonomy' (the basic 
foundation of federalism) real, meaningful, purposeful and 
effective. Since the Congress party was in power at the Union 
and the States, though there were muffled voices about federalism 
within the Congress party, the State Governments were practically 
silenced. And as a result of party discipline, the State Govern-
ment had to carry out whatever the Union Government decided for 
them — including the abrupt and unceremonious change of Chief 
Ministers and the imposition of President's rule even in Congress-
ruled States (including the dissolution of elected legislatures). 
Then Janata party came to power. It dismissed State Governments 
of the Congress party and dissolved the State Legislatures. The 
Congress party and Congress leaders suddenly realised that our 
Constitution is a federal one. But when the Congress party was 
voted to power in January 1980, the principle of federalism were 
given a go by and the Congress Government at the Centre repeated 
the performance of the Janata party by dismissing several State 
Governments and dissolving the elected State legislatures. 
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The monopoly of the power of Congress party has come to 
an end. Different political parties and regional parties are in 
office in different States and at the Union, This is most likely 
to be the future pattern of Indian polity. Hence the relations 
between the Union and State have now assumed unprecedented signi-
ficance and importance. Unless this aspect of the problem is 
properly understood in terms of Indian reality and political 
sociology of changing political panorama of Indian life, the 
forces of unity and integrity cannot be strengthened. 
As soon as a demand is raised for a review of Union and 
State relations, some people, inspired or otherwise, become 
hysterical and argue that any review would affect national integ-
rity and unity. 
It is relevant to point out that not long after commence-
ment of the Constitution, the State Reorganisation Commission, had 
occasion to go into some of these questions. The report of the 
Commission was submitted in 1965; and some of the discussions in 
the report, more than a quarter of a century ago, indicated that 
the present inadequacies could be partly visualised by perceptive 
observers even in those days. Paragraphs 181 and 182 at page 52 
of the Report read as follows: 
181. It is no doubt true that all the States of the 
Indian Union are now dependent in varying degress on 
central aid for development expenditure. However, we 
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must not lose sight of the fact that excessive depen-
dence on the Centre detracts from the federal principle 
since a real division of political power is not possi-
ble without an adequate separation of financial powers 
and resources. The balance of federal Union is bound 
to be disturbed if there are amongst its constituent 
units poor relations or mendicants, particularly, if 
they are inclined to be extravagant. "If a federal 
system with any real independence in the States is to 
continue", says Sir John Latham, formerly Chief Justice 
of the Australian High Court, "the States must have 
financial resources under their own control reasonably 
adequate to their responsibilities". 182, We are 
conscious of the fact that, with the growing need for 
administrative cooperation between the Central and 
State Governments, partial dependence of the State 
Governments upon payments from the Centre, and the fact 
that the Central Government by use of the system of 
conditional grants, frequently promotes development in 
matters which are constitutionally assigned to the 
States, the concept of federalism is now everywhere 
undergoing a change. How much importance is to be 
attached to the inter-State cooperation rather than to 
the strictly constitutional aspects of federalism is 
now everywhere undergoing a change. How much importance 
is to be attached to the inter-State cooperation rather 
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than to the strictly constitutional aspects of federa-
lism will depend on the needs and circumstances of the 
time and the context in which this problem is being 
discussed. 
There is no doubt that the time and circumstances have 
radically changed. Even in 1967 when the unfolding of events had 
not reached a critical stage, the study team of the Administrative 
Reforms Commission, on Union-State relationship headed by Mr. M.C. 
Setalvad, made observations about the anomalous relationship 
between the Union and States. In the introduction to Report the 
Study Team pointed out: 
It is well to recognise that the political facts of the 
Indian scene have played a major role in the development 
of attitudes. Where a single party has control over 
affairs at the Centre as well as in the States an alter-
native and extra-constitutional channel become available 
for the operation of Centre-State relationship. In 
practice this channel has been very active during Cong-
ress Party rule and has governed the tenor of Centre-
State relationships. The political network connecting 
Central and State leadership was used amply to resolve 
conflict and ease tension or even to postpone considera-
tion of inconvenient issues. In the process the Consti-
tution was not violated, at least not deliberately or 
demonstrably, but often bypassed. Besides, political 
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rather than administrative considerations determined 
decisions and the Centre's relationship on the person-
ality of its political leaders and their equation with 
the central leadership. Constitutional provisions went 
into disuse and disputes were settled in the party 
rather than aired through open constitutional machinery. 
The Study Team had only discussed the problem partially. 
The terms of reference confined the Team to administrative rela-
tionships. The political reality was much more disturbing. Ten 
years before this study was made a communist government had been 
returned to power in Kerala in a general election. It disturbed 
the complacency of the Union Government to such as extent that the 
basic federal character of the Indian polity was lost sight of. A 
short shrift through improper use of the Union Government's powers 
partially restored the sway of the Congress party in Kerala. While 
the approach to States ruled by the Congress party in certain 
cases were extra-constitutional as pointed out by the Setalvad 
Study Team, approach to States ruled by the opposition also unfor-
tunately became extra-constitutional in certain matters. The Union 
Government under the Constitution enjoys enormous powers to 
control the functioning of the State governments. Partisan and 
manipulative exercise of the administrative, legislative and 
financial powers given under the Constitution could always enable 
the Union Government to destabilise any State administration. Such 
instances were not rare. But there was no guarantee under the 
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Constitution to prevent such manipulative exercise of power. 
States were completely helpless, if as a result of divergence in 
political views the Union decided to use the levers of power to 
undermine the effectiveness of such State governments. In the 
long run the national integration becomes the victim of such 
partisan approach. This situation warrants appropriate changes 
in the Constitution so that the constitutional structure itself 
provided for a healthy interplay of political forces in a system 
which is bound hence forward to be multi-party in character. 
Setalvad Study Team recognised the need for adjustments 
more than 15 years ago when the problem had not assumed such dis-
turbing proportions. In its introduction to the Report the Team 
commented: 
From the constitutional angle the situation was abnor-
mal. As a result of bypassing normal constitutional 
processes a habit of settling issues through extra 
constitutional means grow and sufficient experience and 
a proper climate for settling them through the regular 
process were not developed. The emergence of non-Cong-
ress governments in the States accordingly forced the 
problem to the forefront for the earlier devices are no 
longer available. 
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The Study Team further mentioned: 
In a few years as this experience is assimilated diffi-
culties presented by its sheer unprecedentedness should 
be gradually solved by proper adjustments in response 
from the body politic. 
The political response in subsequent years did not 
reveal any intent to allow the federal machinery to adopt itself 
to the chaning political situation. The compulsions of socio-
economic planning against the background of alarming population 
growing demand for employment, absence of social security measures 
in the face of continuous price rise, have further complicated the 
postion. The complete control exercised by the Union Government 
over all aspects of economic activities, gives it a primacy and 
status, which is not consistent with their responsibilities given 
to the State governments under the Constitution, It is this 
imbalance which needs to be redressed if sustained socio-economic 
growth is to be ensured. 
Shri B.N. Rao, Constitutional Adviser to the Constituent 
Assembly in the introduction to the first edition of the book on 
Constitutional Precedents (Second Series) wrote: 
The Weimar Constitution of Germany in representative of 
the numerous European Constitutions that cropped up soon 
after the First World War and contains various instruc-
tive provisions Acclaimed at the time as one of the best 
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efforts at Constitution making it failed to fulfil any 
of the great expectations of its f;ramers. Instead, it 
has served to be at once a lesson and a warning that 
the success of a Constitution depends, not upon the 
excellence of the written instrument, but upon whether 
it is suited to the genius of the people for whom it is 
made. 
Some of the intellectuals have expressed apprehensions 
that if there is to be a further devolution of powers from the 
Union to the States, Union might become weak and if the reactio-
nary forces in the States get hold of power and Union would feel 
helpless to deal with such a situation. These apprehensions felt 
by these very sincere scholars are based on a false presumption 
that the Union is likely to be more progressive than the State 
governments. May be some of the regional parties emerging now 
could be reactionary, but not all. In fact some of them are more 
of protest movements than political instruments. VUth all the 
enormous powers the Union wield under the Constitution, if a 
reactionary party captures power at the Centre, then the very 
Constitution can be used as Hitler used Weimar Constitution. The 
strength of the democratic institutions lies in the consciousness 
of the democratic forces. The capitalist path of development now 
being followed by the Congress (I) in total violation of, and 
utter disregard to, the objectives stated in the Preamble and 
Directive Principles of Constitution at the Union level 
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concentration of economic power, growth of monopoly setting into 
motion the forces of anti-growth and stagnation, startling econo-
mic disparities, unemployment, uneven economic development (all 
results of the capitalist path of development) are the real dis-
integrative forces of Indian polity resulting in uneven economic 
development of various regions and creating a colonial economic 
relationship between one part or region or State with other parts 
of India. To protect and strengthen the unity of India political 
forces have to be generated to reverse this economic process and 
initiate necessary corrective steps. In that context the States 
would certainly play an important role. Hence a review of Union 
and State relations is called for. 
Only harmony between the Union and the States, based on 
the foundations of principles of federalism would further lead to 
a greater unity while preserving the dignity and freedom of action 
within a given sphere of the State. There cannot be a strong 
India without well-developed and strong States. With respective 
spheres of authority clearly marked out, strong States Vv^ ould add 
strength to the Union and weak States would only weaken the Nation. 
In the words of Prof. Sawyer: "The sub-continent of 
India was another area which by reason of size, population, 
regional (including linguistic) differences and communication 
problems presented an obvious federal situation". 
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The 1935 Government of India Act, which came into force 
in 1937, provided certain basic features of federalism. The Cons-
tituent Assembly in framing the Constitution of India, followed 
to a large extent, some of the basic features of the 1935 Act. 
Thus Indian Constitution was meant to be a federal one. But in 
the working of the Constitution of India some of the unitary-
features have emerged dorainantly as a result of one-party rule. 
The present position is as was stated by Shri Raja-
mannar's Committee; 
Though the Constitution set up a federal system, it 
must be admitted that there are several provisions, 
which are inconsistent with the principles of federa-
lism. There are unitary trends and in the allocation 
of powers, there is a strong bias and tilting of the 
scales in favour of the Centre. In a federation, the 
national and the State Government exist on the basis 
of equality and neither has the power to make inroads 
on the definite authority and the functions of the 
other unilaterally. In India, however, the national 
government is vested with powers on certain occasions 
to invade the legislative and executive domain of the 
State. There is a theme of subordination running right 
through the Constitution. There is a large scope for 
the Centre to intrude into the State affairs and thus 
affect the .autonomy of the States. There are certain 
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provisions in the Constitution, which appear to confer 
on the Union Government supervisory poorer over the 
States even in well-defined and specified matters which 
are exclusively in the State field. 
Hence the need for review Union-State relations has be-
come imperative and the appointment of Sarkaria Commission is 
itself an unambiguous recognition of the need for such a review. 
But the way the Commission is constituted and the terms 
of reference are formulated without consultation with the States, 
would certainly make one feel that the Union Government is not 
keen about a purposeful review of Union and State relations but 
this Commission is meant to act as a diversion as the British 
Royal Commissions. The motives of the Central Government do not 
seems to be honourable. 
The relations between the Union and States can be 
broadly classified as (i) The Legislative, (ii) the Administra-
tive, and (iii) the Financial Relations. It is beyond dispute 
that the subjects such as defence, foreign relations, currency, 
economic planning, banking, insurance, oil fields and minerals, 
exports and imports should be exclusively under the control of 
the Union Government. A committee must go through all the three 
lists, i.e.. Central, State and concurrent lists and make a 
proper rearrangement. 
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All attempts to amend Article 370 should be prevented. 
Special status of Jammu and Kashmir should not be disturbed. 
Legislative Relations 
Article 31 C and the Directive Principles of the Constitution 
Under Article 31 C the Parliament can pass law to give 
effect to the policy of the State for securing all or any of the 
Directive Principles laid down in Part IV of the Constitution. If 
there is a declaration that the law is meant for implementing 
such policy, such a law will be valid notwithstanding any abridge-
ment of Article 14 or 19. If a legislature of a State seeks to 
pass any law for the purpose of implementing Directive Principles 
of Constitution, in terms of Article 31 such law has to be 
reserved for consideration of the President and his assent. Until 
the law receives the assent of the President it cannot come into 
force. This is an anomalous situation. The State legislatures 
should have the same privilege and power as the Parliament in this 
regard. Consideration and assent of the President should not be 
required. Article 31 C should be suitably ammended to enable the 
State legislature to make laws for implementation of the Directive 
Principles of Constitution without delay. 
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Entry No. 97 Union List 
1. Article 248 — Residuary Powers. The residuary 
legislative power is vested in the Parliament. And the State 
legislatures cannot exercise residuary powers, which they could 
under Section 104 of the Government of India Act 1935. The 
American and the Australian constitutions provide for the exer-
cise of residuary powers by the States. It will be in the 
interest of the smooth functioning of the Indian polity, having 
a regard to the unity in diversity, if the residuary powers are 
allowed to be exercised by the States. 
Except in times of war and national peril the residuary 
powers of legislation conferred by Article 248 and residuary power 
of taxation conferred by Entry No, 97 of the Union List should be 
vested in the State legislature. Hence Article 248 should be 
accordingly amended. 
Directions which can be given in pursuance of the 
executive powers of the Union to the States should be given only 
in consultation with the Inter-State Council under Article 256. 
Article 249. Parliament to make laws in respect of 
matters specifically included in the State List. Article 249 can 
be invoked with the aid of the resolution passed by the Council of 
States by two-thirds majority that it is necessary or expedient 
that the Parliament should make laws. This is in total violation 
of the basic principles of federalism. The Union can easily 
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invade the jurisdiction of the State, if the political party 
ruling at the Centre can command tvwo-thirds majority in the 
Council of States. Hence this Article should be deleted. 
Article 252, If two or more State legislatures desire 
that the Parliament should make law relating to the subjects in 
List two, the Parliament can pass law regarding subjects in List 
No. 2 and the Parliament alone will have the power to amend but 
not the State legislature to which it applies. 
The State legislature which had passed a resolution 
enabling the Parliament to make laws should have the power to 
either amend or to repeal. Hence Article 252 should be suitably 
amended. 
Article 200, Under this Article the Governor can 
reserve the Bill passed by the legislature of the State for the 
consideration of the President and the Vovernor shall not assent 
to any Bill and is bound to reserve for the consideration of the 
President if that Bill in his opinion, if it becomes law, 
derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger its 
position which that Court by the Constitution is designed to fill. 
Accept the Bills of this nature that affect the powers of the 
High Court, the Governor should not have the discretion to reserve 
the Bill for the consideration of the President. The Article 200 
should be suitably amended. Under Article 200 no time limit is 
prescribed for Presidential consideration. Any Bill can be put in 
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cold storage. As the President is bound to act under Article 74 
on the advice of Council of Ministers and since he has no options 
at all, the legislative power of the State can be easily inter-
fered with by the use of Presidential veto. In other words both 
in theory and practice the legislative process of the State 
legislature in certain respects are subordinate to the supremacy 
and subject to political convictions or prejudices of the Union 
Executive. Most Governors owe their loyalties to the ruling party 
at the Centre as most of them are partymen or obliged to the Party 
in several ways. They are always chosen mainly to watch the poli-
tical developments or even to manipulate developments some time. 
Hence it is very difficult to accept that the Governor's act on 
the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State. There had 
been occasions when even some Congress Ministers in States used to 
feel exasperated at the indifference of the Centre, regarding bills 
passed by their respective legislatures and used to remark "save 
us from Delhi socialism". These bills mainly dealt with welfare 
measures which were far more progressive than the legislation 
initiated by the Union Government, When a State legislature 
passes a bill it need not be sent for the assent of the President, 
If there is any violation of the Constitution, the judiciary can 
deal with the matter, instead of allowing a political judgement or 
political prejudices to prevail. Hence this article should be 
amended. Speaker's certificate that the Bill had been passed 
should be enough for the law to come into force or the Governor 
should act on the advice of the Council of Ministers as the 
President does under Article 74. 
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Emergency 
If the President is satisfied that grave emergency 
exists and the security of the country or any part thereof is 
threatened by war or external aggression or internal disturbances 
he may declare emergency by proclamation. Thus there are two 
types of emergency: (a) External and (b) Internal. V/hile the 
Union Government should have the power to declare external emer-
gency, the provisions regarding internal emergency are to be 
formulated in the light of the experience of Emergency in 1975, 
Financial emergency under Article 360 should be promul-
gated only after the matter is placed before the Inter-State 
Council. 
Article 360 has not been invoked so far. Financial 
instability can be the result of mismanagement of economy by the 
Union Government and in such a case of emergency the States pay 
the penalty. This is an anomalous position regarding the finan-
cial emergency. Hence placing the proposal for financial emer-
gency before the Inter-State Council is absolutely necessary. 
Article 356 and 357 — President's Rule 
The President on the receipt of the report from the 
Governor of the State, or otherwise when he is satisfied that the 
situation has arisen in the State, in which the government of the 
State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of 
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the Constitution can invoke Articles 356 and 357, dismiss the 
State Government and event dissolve the legislature (optional) 
and assume all power to himself. 
It is the Government at the Union level that assumes 
all powers. And it is the Union Government that decides whether 
to impose President's Rule or not. In actual practice the 
governors are told by the Home Ministry when they should write 
the report and how they should write the report. The Governors 
are helpless in these matters, as they continue to be Governors 
at the pleasure of the President (this only means the pleasure 
of the Prime Minister). Under Article 356 as it stands, even the 
Governor's report is not necessary, it is only the satisfaction 
of the President that is necessary; in other words it is the 
subjective satisfaction of the Prime Minister who heads the Counci. 
of Ministers. It is both a tragedy and a farce that the State 
Governments and State Legislatures owe their existence to the 
pleasure of the whims of the Prime Minister. 
It may be of interest to know that historically the 
President's Rule was imposed for the first time (after the Cons-
titution came into force) on 21st June 1951 in Punjab. Ever since 
that day till today the President's Rule was clamped about 67 
times in 21 States excluding the Union Territories. In the scheme 
of the Constitution the Council of States and the President are 
the custodians of the interests of the States. But since the 
President has to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers 
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under Article 74, the President is reduced to a rubber stamp and 
in effect it is the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers 
who take decisions. 
If the President's Rule becomes inescapable it should 
be imposed only with the approval of both the Houses of Parliament 
and in consultation with the Inter-State Council. And the elec-
tions should be held within 3 months from the date of imposition 
of President's Rule. The existing government should be allowed to 
function as a care-taker Government. 
If the violence and internal disturbances are of such 
magnitude that fair and free elections could not be held, the 
President's Rule can be prolonged with the approval of both 
Houses of Parliament. The Inter-State Council should be invari-
ably consulted. The law should be suitably amended. 
Article 365, This article is no less obnoxious. If any 
State Government fails to comply with, or give effect to, any 
direction given in exercise of executive power (by the executive), 
Article 365 would enable the President to invoke Article 365 and 
impose President's Rule. Here again it is only the judgement of 
the political executive and not the result of determination by the 
judiciary, Hypothetically if the directions given by the Union 
Executive are themselves obnoxious or viota e rule of law, is a 
State Government still bound to carry out the directions? Except 
at the time of war, at other times any direction issued should 
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satisfy the test of public interest and State Government cannot 
be compelled to carry out the directions given by the Union 
Executive which can even be "malafide" sometimes. This Article 
itself was incorporated eleven days before the Constitution was 
finally adopted by the Constituent Assembly. This is obviously 
an after thought. This article should be deleted. 
Finance 
The primary sources of public income are: (i) Taxes, 
(ii) Domestic Borrowings, (iii) Economic surpluses generated by 
Public Sector undertakings. Certain revenues are collected 
exclusively by the Union Government. These are transferred to, 
or shared with, the States. The Finance Commission set up under 
Article 280, advises the President in the matter in which these 
revenues should be shared. But however, a substantial part of the 
financing by the Government of India is done under the enabling 
provisions of Article 275. The Finance Commission has no say in 
this matter. 
During the last 30 years, more than 60 per cent of the 
budgetary funds from the Union to the States were in the form of 
Plan and discretionary assistance and only 40 per cent of funds 
were transferred in pursuance of the recommendations of the 
Finance Commissions appointed from time to time. These funds 
constituting 67 per cent of transfer were either directly or 
indirectly within the jurisdiction and purview of the Planning 
Commission. 
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The central taxes which the States are entitled to 
share together accounted for about 55 per cent of the taxes 
raised by the Union and out of this 55 per cent the State's share 
was about 45 per cent. The non-statutory grants (Plan and dis-
cretionary) were to be decided on an year-to-year basis when the 
annual plans were finalised. Thus it is the Planning Commission 
which has no statutory authority that decided the major share of 
the funds transferred to States and not the Finance Commission 
which is a statutory body. The Government of India can play havoc 
with the State Governments by utilising discretionary grants. This 
has political ovettones. Therefore the wational Development 
Council every year should formulate general principles for distri-
bution of grants-in-aid and the deficits in the State budgets must 
be made good by the Government of India, by distributing these 
grants in an appropriate manner. And such deficits that arise in 
the State budgets, as a result of developmental programmes which 
are part of the planning to generate productive wealth and 
approved by the National Development Council and Planning Commi-
ssion, should be treated as deficit in the central budget of the 
Government of India. Such developmental programmes should be 
given recognition in the Constitution, The Constitution should be 
suitably amended for this purpose. According to Professor vVheare, 
one of the essential requirements of federalism is that Union and 
State must each have, under its independent control, financial 
resources sufficient to perform its exclusive functions. The 
financial position must be adequate as well as elastic according 
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to the division of financial resources and the tax structure. The 
resources for raising funds available to the States are practi-
cally inelastic and comparatively very inadequate. In the context 
of developmental plans and efforts to reduce uneven development 
and disparities the States are in need of increasing resources. 
The Union Government, apart from the resources available as per 
provisions of the Constitution, has the facility of foreign aid 
and recourse to deficit financing. These two avenues are denied 
to the States. If the States have to depend totally on Union 
Government for financial resources, the federal stace would end 
up as a unitary state. This is the danger inherent in the situa-
tion. There should be a complete review of all matters relating 
to the fundamental issue, that is the division of national finan-
cial resources between the Union and the State in order to main-
tain and protect the federal nature of the Indian polity and the 
financial strength of States' finances. For example it may be 
mentioned that customs duties, export duties and corporation taxes 
should be included in the divisible pool. Regarding profits 
earned by Government of India on sale of commodities such as 
petroleum, coal, etc., relating to which the Government of India 
has exclusive trading rights and right to fix prices, what are 
called administered prices, the State should have a share and the 
Finance Commission can prescribe the principles of sharing. 
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Corporation Taxes 
Clause 6 of Article 366. Corporation Tax means any tax 
on income so far as tax is payable by companies. In pith and 
substance Corporation Tax is a tax on income but this is not 
included in the divisible pool. Thus Corporation Tax should also 
be treated on the same footing as income tax. Customs and export 
duties should also be compulsorily distributed between the Union 
and States. Tax on capital values of assets of individuals and 
companies should be within the divisiole pool. 
Article 272 should be amended to make the division 
compulsory. As the sharing of basic excise duties between the 
Union and the States as it stands today is discretionary and not 
mandatory. The additional duties and excise on goods of special 
importance (Act 1957) authorise the Parliament to impose certain 
duties and excise on specified goods namely sugar, tobacco, 
cotton fabrics, rayon, artificial and woollen fabrics produced or 
manufactured in India and these goods were declared to be of 
special importance in inter-State trade and commerce for the 
purpose of Central Sales Act 1956. While it is true that the 
Government of India has assigned these additional duties to the 
States the rider in the Act that the State would preclude from 
getting any part of the proceeds of the additional duties from the 
Government of India if any State imposes a tax on the sale of 
these goods. This rider prevents the States to impose sales tax 
on a number of commodities or they should lose the benefit of 
additional duties of excise. 
32 
Under statutory devolution of resources not less than 
50 per cent of tax revenues of the Central Government should be 
transferred to the State. In 1982-83 budget such statutory 
devolution is only 25 per cent. That is why to achieve this 
purpose the above changes are suggested. 
The surcharge on excise duties and income tax should 
also be shared. 
Grants 
There are two types of grants; (a) grant-in-aid which 
are statutory grants under Articles 273 and 275, and (b) non-
statutory or disbretionary grants. 
Article 282. This empowers the Union or State to make 
any grant for any purpose when it falls outside the area of legis-
lative authority. All grants for plan schemes to a considerable 
extent are discretionary under Article 282. These discretionary 
grants have overwhelmingly outstripped the statutory grants 
recommended by the Finance Commission and they have reduced the 
position of the States to that of supplicants for central assis-
tance. Discretionary grants will today range between 71.3 per 
cent to 88 per cent. These discretionary grants naturally 
fluctuate depending upon the Centre's financial position. There-
fore, the position of the State becomes nebulous and since depen-
dence on the Centre becomes more pronounced in a federal structure 
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while different parties may come to power in different States it 
would be better that ah independent body like the Finance Commi-
ssion lays down the principle even with regard to the discretio-
nary grants without allowing discretionary grants to be used for 
political manipulations. 
8. Redistribution of Entries in the different lists inclu-
ded in the Seventh Schedule: 
(i) Entry nos. 82 to 92 A of the Union List enumerates the 
taxes that can be levied by the Union Government. Some 
of these taxes should be justifiably within the Union 
List, For instance, taxes on income (excluding agricul-
tural income customs and export duties). Duties of 
excise on manufactured goods, corporation tax, taxes on 
transactions in stock exchanges and future markets, 
rates of stamp duty on various commercial transactions 
as enumerated in Entry 91. Such taxes when imposed 
affects the overall economy. Therefore, they are basic-
ally Union functions. 
(ii) There is, however, no justification for including the 
following taxes within the Union List. 
(a) Taxes on capital value of land and buildings in 
rural and urban areas (Entry No. 86). 
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(b) Estate duty in respect of land and buildings in 
rural and urban areas (Entry No. 87), 
(c) Duties in respect of succession to property (Entry 
No. 88). 
(d) Terminal taxes on goods and passengers carried by 
railways, sea, or air (Entry No. 89). 
(e) Taxes on the sale or purchase of newspapers and on 
advertisements, published therein (Entry No. 92). 
(f) Taxes on sales or purchase of goods other than 
newspapers (Entry No, 92 A). 
(iii) (a) Planning, development and administration in respect 
of urban and rural areas is a State function. Any 
duties or taxes in respect of land and buildings in 
the urban and rural areas should normally be levied 
and collected by the State. There is absolutely no 
rationale in including these items in the Union 
List, 
(b) Terminal taxes are imposed for the benefit of the 
local bodies. Every Metropolitan authority has to 
bear additional civic responsibilities whenever 
large number of people arrive or large quantities 
of goods are delivered within their jurisdiction. 
The strain on civic facilities on account of 
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continuous-flow of men and materials justify 
imposition of taxes which can compensate the local 
bodies for the extra effort they have to make on 
this account. While taxes on freights and passen-
gers can be levied by the Union Government terminal 
taxes should in all fairness be levied by the State 
Governments and should be collected by the Union 
Government. 
(c) It is not clear why sale or purchase of newspapers 
should be put in a special category and brought 
within the Union List. Tax on sales or purchase of 
any goods should be within the State List (Entry 
No. 92). 
(d) Entry No. 92(A) introduced under the Constitution 
(Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, was an ill-conceived 
measure. Through, a reference to "inter-State 
trade or commerce" an attempt was made to deprive 
the States of its rightful claims, 
9. Distribution of Revenue between the Union and the States: 
(i) There is no justification for levy of duties by the Union 
when the Duties are collected and appropriated by the 
States, Under Article 268, the States are discharging 
this function at present. The proceeds are very small. 
Further more, no State will impose duties which will be 
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a disincentive to location of industries in the State. 
Having regard to this, Entry No. 84 in the Union List 
and Article 268 should be amended so as to empower the 
States to levy duties enumerated in Article 268. 
(ii) Article 269 should be amended. Taxes and duties, as 
pointed out in para 8 (ii) above, because of their very 
nature, should rightly belong to the State List. This 
will call for modification of Entry Nos. 86, 87, 88, 89 
and 92 transfer of the items mentioned in para 8 (ii) to 
the State List. Entry No. 92 A should be deleted, 
(iii) Article 270 should be amended so that "taxes on income" 
include corporation tax. Substantial amounts are 
realised by way of Corporation Tax and this amount has 
been kept out of the divisible pool without any justi-
fication whatsoever. 
(iv) Parliament has been empowered under Article 271 to 
increase any of the duties or taxes referred to in 
Article 270 by a surcharge for purposes of the Union, 
A surcharge is normally imposed to meet a special situ-
ation. Normally occasion for such an imposition should 
not arise. Since imposition of such a surcharge may 
affect the financial interests of the States, approval 
of the Inter-State Council should be necessary in such 
cases. This will call for amendment of Article 270. 
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(v) The States' share of Union Duties of Excise should not 
be less than 50 per cent of the proceeds. Article 272 
should be appropriately amended. 
(vi) Article 274 provides for prior recommendation of the 
President in respect of bills affecting taxation in 
which States are interested. Since the President gives 
recommendations only on the advice of the Union Council 
of Ministers, he has no special role to play in this 
regard. This Article therefore requires amendment. The 
recommendation referred to in Article 274 should hence 
foiAward be obtained from the Inter-State Council. The 
money bills which propose to vary any tax or duties in 
which the States are interested should require concurr-
ence of the Inter-State Council. Article 274 and 109 
should be appropriately amended. 
(vii) The ceiling provided in Article 276(2) should be deleted. 
Central Sales Tax 
There are many defects in Central Sales Tax Act 1956, 
preventing State legislatures from imposing sales tax on commodi-
ties which are declared by th? central law as commodities of 
special importance for inter-State trade and commerce. 
(viii) Sales tax should be exclusively a State subject. This 
is the only elastic source of revenue for th? States and 
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curtailment of this power by earlier amendments to the 
Constitution deprived the States of substantial revenues. 
Article 286 should be amended. The restrictions on the 
States' jurisdiction through Constitution (Sixth Amend-
ment) Act, 1956 should be done away with. Articles 286 
(2) and 286 (3) should be deleted. In case of any Inter-
State dispute in this respect the Inter-Sta^e Council 
should discuss the matter and settle the issue. The 
States can also enter into either bilateral or multi-
lateral agreement with each other to sort out adminis-
trative problems arising out of this matter, 
(ix) Article 287 should be suitably amended. It is not clear 
why Railways which consume substantial quantity of 
electricity should be exempted from payment of taxes on 
electricity. While Government of India offices may be 
exempted from payment of such taxes, but there is hardly 
any justification to exempt commercial operation of the 
Union Government from payment of electricity duty. This 
is another instance where the bias against the States 
are so obvious. While the Union enjoys all the exemp-
tions as enumerated in Chapter I of Part XII of the 
Constitution the privilege extended to the States under 
Article 289 (l) is withdrawn in the next clause namely 
Article 289 (2). 
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(x) For calculation of net proceeds of taxes in the divisi-
ble pool, cost of collection should be determined and 
certified by Comptroller Auditor General, subject how-
ever to a ceiling to be determined annually by the Union 
Government in consultation with the States. This is 
essential to prevent, wastage of resources through massive 
expenditure on administration. 
(xi) In an emergency the State Governments should have the 
authority to obtain ways and means advance from the 
R.B.I, subject to future adjustments. "Emergency" will 
mean natural calamities and internal disorders. 
(xii) Borrowing by States requires approval of the Union 
Government. The principles and quantum of such borrow-
ing including the share of the States should be decided 
by the Union Government in consultation with the State 
Governments. The policy of the Union Government in this 
regard should be placed before the Inter-State Council 
every year. Final decision should be taken by the Union 
Government having due regard to the views of the State 
Governments as expressed in the Inter-State Council. 
Inter-State Trade and Intra-State Trade 
Article 302 empowers the Parliament to impose restric-
tions on trade and commerce not only relating to inter-State trade 
but also intra-State trade in public interest. There is no point 
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in the empowering Parliament to impose restrictions on intra-State 
trade. It is an exclusive sphere of the State. Trade and commerce 
are in Entry No. 26 of the State List but it is subject to Entry 
No, 33 of the Concurrent List, Entry No. 33 of the Concurrent List 
is as follows: 
Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and 
distribution of: 
(a) the products in any industry where the control of such 
industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law 
to be expedient in the public interest, and imported 
goods of the same kind as such products; 
(b) Foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils; 
(c) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concentrates; 
(d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and cotton seed; 
and 
(e) raw jute. 
While there may be force in the contention that produc-
tion, supply and distribution of certain products of an industry 
which may be of vital interest connnected with defence or integra-
ted planning may be under the jurisdiction of the centre it is not 
necessary to subject the power of the State legislature to that of 
Parliament relating to trade and commerce in general. Therefore 
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Entry No. 33 of the Concurrent List will have to be suitably 
modified. 
Clause B of Article 304 used the expression "reasonable" 
restrictions relating to the power of the Legislature of a State 
whereas Article 302 uses only the expression 'restriction' without 
being qualified by the word "reasonable". In article 302 restric-
tion must be qualified by the word "reasonable". 
Under Article 304 no bill or amendment for the purpose 
of imposing reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade and 
commerce by the legislature can be introduced without the previous 
sanction of the President. Such previous sanction may be necessary 
in relation to inter-state trade but it would be necessary when the 
State legislature has to deal with intra-state trade. If the 
restrictions imposed by the State Legislature are not necessary and 
not in public interest the High Courtor the Supreme Court are 
empowered to strike down the law. The previous sanction of the 
President cannot render in valid and valid. Hence the proviso to 
Article 304 should be ommitted. 
Article 307 contemplates the appointment of an authority 
for carrying out the purpose of Article 301, 302, 303 and 304. It 
is similar to inter-state Commission in the USA. It would be 
desirable to appoint such a commission to deal with such cases in 
the course of inter-state commerce rather than leaving it to the 
political executive of the Union, 
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Public Financial Institutions 
Public financial institutions such IDBI, IFCI, U.T.I., 
L.I.C. and the banks have played a vital role in the economic 
development of India's growth of concentration of economic power, 
growth of monopoly—private sector itself. The financial founda-
tions of private sector within the framework of mixed economy are 
based on the financial institutions over which only Union Govern-
ment has a control and the State Government have no say at all. 
To take only the case of IDBI as on 30th June 1981 outstandings 
with IDBI's borrowings from the national industrial credit (long-
term operations fund) were of the order of Rs,1333 crores. The 
cumulative amount of assistance sanctioned and disbursed since the 
inception of IDBI stood at Rs.7088 crores and Rs. 4730 crores respec-
tively as at the end of 1980-81. The amount outstanding as at the 
end of June 1981 was Rs»3214 crores. Having regard to the enormity 
of the role of these financial institutions they must be brought 
under the control of National Development Council and the invest-
ment pattern has to be decided by the National Development Council 
from time consistent with the objective laid down in the Preamble 
of the Constitution. Any project set up (after necessary approval) 
in the public sector either by the Central Government of the State 
Government should not suffer for want of finance and the public 
finance institutions' primary investment must be in the public 
sector and not in the private sector. State Development corpora-
tions should not be forced or abetted to act as agencies to private 
sector. 
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Article 263: Inter-State Council 
Under Article 263 the President can establish an inter-
S,tate Council for the purpose of coordination between the States. 
So far the President has not established such a Council. No doubt 
the five Zonal Council came into existence as the result of States 
Reorganisation Act. But they have become practically non-functio-
nal. It is high time, for the purpose of coordination between the 
States, an inter-State Council, under Article 263 should be imme-
diately established. Apparently Article 263 as it is worded does 
not contemplate the disputes between the Union and the States to 
be brought before the Council. Inter-State Council should have 
the power to discuss if the disputes arise between the Union and 
the States. Article 263 should be suitably amended. 
While redistribution of powers to raise resources with 
a view to enable the States to meet their obligations is essential, 
regular dialogue between the Union and the States, on a plance of 
equality, is no less important. Coordination between the States 
was conceived in the Constitution. Article 263 provided an 
appropriate machinery. But in exercise of the powers under Article 
263 the President has already constituted the Central Council of 
Health the Central Council of Local Self Government and the Central 
Council of Indian Medicine. Number of other advisory bodies have 
also been set up. Dr. D.D. Basu in his introduction to the Consti-
tution of India pointed out that. 
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in fact, the primary object of an Inter-State Council 
being coordination and federal cohesion, this object has 
been lost sight of, while creating fragmentary bodies to 
deal with specified matters relying on the statutory 
interpretation that the singular 'a' before the word 
'council' includes a plural. 
A number of Councils designed on the present pattern can hardly 
serve any purpose. Before Council meetings are held voluminous 
t papers explaining the Union Government's policies are furnished 
o the State Governments. There is no scope for any genuine parti-
cipation by the States in such meetings. The States accept what-
ever they are told. In any case, any dissent by any State does 
not affect the decision of the Government of India in any way. 
Under a reorganised system, discussion on most of these 
routine matters can be held at the official level. Only important 
policy matters of national importance having direct bearing on 
financial and administrative coordination should be discussed in 
the -Inter-State Council. And there should be only one Council 
presided over by the Prime Minister with all the State Chief 
Ministers as Members. It would be necessary to amend Article 263 
to give the Inter-State Council the powers to ensure coordination 
between the States as well as between the Union and the States. A 
Council consisting of all the Chief Ministers and presided over by 
the Prime Minister will be an effective body capable of dealing 
with all intricate issues in the field of coordination. Such 
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decisions cannot be left to either the nominees of the Chief 
Minister or the nominees of the Prime Minister. If in any reason, 
whatsoever, the Prime Minister is unable to preside over the 
meeting of the Inter-State Council the senior-most Chief Minister 
should preside over the meeting. The question of either the Union 
Home Minister or the Union Finance Minister presiding over such 
meetings in the absence of the Prime Minister should not arise. 
Union Ministers and Ministers of State Governments, may as and 
when necessary, attend the meeting of the Inter-Stace Council to 
assist the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers. In such meet-
ings as far as possible decisions should be taken by consensus. 
However, in case of any difference of opinion, recommendation of 
the Inter-State Council, when adopted by a majority or two-thirds 
of the members present and voting, should be acceptable to both 
Union and the States. 
Another important aspect is the selection of the Secre-
tary-General of the Council and other supporting officials. The 
post of Secretary-General should be held by a person nominated by 
turn by the States. Other officials should be nominated according 
to an agreed formula, by the State Government and the Union Govern-
ment. This arrangement will ensure independent functioning of the 
Secretarial which is absolutely essential. 
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Recommendations of Shri Rajamannar's Committee 
1. Every Bill of national importance or which is likely to affect 
the interests of one or more States should before its introduction 
in Parliament, be placed before the Council, and its comments and 
recommendations thereon should be placed before Parliament at the 
time of introduction of the Bill, 
2, It should be definitely provided that before the 
Union Government takes any decision of national importance or any 
decision which would affect one or more States, the Inter-State 
Council should be consulted. 
Exceptions may be made probably in regard to subjects 
like defence and foreign relations. But even in such matters the 
decision of the Central Government should be placed before the 
Inter-State Council subsequently without any avoidable delay, 
3, If the Inter-State Council is to be really effec-
tive, its recommendations should be made ordinarily binding on 
both the Centres and the States, 
If for any reason, any recommendation of the Inter-State 
Council is rejected by the Central Government such recommendation 
together with reasons for its rejection should be laid before 
Parliament and the State Legislatures. 
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National Development Council 
The National Development Council should be given Consti-
tutional status entrusted with broad functions in relation to 
planning and development, economic coordination to achieve the 
objectives mentioned in the Preamble to the Constitution and 
Principles stated in the Directive Principles of the Constitution, 
Planning Commission 
The Planning Commission has been created by an executive 
order and is being currently used more as a political instrument 
of the Government than as an expert body charged with the responsi-
bilities of planning, economic development and socio-economic 
changes in the broad framework of objectives laid down by the 
Preamble to the Constitution. Hence the Planning Commission should 
become a statutory body created by the Parliament. It should 
consist of experts and act as an advisory body to National Develop-
ment Council. It should have the freedom to plan, to supervise 
implementation of plans, to advise as well as to criticise without 
any inhibition. So far the plan development has resulted in 
economic growth in certain directions. It has taken the path of 
capitalist development and not social planning partaking the 
character of socialist planning. 
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Associate State Planning Bodies 
The law should provide for creation of Associate State 
Planning Bodies for formulating and implementing in a purposeful 
manner State Plans and development projects. There should be 
purposeful coordination between Central Planning Commission and 
Associate State Planning Bodies. The Associate State Planning 
Bodies must function as Planning Commissions within the sphere of 
the State, 
Full Statehood for Delhi, Pondicherry and Goa 
It is time that full Statehood is conferred on Delhi, 
Pondicherry and Goa. 
The Nominated Members to Rajya Sabha 
Though the constitution makers had laudable objectives 
in providing for nomination to Rajya Sabha of certain categories 
of persons, the provision of the Constitution had been abused and 
misused quite often. The principle of nomination should be given 
up and there should be no nominated members. 
Devolution of Power within a State 
While the demand that the power from the Centre should 
be devolved further to the States, the power should not get concen-
trated at the level of States. Within a State, there should be a 
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devolution of power to various Jaodies like Z.P., Panchayat Sami-
thies and Article 40 of the Directive Principles of State policy 
which enjoys a duty on the State to organise village Panchayats 
and endow them with such power and authority as would be necessary 
to enable them to function as units of Self-Government should be-
come a reality. 
Under Article 244-A the Parliament can form an Autono-
mous State within the State of Assam, 
This Article should be suitably amended for enabling 
the creation of autonomous regions within the given State provid-
ing democratic institutions consistent with the character and 
composition of that particular State. 
Entry No. 31 of the Union List 
A.I.R. and T.V. are slowly ceasing to be National Insti-
tutions and are being transformed into political instruments of 
ruling parties. They should be converted into autonomous Corpora-
tions directly responsible to inter-State Council, 
Entry No, 7 and Entry No, 52 of the Union List 
Entry No, 7 must be restricted to cover such industries 
and industrial production that are directly related to defence or 
prosecution of war. 
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Taking advantage of Entry No. 52 which reads: "Industries 
the control of which by the Union is declared by parliament to be 
Law to be expedient in the public interest", the Centre is trying 
to control all kinds of industries including small-scale industries. 
Hence industries development regulations and policy must be reviewec 
from time to time by the National Development Council and the Law 
should be accordingly ^ mended and the same principle must be made 
applicable to the regulation of mines and minerals development unde] 
Entry No. 54. 
Economic planning and economic coordination and the core 
sector of industry should remain the responsibility of the Union. 
The planning Commission with respect to medium and small scale 
industries which do not need foreign aid or foreign collaboration 
and are totally based on indigenous technology, allocate capacities 
to each State. Within the limits of allocation of capcities, the 
States should have the power to issue letters of intent and licencei 
in conformity with national/industrial policy and Directive Princi-
ples of the Constitution. 
Acquisition and Requisition of Property 
Entry No. 42 of the Concurrent List. This deals with 
acquisition and requisition of property for the purpose of the 
State. The power of the State to acquire or requisition property 
must be unambiguous. Therefore, the power to acquire property for 
the purpose of the State should be in the State List. This assumes 
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importance in the context of the take-over of sick industries 
apart from other properties by the States. Now the sick industry 
has become a happy hunting ground to derive benefits of merger 
and deductions in Income-Tax. At present, even if the State 
Government wants to take over, it has to face enormous difficul-
ties. Hence amendment of Article 31 (c) also is called for: 
IAS and IPS. Those in the All India Services like IAS 
and IPS are posted in the States but they remain under the super-
vision and disciplinary control of the Union Government, It is 
forcibly contended that when different political parties come to 
power in the States and the Centre, the Central Government attempts 
to use the IAS and IPS officers and advise them to non-cooperate 
and some time to subvert State Governments and bring these Govern-
ments to disrepute. While there is considerable truth regarding 
the attempts made by the ruling party at the Centre to use these 
officers and also that some of them succumb to the pressures and 
temptations, all officers cannot be treated to belong to the same 
category. Some of them are persons of conviction, high integrity 
and character. But for some such officers belonging to IAS and IPS 
there would not have been even a semblace of administration in 
States like Bihar, Hence a balance must be struck regarding their 
position in State administration. It is undoubtedly true they must 
remain under the supervision and disciplinary control of the State 
Government primarily but they must have reasonable protection from 
harassment and insecurity from some unscrupulous political heads of 
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the Government and various ministries. There are good governments 
and there are not a few bad governments too. Hence while these 
officers must be primarily under the control of the State Govern-
ment, there must be administrative tribunals to deal with discip-
linary matters and security of service. The Tribunals should also 
have power to suo moto enquire into misconduct of officers. 
The Administrative Tribunals must be constituted with 
the judges of high courts and they should be nominated by a judi-
cial committee consisting of the Chief Justice of India and two 
senior judges of the Supreme Court. These Tribunals can have 
their benches in some important places in India. The officers 
must have a right to appeal to the Supreme Court against the order 
of the Tribunal. The same procedures and principles should be made 
applicable to the officers and employees appointed by the State 
Governments. 
Judiciary 
The common man in India has faith in the judiciary still, in spite 
of the gradual clogging of the system. The courts on their part 
are trying to inspire confidence in the people by exploring new 
vistas of sociological jurisprudence like public interest causes. 
Unstinted faith in and abiding commitment to the objectives stated 
in the Preamble of the Constitution should become the ethos of 
judicial conscience. 
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Without an independent judiciary and the faith of people 
in judicial institutions, the very democratic structure and federa-
lism cannot survive. 
In a federal structure created by the Constitution pro-
viding for distribution of powers between the Union Executive and 
the Parliament on one hand and State Legislatures and State 
Executives on the other the Supreme Court has to act not merely as 
the interpreter and the guardian of the Constitution but also as a 
tribunal for the determination of disputes between the States and 
the Union and among the States. Under the Constitution Supreme 
Court is vested with jurisdiction to deal with these matters under 
Article 131. With the multiplicity of political parties coming 
into power, the judiciary has a vital role in maintaining the 
stability of the federal structure. Hence no political party 
should be allowed to have an opportunity to subvert judicial insti-
tutions. 
Ml 
Under Article 124 every judge of the Supreme Court is 
appointed by the President after consultations with such judges of 
the Supreme Court and High Court in the States as the President may 
deem necessary and in the case of the appointment of judges other 
than the Chief Justice the President is bound to consult the Chief 
Justice of India. The President under Article 74 is bound to act 
on the advice of the Council of Ministers, He has no discretion in 
the matter. Hence the Law Ministry, the Home Ministry and the Prime 
Minister are generally concerned in the appointment of judges and 
54 
ultimately it is the Prime Minister who decides. Thus the judges' 
appointments are made by the Executive. With the multiplicity of 
different political parties coming into power in the State and the 
Centre, the appointment of judges must be above controversy. There-
fore, it is suggested that Article 74 should be amended suitably 
that the Council of Ministers will not be concerned with the 
appointment of judges and they cannot render any advice under 
Article 74 and the President need not act on their advice. 
With regard to the appointment of judges of the Supreme 
Court since already the Supreme Court is in existence and is func-
tioning there should be a judicial committee consisting the Chief 
Justice and all the other judges. There should also be a Judicial 
Council of the Council of states. This judicial committee should 
make recommendations in consultation with this Judicial Council 
regarding the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court to the 
President. If they desire they may have the benefit of consulta-
tions with Chief Justice of High Courts. In case of appointment 
of the Chief Justice the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court, 
unless he is medically disqualified, must be appointed. In all 
matters the advice given by the judicial committee to the President 
must be binding on the President; the President shall act on their 
advice as he does new under Article 74. If the President chooses 
he may also consult the Government. In case of appointment of High 
Court judges the Judicial Committee of the Supreme Court shall 
consult the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned or any other 
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Chief Justice or judges as they may deem necessary. The President 
may consult the State Government but he shall act on the advice of 
the Judicial Committee of the Supreme Court, 
Regarding the transfer of judges, the Judicial Committee 
of the Supreme Court should be the final authority. While transfer 
in certain cases cannot be disputed, that matter has to be left to 
the Judicial Cormnittee of the Supreme Court. This appears to be 
the only way how the judiciary can be made totally independent of 
the political executive and how different political parties with 
their socio-economic philosophy coming into power in the States and 
the plitical party ruling at the Centre treating some of the State 
Governments with utter hostility can have confidence in the federal 
system thus strengthening the forces of national unity and national 
integration. There are attempts now to denigrate and to destroy 
the sacred institutions created by the Constitution. It is ulti-
mately the quality, integrity and the stature of men who fill these 
posts that matters. Their appointment should not give scope for 
suspicion or controversy. 
Under Article 143 (l), the President can refer certain 
matters to the Supreme Court for their opinion. It has been 
recommended by Shri Rajamannar's Committee that a provision on the 
lines of Article 143 (l) may be made empowering the Governor to 
refer the question of law or of public importance to the High Court. 
In a number of States in the American Union, it is constitutionally 
provided for this purpose. A provision may be made for such 
reference to the High Court by the State Government. 
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Election Commission 
Under Article 324 (2) the President appoints the Chief Election 
Commissioner and other Election Commissioners. V^ hen any other 
Election Commissioner is appointed, Chief Election Commissioner 
acts as the Chairman of the Election Commission, As the President 
is to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 
74, in practice for all purposes it is the political executive 
that appoints the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election 
Commissioners if any. 
Sanctity of democratic processes and confidence in 
democratic institutions depend to a large extent on the indepen-
dence and supremacy, strength of character and democratic 
conscience of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election 
Commissioners if any. If they act as agents of the political 
executive of the ruling party at the Centre democratic processes 
would be subverted and democratic institutions would be destroyed. 
In the context of political pluralism if there should be 
harmony between the Centre and States with different political 
parties in power, the Election Commission should not only be 
independent but also its conduct should be beyond suspicion. For 
achieving this purpose, the Chief Election Commissioner should not 
be appointed by the political executive. 
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The Supreme Court should select a person who is quali-
fied to be appointed as a judge of -the Supreme Court, for the post 
of Chief Election Commissioner and either judges of High Court or 
persons qualified to be appointed as the judges of High Courts for 
the posts of Election Commissioners. The President should act on 
the advice of the Supreme Court as he does under Article 74 under 
the advice of the Council of Ministers. 
The Election Commission should consist of at least three 
Commissioners, i.e.. Chief Election Commissioner and two Election 
Commissioners. The Election Commission in consultation with the 
Chief Justice of the respective State High Court should appoint 
the Regional Election Commissioners for every State. 
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AIM, SCOPE AMD METHODOLOGY 
AIM AMD SCOPE 
The present study displays la the foimi of aunotatlons 
that Is available in the field of Centre-State relations 
1B India since Independence* The blblography Is exhaatlce 
In nature and attempt has been made to cover all aspects of 
Centre-StatA relations. 
I am confident that this bibliography will be useful 
to all those who have some Interest In the field of Centre-
State relations Research Scholars In the field of Centre-
State relations will find It helpful* 
The part one deals with the descriptive part. 
The part two which Is the main part of the present 
study consists of an annotated list of 255 documents. 
METHODOLOGfY 
While starting with this task or general survey of 
literature on Centre-State relations In Maulana Aaad 
Library, Allgarh Muslim University, Allgarh, Sapru House 
Library, New Delhi has been made. 
STANDARD FOLLOWED 
As far as possible the Indian standards recoimnended 
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for Bibliographic reference (9s 2381 - 1963 ) has 
beea followed. 
After searching the literature entries were 
recorded on 7X5"cards: The entries in the bibliog^ 
raphy contains abstracts giving essential information 
about the article documented, 
ARRAWGEMEWr 
Efforts have been made to arrange the entries 
under co-extesslve subject headings. For this pxirpose 
a comprehensive list of subject readings was con^iled. 
The entries are serially numbered* 
INDEX 
The part thfae of Bibliography contains Author 
and Title index in alphabetical sequence, ^ach index 
guides to the specific entry or entries in the biblio-
graphy. The subject inddx has not been prepared for 
the reason that the bibliography itself has been 
arranged alphabetically by subject readings & sxibject 
index would have been a diplication of the same 
sequence* 
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CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORiVlS CO/^ISSION, REPORT 
1. A.R.C. CENTRE-state relations. Capital, 163, 4070, 1969, 
July 10, 49. 
Describes that the Administrative Reforms Commission's report on 
Centre-state relations may be welcomed by the prolagonis-u of a 
strong Centre, but its recommendations are hardly going to solve 
the ticklish Centre-state relations. Under the constitution, an 
Assembly is summoned on the advice of the Chief Minister. Consti-
tution also stipalates that the intervening period between two 
Assembly sessions should not be more than six months. From this, 
it is obvious that even if a Ministry locas its majority after an 
Assembly session, it can remain in office only for a maximum 
period of six months. It may be argued that a Government which 
has lost its majority should not remain in office for a single 
day. 
2. NO ROVING inquiry. Statesman(Delhi). 1984, February 14. 
Describes that the Administrative Reforms Commission took an 
eminently practical view by stating that the constitution "was 
neither purely unitary nor purely federal" and that the need to 
sustain and strengthen the unity of India did not justify concent-
ration of administrative powers in a distant Centre which not only 
breads inefficiency but creats resentment hostility towards the 
62 
Centre, This is exactly what has hapened since its report in 
1969, and created the circumstances in which the Sarkaria Commi-
ssion was set up. When the centre and the states are in the 
control of different political parties, some conflicts arise and 
sound principles and guidelines are needed for their settlement. 
Centres superior powers or its political influence can not be the 
ambiter in such situations an inter-state Council has not been 
set up as provided in the constitution. 
and DECENTRALISATION 
3. BIDDING GOODBYE to autonomy. Thought, 24; 20, 1972; May 13, 5. 
Describes that those who work for ad-hoc overseeing or "super-
cabinet" role for these committees, can not possibly claim to work 
for decentralization of power, the bedrock of functionary demo-
cracy. It is a most point whether in a country like India power 
should flow from the Centre or grow up to the Centre on the basis 
of regional or even parochial considerations. This may sound to 
be too academic an issue to be of practical relevance. But the 
crucial point is whether it is the local realities or the whims 
of the Centre that should decide what is good for this or that 
State. Whether this would also be the choice of those who made 
themselves hoars in admiration for her is what one may have to 
find out it the bid for bidding adien to regional autonomy is at 
all to be a subject of discussion in India. 
B3 
4, BOSE (Sauat), Working class and decentralisation of power. 
Mainstream, 16; 24, 1978; February 11, 31-32. 
Describes that the structure of the Indian polity has an in-built 
dichotomy: its form is federal but the content is unitary. Social, 
economic and political implications of this dictomy have changed 
over the years since the adoption of our constitution. In a 
dynamic situation, it would be naive and foolish to hold on 
rigorously to one set of 'belief only, however sacrosanct that 
belief might have been in the initial years of freedom. Centre-
state relations must give way to greater decentralisation of power 
so that more progressive policies may be followed by the state in 
matters affecting the fate of the common working people of the 
state. 
5. DECENTRALISING INDIA. Indian Express (Delhi), 1984; January 13. 
Describes that a more fundamental reform of both political and 
economic administration would be to reorganise the country in 
smaller states, smaller districts and basic development units 
smaller than the block. While the idea is certainly commendable, 
it is not certain how receptive the states might be. While they 
have been activ'e in trying to wrest greater powers from the Centre, 
they have in turn been loath to devohemore powers on the districts 
and blocks. Invitation further to share economic power and finan-
cial resources at the divisional level may not be easily accepted 
by some. Yet Mrs Gandhi should not be faulted for this because 
genuine devolution and reorganisation of the units of political 
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and economic management and administration are among the important 
structural changes that India west accomplish of it is to become a 
more accommodative and purposeful society. 
6. JAMBUNATHAN(S), Note on decentralisation in administration, 
Indian Journal of Public administration, 24; 3, 1978; July-
September 775-778. 
Describes that inspite of the best efforts of the administration, 
there is failure in achieving the object was because of environ-
mental and external constraints and happenings which could not be 
foreseen or prevented. Decentralisation is not an end by itself. 
It is only a technique. It success depends on careful planning of 
details at higher levels and a conscious commitment to delegate 
and not to interfere thereafter, adequate transfer of staff 
resources, and a constant dialogue within the organisationand care-
ful monitoring. Whole idea is that it is not arigid formula but a 
continuous process of give and take, of finding out the shortfalls 
and loopholes, plugging them effectively, using the most important 
resource, viz, the man in the organisation whose decisions-making 
skill has to be prefected to show results. 
7. RAO (V Vamkata) and HAZARIKA (Niru). Democratic decentralisa-
tion. Theory and Practice. Indian Journal of Public adminis-
tration. 24; 3, 1978; July-September, 640-651. 
Describes that it is anti-democratic to include officers of the 
State Government as members of local bodies. There is no identity 
of interest between the officials and non-officials. Both performs 
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distinct functions in democratic bodies and the distinction must 
be maintained. Grant-in-aid is the most effective instrument by 
which the local authorities are controlled by the State Government 
Grant-in-aid rules curtail the autonomy of the local bodies. In 
regard to personal administrationt the local boards are not 
completely free. Mode of recruitment, the emolument of certain 
officers and their conditions of service, retirement benefits, 
etc., are determined by the State Government. Local bodies are not 
entirely democratic; there is no genuine decentralisation of powers 
and functions to them. 
8. SUBRAMANIAM (V), Rhetory of decentralisation and the reality 
of centralisation. Indian Journal of Public administration, 
24; 3, 1978; July-September, 763-769. 
Describes that the rhetorical attachment to decentralisation in 
India flows mainly from three factors, namely, the heritage of 
British ideas about democracy, Gandnian ideas of the distribution 
of power and control, and thirdly ideas generated in connection 
with the establishment of Panchayati Raj and the efficient execu-
tion of economic plans at the village, district or regional level. 
Contributions of technology towards centralisacxon vary in impor-
tance from one country to another and from one type of business to 
another. But there is also a universal effect in that once a 
possibility is realised in one country the possibility is consi-
dered in every other country and increase the tendency towards 
centralisation. Other universal factor of centralisation is the 
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attempt to promote economic development through centralised 
economic planning. 
9. THAPER (Romesh). Centralisation lies in ruins. Times of India 
(Delhi), 1983; January 23. 
Describes that we have lived so long within the frame-work of a 
largely centralised federal system that anything which appears to 
crack the frame is seen as the beginning of the end. Breakdown 
of governance in so many spheres, and the confusion among all our 
parties on the real content of development particularly in the 
rural areas of our vast and complex, sub-continent have created a 
mood of profound demoralisation. Only a responsive, decentralised 
system, with adequate structures for problem-solving co-ordina-
tion, can ensure social justice and will have to replace the 
arrogant asertion of power from New Delhi, I say this because 
the central task before us during the coming decade is to design 
a package of policies which will lift the lost and dammed of our 
society to a productive and human existence-300 millions at this 
moment, and threatening to become 500 millions at the turn of the 
century. 
10. IHAPER (Romesh). This Autonomy Business. Economic & Political 
weekly, 13; 6-7, 1978; February annual, 179-81. 
Describes that the Janata party, inheriting the counter-compul-
sions born during the autocratic rule of Indira Gandhi, would 
stress the urgency of decentralisation and the devolution of powers 
quietly absorbed by the centre over a period thirty years. Engage-
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ment between the centre and the states will become sharper once 
the elections in the east and the South are over. Trouble is that 
there are too many oldman with burning ambitions, and rigid ideas, 
matched against equally wooden ideo-logues talking parochialism, 
class war and nationalism in all manner of supposedly progressive 
garb. Hence the endless talk and the tantrums. We should be 
looking for some one or something to bring us down to earth. 
DESTABILISATION, STATES. 
11. DESTABILISING STATES. Patriot, 1983; August 5. 
Describes that a change in the leadership of Bihar Congress-I 
party is imminent since the legislature party or performance on 
the economic or political fronts do not seem to matter one must 
look to Delhi for the explanations of the palace revolutions 
which are engineered in the Congress-I ruled states from time to 
time. Dissidence in the states waxes and wanas or cue from Delhi. 
If they look around they may trace the source of dissidence to one 
or other of the unelected aides who crowed the corridors of power 
in Delhi, Deoctions which do not have to be justified in public 
organisational bodies or even to the elected legislature parties 
are apt to be open to abuse. Instability in the states is not a 
party matter; it concerns millions whose lives are affected by 
unstable conditions. This is the point at which even party people 
have the right to devoid to know why the states have to be 
destabilised so-that tweedledums can supplant tweedledees. 
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DISSOLUTION OF ASSEMBLIES. 
12. DISSOLUTION. Hindustan Times, 1980; February 19. 
Describes that the dissolution of the Assemblies in nine States 
under non Congress-I Governments does not come as a surprise; 
pressure was inexorably building up in the Congress-I for such a 
step. Dissolution of the Assemblies has not been accompanied by 
any curtailment of the civil liberties or the right of free speech 
or assembly. There can no doubt be delays in enacting measures; 
also some of these may not even get through. But such difficulties 
can always be resolved through dialogue and persuasion, methods 
crucial to the democratic process. What is needed is a climate 
of understanding between the ruling and opposition parties a 
broad consensus on ends and means based on a shared concern for 
the national interest. This is precisely what has been missing 
for the last five years or so. 
FEDERAL STRUCTURE. 
13. ABDULLAH (Farooq). Review Centre-State relations, Indian 
Express (Delhi), 1983; July 9. 
Describes that Centre-State relations today are in a flux. 
Centralisation of administration and legislation in certain areas 
along with decentralisation in other areas is federalism. 
Federalism also means power concentrated in some areas. Totality 
of governmental power and functions are divided between the Centre 
and the States. By the nature of things this relationship cannot 
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be static; perforce it has to be dynamic and undergo change, 
constently finding new balance after responding to various forces 
and to developing situations. This has to be so because new 
problems, new demands and new requirements came up from time to 
time. In the light of the expereince we have gained in this 35 
years since independence this relationship needs to be reviewed 
and recast. 
14. BAG (Dulal Chander). Restructuring federal polity in India. 
Secular Democracy. 11; 15, 1978; August 1, 47-53. 
Describes that federalism is today for away from feodus, the 
Latin source of the term. It is now very much related to freedom 
and democracy of the universal human posture. Installation of 
democratic system of government and the success of bourgeois or 
quasi-bourgeios revolution against the imperial auto cracy are the 
twins of the material condition of the capitalist history of our 
time. Authors of memorandum appear to have drafted the suggestion 
with a view to avoiding the situations like the one that occured 
under the regime of Indira Gandhi. Equality of the constituent 
states is established the other handles of the union domination 
are cut to their size. This is too of timistic a view to conform 
to the realities of the time. There is no possibility of the 
Government at the Centre taking up the cause and initiating an 
Awardment. 
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15. BEHL (RK). Genesis of tension in Centre-State ties. 
Tribune (Chandigarh), 1984; March 31. 
Describes that there are divergent views on how the Centre treats 
the States. Can be represents the combined strength of all 
states in the federal garb since Parliament and the set up at the 
Centre consist of the elected representatives of the States. 
Cooperative federalism is basically a federalism of functions 
rather than of powers. Basic difference between classic federa-
lism and cooperative federalism is mainly one of emphasis; while 
the former views the two level governments as equal rivals the 
later views them as equal partners. Centre and the States co-
operate in the field of concurrent legislative powers. When 
Parliament enacts a law on a concurrent subject the States are 
generally kept informed similar process is set in motion when a 
state legislates in the same sphere. 
16. CHAKRABORTY (Satyajit). Problems and prospects of federalism. 
Secular Democracy. 11; 13, 1978; July 1, 15-17. 
Describes that despite the long distances and the differences in 
climate and physical features involved in an area of the magnitude 
as in India, nature does not compartmentalise the country into 
discrete units. States in India are not independent economic 
organisations and industrial development took place and still 
takes place at the most conveniently located centres disregarding 
political boundaries. Federation of India is not an artificial 
creation but the genaine emergence of a single nation welded 
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together by social, economic and political forces. So far as 
parties are concerned it may be said with a note of contain 
that no party in power at the Centre will let loose the authority 
of the Centre and give away the States. He brings out the unique-
ness of Indian federalism and makes a plea for a practical, non 
partisan approach to the ticklish problem of Centre-State 
relations, 
17. CHITTARANJAN (CN). Test for federal bonafides. Mainstream. 
11; 12, 1980; March 29, 3. 
Describes that Kerala is not the only State to have sought to 
invoke the provision in the constitution for smooth resolution 
of disputes involving "Some or all of the States, or the Union 
and one or more of the States" through the instrumentality of an 
Inter-State Council. Those who have been seeking greater powers 
for the States-a plea often heard even when the same party is in 
power at the Centre and in some of the States concerned-have not 
been working towards any weakening of the Centre. Everyone knows 
that a Centre reduced in importance in areas of vital concern like 
Defence and External Affairs, for example, can mean a grave threat 
to national integrity, sovereignty and independence. No responsi-
ble party in or out of power would dream of permitting such an 
eventuality. 
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18. DIVATIA (Kumud)# Academic view of federalism. Economic and 
Political Weekly. 9; 50, 1974; December 14, 2059. 
Describes that the political, administrative, economic and 
financial aspects of the Centre-State relations have been ably 
dealt with, and alternatives to reduce the area of conflict 
between the centre and states have been put forward. After all, 
the relationship between the Centre and the States is a mean to 
acheive an end. If* there is agreement on the fundamental objec-
tive of the political system, and if we are honest about working 
to achieve this objective, problems of Centre-State relations 
will pale into insignificance. Present State of affairs in 
regard to Centre-State relations is due to the fact that political 
parties are exploiting the issue for acquisition of power. It has 
become a power in the game of political bargaining. 
19. FEDERAL POLITY to be UF policy & allmark. Indian Express 
(Delhi), 1984; March 17. 
Describes that the six-party opposition united Front is likely to 
express its commitment to democratic and federal polity, secular 
ideals, egatitarian economy and socialist society rooted in 
Gandhian values. Front demands autonomy for the government cont-
rolled media so that voice of dissent is not destroyed through it. 
On foreign policy, it says the test of diplomacy lies in strengthen 
ing friendship with neighbours and it should receive priority. 
Autonomy of university education must be respected and education 
should be linked to employment and needs of the society. Provisions 
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of drinking water, elementry education, link roads and minimum 
needs and eradication of malnutrition in children must be 
attended to on.a priority basis. Problems of slums must also be 
handled expeditiously, 
20. KARUNANIDHI. Who should be more powerful-centre or state: 
You can't run India from Delhi. Illustrated Weekly of India, 
99; 13, 1978; March 26, 14. 
Describes that the creation of linguistic states, every state has 
now acquired a special characteristic, identity and consciousness 
with regard to language, culture and territory. One may call this 
phenomenon by any have like 'nationality*, cultural nationality" 
or "Subnationality", but it is something which can not fail to 
reckon with. I am for restructuring the relations between the 
Centre and States on the principles of true, whole-some federalism 
and state autonomy-this is the way to provide an everlasting 
union. Federal idea is one of "Shared sovereignty" responsive to 
the needs and will of the people in whom sovereignty ultimately 
resides, and in such a political system one "level of Government" 
does not have the power to destroy another. Let us trust the 
people and do away with the concentration of power at the Centre 
to ensure our unity. 
21. MUSTAFI (Ashoka). Aspects of federal polity. Mainstream, 1; 
25, 1978; February 18, 21-22. 
Describes that memorandum on Centre-State Relations prepared by 
the West Bengal Government raises certain basic issues, regarding 
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the nature and base of our federal polity. Nature of our Govern-
ment involves both the problem of state, autonomy and citizens 
right. Concepts of a federal state could be actualised in our 
country only by allowing full freedom of development to every 
linguistic cultural state. All regional languages should, there-
fore, be given equal status and the productive resources of the 
country should be distributed among the states without any 
discrimination and Central Services should be under Central control 
alone. Units of the Indian federation so called could become 
willing and effective partners in our political system. 
22. NAMBCXJDIRIPAD (EMS). Phenomenon. Its merits, demerits. 
Patriot, 1983; January 26. 
Describes that the acceptance of the federal character of the new 
Indian State raised the question of what are now called Centre-
State relations. Unity and integrity of India can not be preserved 
and strengthened if efforts are made either to bring about complete 
centralisation, i.e., attacks maae on the rights of the States or 
to absolutes the rights and powers of the states. It will be 
wrong for the political forces interested in national unity and 
integration to adopt a negative approach to these so-called 
regional parties. It should be recognised that in the rise of 
these regional parties and their ability to move the masses against 
the authoritarian ruling party, there is positive element, regiona-
lism being a natural and legtimate reaction to the ruling party's 
drive for centralisation of all power. Whatever element of national 
disintegration is revealed in the regional parties and movements 
should be resisted. 
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23. NEW LOOK at federalism. Statesman (Delhi), 1983; March 26. 
Describes that the centre has steadily eroded state autonomy not 
through formal innovations but by the simple expedient of appro-
priating financial powers, especially through the formula for 
disbursement of funds prescribed by the seventh finance commission 
and by extending the jurisdiction of many institutions such as the 
CRA or the central Bureau of investigation, the latter not being 
easily reconciled with the provisions of the special police 
establishment Act. Even a careful reading of the constitution may 
still suggest a balanced relationship between New Delhi and state 
regimes. Mr Sarkaria might achieve something only if the latter 
are persuaded to stand up for their rights, and if the need for a 
strong and healthy federal equation can be separated from party 
polemics. 
24. RAJKHOWA (Hem Chandra). Union-States relations. Mainstream, 
7; 41, 1969; June 14, 14-17. 
Describes that constitution was framed at a time when Indian 
National Congress was uniformly weilding power in the centre and 
in all the states. But at present political situation has drasti-
cally changed calling for a re-thinking of the democratic machinery 
of the state-essence of a federal system is that in the spheres 
execusively assigned to the states, they will be free to pursue 
their own policies. But the basis on which the planning commission 
began to work from the very start was that there would be practical 
uniformity of policy over the entire sphere of administration both 
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in the Union and State. India is a paramount federation having 
already a strong Centre. Hence, there is no room to air views 
for constitutional amendment to make a strong Centre. What is 
necessary to consider is the devolution of powers and that 
dialogue should start right now between the Centre and the States 
to the effect. 
25. I^ AMAMURTI (P). Centre-State relations. People's Democracy, 
43; 2, 1978; March 5, 6-8. 
Describes that the constitution, according to the Congress view, 
should be a federal one with the largest measure of autonomy for 
the federating units and with residuary powers vesting with the 
units. Land revenue and sales-tax are the only two items and the 
states are charged with the responsibility of doing welfare 
activities for the people in respect of all their vital needs. 
Expanding sources of revenue, such as custom duty i.e., export 
and import duties, and excise duties are the preserve of the 
Central Government. Government trangresses the provisions of the 
constitution, then there is the Supreme Court to decide that such 
a law is beyond the competence of the state Government and there-
fore the Supreme Court can strike at down, 
26. SURI (Surindar). Evolution of federal polity resolving new 
problems. Times of India (Delhi), 1979; December 10. 
Describes that of the many changes taking place in the Indian 
political system, the one in the Centre-State relations is perhaps 
the most significant in a long-term perspective. States have been 
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looking for greater authority and ostensibly, decentralisation of 
powers is in the offering. Among the points of growing tension 
in Indian federalism is the feeling in some communities that their 
cultural message for the worted at large is not being promoted. 
Some others have grievances in economic matters what these demand 
amount to is that the centre should not monopolise India's exter-
nal relations, especially in economic or cultural matters. Rather, 
it must learn to play an effective mediatory role even as it 
continues to safeguard the country's integrity and independence. 
NATIONAL INTEGRATION. 
27. AHLUV/ALIA (Jasbir Singh). Indian model of unity: where the 
Petal and the milk coexist. Statesman (Delhi), 1982; 
November 10. 
Describes that the problem of national integration, in relation 
to the Sikh community in particular and the minorities in general, 
was faced by Guru Nanak himself when he introduced a new social, 
political and religious entity in the form of Sikhism, Though the 
Indian model is coordinate with the non-capitalist path of develop-
ment, yet the political forms and institutions and economic struc-
tures have been mostly transplanted from the Western model. Thus 
there are certain inherent contradictions in the system which 
militate against the Indian conception of national integration. 
Transplanted Western values, claiming primacy and precedence over 
* 
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identities, look down upon them as antagonistic to national 
integration. 
28, GUPTA (Bhupesh). Centre-State relations: National dialogue-
A must. New Age, 26; 11, 1978; March 12, 1 
Describes that the Chief Minister cannot undertake even small 
things, a health scheme or a forest developmental scheme or 
something like that. Officials from the Centre think they have 
to go from here to do even such things. They must find a forum 
where they can exchange their views. If you do not doubt their 
integrity and their desire to keep India as one, why not sit 
together and talk. No wonder that the unitary features, expressly 
and implicitly, dominate the constitution, though it is supposed 
to be of federal character. Practice has made the situation a 
great deal worse, thanks to the monopoly of burgeois power and the 
single party Congress rule at the centre and most of the states 
over the past years. 
29. KARUNAKARAN (KP). Conflict and Unity. Mainstream. 7; 43, 1969; 
June 28, 13-16. 
Describes that the aim of this contribution is to examine the 
conditions for conflict between region and region and between 
Centre and States in contemporary India and to explore the ways and 
means of promoting unity in this country. It does not go back very 
much to the past but is conflicting mainly to the examination of 
the conditions for conflict and co-existence in the political 
history of India since her achievement of freedom. Reoraanisation 
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of states on linguistic basis was a great land work in this process 
of democratisation. Language for administration in the States were 
important development Assertions of the separate identity of our 
cultural area and the right of people of that region to choose 
their own leaders can go side by side with limited co-operation and 
integration in the national sphere. It is only when this political 
reality is accepted by all the dominant political forces in the 
country, 
30. RAMASWAMY (NS). Centre-State relations for national integra-
tion, Hindu (Madras), 1983; November 1. 
Describes that India's Parliamentary democracy model, in its 
present structure, is undergoing severe strain. Number of States 
are asking for more autonomy. They feel that the highly central-
ised structure of decision-making and resource allocation is nox 
conducive to rapid development. At the other end, the centre has 
been taking increasing responsibilities every year, thinking that 
it is becoming more and more powerful and it is helping development. 
In fact, with every incremental responsibility, under taken by it, 
the centre is becoming less and less powerful to carry out the 
essential federal functions, which only the centre ought to do. 
Ideally, we should have a structure of centre-state relations, 
where there should be maximum decentralisation delegations and 
autonomy to the states so that each state can develop its on genius 
without much interference from the central Government, 
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31. SUBRAMANYAJvi (Ka Naa). About national integration. Tribune 
(Chandigarh), 1982; July 9. 
Describes that language could have been a force towards integra-
tion, instead of which it is being used by dichards for disuniting 
the various linguistic groups within the nation. Rulers have 
played into their hands. Regional chauvinisms and loyalties could 
be offset only by national ideals and aims. Lacking the educatio-
nal philosophy for a nationally inspired educational system-India 
has been notoriously free of educational philosophies is its years 
of Independence-the offsetting of regional chauvinism is a matter 
of wap hazard ad-hoc activity which can never be wholly satisfac-
tory. Economic quality might be a distant dream in the nation, but 
the economic quality of students might be achieved by wise provi-
sions so that inequalities do not plaque the young minds and ripen 
into communal or other violence. 
REGIONALISM. 
32. ABRAHAjVi (AS). Regionalism in full cry: Dangers of exclusivity. 
Times of India (Delhi), 1982; November 5. 
Describes that regionalism has come to mean linguistic and cultural 
exclusivity. Kamada chauvinism feeds on limitting or even denying 
the rights of non-kanwadiga on minorities and on imposing kanwadiga 
values on them. Same is true of Tamil Nadu, Telgu, Marathi or 
Punjabi regionalism. Process does not end there. Within region 
or states sub-groups with caste, religious or cultural affiliations 
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emphasise their separateness from the rest and seek official 
recognition of it in some form (witness the Mandal Commission 
recommendations on the backward classes). Every political party 
not least the Congress-I, has not merely compromised with divisive 
regionalism and sub-regionalism, casteism and sub-cateism but 
actively fostered them, 
33. CHAKRAVARTTY (Nikhil). Regionalism, not a dirty word. Times 
of India (Delhi), 1983; January 23. 
Describes that there is widespread feeling, amply justified, that 
the Congress-I leadership, though running the administration over 
the greater part of the country apart from wielding power at 
Centre, has not bothered to build a party organisation worth the 
name, and decisions even at the district lavel have to be referred 
to Mrs Gandhi herself. Apart from the physical impossibility of 
running such a set up, the need to respect regional feeling within 
the part itself has become imperative-serious on slaught upon the 
fabric of Indian democracy has been the large scale spread of 
carruption in public life. To wish it away as a global phenomenon 
or to accuse one another of being more corrupt than thereselves-
as most of the parties land to do-will not enhance their standing 
in the eyes of the masses, 
34. GANDHI (Rajmohan), Centre-States and human nature. Naqpur 
Times. 1984; February 10. 
Describes that many of our politicians and senior bureaucrats have 
worked both in their States and at the Centre. They have personal 
82 
experience of the Delhi end and also of the regional and where 
they have had to wrestle against Delhi's control. But such a 
perspective is easy to forgot. And some have never acquired it. 
To many, the demand will sound justified. But if it is right 
that states should have an honourable place beside the centre, 
should not the citizen have aan honourable place next to the ruler, 
be the latter "national" or regional? The solution to the coming 
battle over TV and radio between the centre and the states will be 
to hand over Doordarshan and AIR to an autonomous body and thereby 
to release TV and radio from the stifling hands of political rulers. 
35, JAFA (Jyoti). Safety in regionalism: self-expression in the 
North-East. Statesman (Delhi), 1982; November 19. 
Describes that the birth and growth of regional parties is closely 
related to fluctuations in Congress fortunes. When the Congress 
was strong in purpose and ideology, regional parties were practi-
cally non-existent. But the federal structure demands that leader-
ship be allowed to evolve from the bottom. Whenever the system 
faces a serious challenge. New Delhi responds by centralised 
control crisis management is not possible through the autonomous 
regional system that all the border states are demanding. But 
toppling regional leaders is not the path to integration. Several 
serious political studies reveal that success ionist demands always 
increase under a nominated Chief Minister who does not enjoy local 
confidence. Stability returns v/hen power is shared with regional 
interests. 
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36. JAISINGH (Hari). Limits of regionalism. National Herald, 
1983; February 9. 
Describes that NT Rama Rao has played upon the regional sentiments 
of the people of Andhra Pradesh and he would continue to do so 
whenever he finds himself on a sticky wicket politically. His 
public postures are meant to establish himself in the new role of 
a political hero. What is more, these fit in with the overall 
CentrerState relations. Which have hitherto been looked upon as 
an manoeuvring act or at best, a gymnastic show. NTR knows the 
rules of the game, while playing to the Andhra gallery, he seems to 
realise fully his responsibilities as an Indian. While playing the 
national role at the Centre the Congress-I has to see how best it 
can channelise regional forces and weed the needs and aspirations 
of the people at various levels. There are no basic contradictions 
in the two roles provided they are played intelligently and 
objectively. 
37. MISHRA (RK). Revival of regionalism. Patriot. 1982; April 5. 
Describes that Indian nationalism had to pay a heavy price before 
it could fully comprehence the grave threat communalism posed for 
the unity of the country. Unfortunately by the time the serious-
ness of the menace was realised, the ailment had become malignant 
and the will to resist partition had eroded considerably, Strong-
Centre-versus-autonomous States controversy is merely an attempt 
to escape from the stark reality that regional chauvinism is an 
attack on the concept of the Indian nation-state and the battle 
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between the two is for winning the allegiance of the people at 
the costof the competing sentiment. Those who talk of the danger of 
destabillisation and disintegration and do not see the implications, 
of the rise of the regional chauvinism in this context are evidentlv 
shutting their eyes towards politically inconvenient realities. 
38. RAO (VKRV). Centre-State relations in India. Mainstream. 11; 
21-22, 1973; January 26, 19-22. 
Describes that the planning commission and the experiment of 
planned development which has increased the financial dependence 
of the States on the Centre and led to a complition among than for 
bigger Plans and larger Plans grants. Regional backwardness and 
differentiation is now emerging as a factor in new demands for 
state-hoods and causing increasing embrassment for the Central 
Government. Centre has certainly retained and in fact strengthened 
its position as the dominant partner in the economic and fiscal 
spheres, there is increasing difficulty in the excise of this 
position, as the states are functioning more as pressure groups 
them as active partners in the process of building up the social 
and economic development of the country on the basis of economic 
growth and social justice. 
39. REGIONAL PLANNING. Statesman (Delhi), 1982; December 18. 
Describes that the suggestion for a planning board for the eastern 
region-comprising west Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and the north-eastern 
states and Union Territories- is arguably sound in theory not only 
because of geographical contiguity but also because raw materials 
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and production attributes are complementary. It might be optimis-
tic to expect the eastern region's three major states to undertake 
any kind of integrated planning. North-east already has a separate 
Council to look after the area's special economic problems; but 
though the NEC attempts good work, it is by no means assured of the 
full cooperation of its constituent units. Given these reservations 
it would be unrealistic to expect Meghalaya or Mizoram to partici-
pate in a board that is likely to be dominated by West Bengal, 
Bihar and Orissa. 
SEMINAR, BANGALORE. 
40. BANGLORE SEMINAR. Hindustan Times. 1983; August 11. 
Describes that the Bangalore seminar also pointed out that the 
Centres dominance in financial and economic matters came about 
without constitutional changes; incremently the Centre has 
accused to itself more and more fiscal powers at the expense of 
the States. There are both political and as well as constitutio-
nal dimensions to the Bangalore Seminar. Participants were fully 
aware that the Central Government had already asked the Sarkaria 
panel to review the federal set-up; but they were not unaware that 
the commission's recommendations would be considerably influenced 
by political pressures and public debate. Seminar achieved its 
purpose precisely because partisan and shrill voices were not 
allowed to dominate debate must continue but in dignified vein. 
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BIHAR. 
41, BIHAR STATE seminar on Centre-State relations. People's 
Democracy. 43; 2, 1978; August 13, 8. 
Seminar on Centre-State relations was held on July 18-19, with two 
sessions daily, at the Wheeler senate House of Patna University 
under the auspices of the society of study of socialism. West 
Bengal Chief Minister said that the view that strong States should 
weaken the Centre was erroneous. In fact a strong cencre can be 
ensured only by strong states. He presented several proposals and 
said, let the leaders face the people with their party programmes 
and implement them for the good of the people. Centre was delaying 
concurrence to the proposed plan of distribution of land among the 
peasant workers. Centre had no idea of burning issue and the state 
had to protect the legal rights of the sharecroppers. 
STRONG CENTRE, 
42, FOR STRONG Centre, Link, 15; 25, 1973; January 26, 48, 
Describes that is of opinion that if India has to develop economi-
cally and politically at a faster pace, any attempt to weaken the 
authority of the Centre should ba nipped in the bud. He is totally 
opposed to the demand that the Centre should be responsible for the 
only defence. Foreign Affairs and communications, Madhya Pradesh 
Chief Minister P.C. Sethi is emphatic that under no circumstances 
will be support any step that will lead to an erosion of the 
authority of the Centre. He has implicit faith in the Prime 
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Minister who, he says, will give her decision in the context of 
a national perspective and he will abide by it. Relations between 
Madhya Pradesh and the Centre are, perhaps, the happiest. 
43. KHANNA (HR). Need for strong Centre. Hindustan Times, 1982; 
November 27. 
Describes that the members of the constituent Assembly in India 
must have been conscious of the fact that the history of India 
reveals that when ever the Centre has become weak it has invari-
ably been followed by the process of disintegration. Weak Centre, 
has set in motion successionist forces and resulted in loosening 
the ties which bind the different part of the country together. On 
the contrary a strong and stable Centre has deterred and in any 
case controlled the emergence of fissiparous tendencies. It is 
no mere accident that the most glonous chapters of India's history 
have synchronised with the periods when we had a strong and stable 
Centre. It also needs to be emphasised that whatever be the provi-
sions of the constitution, the ultimate success of a constitution 
depends upon the way it is actually worked. 
44. CHOPRA (Pran). States as partners. Indian Express (Delhi), 
1983; August 23. 
Describes that the current debate on relations between the Union 
and the States is bound to grow. Much of it will be polemical. 
Those who want more power for the states will be dubbed as 
unpatriotic and those who want a stronger centre as dictatonal. 
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But it is necessary that some of it should be rational too, and 
held in the much richer perspective that what is needed is not a 
stronger Union or stronger States but a more effective polity 
which is better able than it has been so far to make the national 
system as a whole more cohesive and stronger and above all more 
just. Of that will follow better from the Union or the States-or, 
better still, both-becoming less obese than less obese they must 
become, and police opinion must run them through a new set of 
constitutional exercises if they will not do so of their own, 
WEAK CHIEF MINISTERS. 
45. WEAK CHIEF ministers. Hindustan Times. 1982; September 15. 
Describes that a Chief Minister stronger than the present incumbent 
would not have tolerated such in discipline from his colleagues. 
When Chief Ministers are made so utterly dependent on the slight 
command, they lose initiative and self confidence. They start with 
the handicap of being nominees of the Centre and function in the 
full knowledge that their services can be dispensed with whenever 
the High Command wishes to do so. They have little voice in pick-
ing their cabinet colleagues and have to suffer emissaries from the 
Centre dictating not only who should be in the cabinet but what 
port folios they should hold. It is difficult for a Chief Minister 
to concentrate on administration if most of his time is taken up 
in settling factional wrangles. Responsibility for holding the 
dissedents in leash rests largely on the Central leadership. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
46. CENTPIE AND Stat^. Hindustan times. 1983; January 20. 
Describes that it is, however, not the constitution or the laws 
which ultimately decide Centre-State relations. What ultimately 
matters is how the scates approach the Centre and how the Centre 
deals with the states. Now that it seems that more and more 
states may be governed by parties at variance with the party in 
power at the Centre, the matter assumes urgency. A stage may be 
reached when instead of a single party a coalition may be running 
the Government at the Centre. Country should not be caught 
unawares and preparations should begin now to meet future challen-
ges. Task is not that of constitutional pundits alone but of all 
political parties and whatever their differences, they should not 
let down the country. 
47. CHOPRA (Pran). Political federalism. Indian Express (Delhi), 
1983; July 5. 
Describes that the actual exercise of their powers by the Centre 
and the States, including their powers in respect of each other, 
has been influenced much more by what each considers to be politi-
cally feasible or desirable than by what the constitution allows 
or prohibits. This will be so in future too. Constitution will 
prescribe the limits of the permissible and politics the limits of 
the feasible. If the actual functioning of our federation during 
the first 20 years of independence was very different from what a 
politically neutral reading of the constitution would suggest, the 
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main reason was that the same party was in power at the centre 
and in nearly all the states nearly all of that time, and within 
that party the same person or a relatively monogeneous cluster 
around him commanded respect and authority. 
48. DAS (Sitanshu). Dissolution of U.P. assembly "A certainly". 
Tribune (Chandigarh), 1980; February 9. 
Describes that there is no doubt whether the 45th amendment of the 
constituion extending the reservation of seats for Harijans, the 
scheduled tribes and the Anglo-Indian community requires ratifica-
tion by one-half of the State legislatures. Centre is av/are that 
it may not be possible to fill the Rajya Sabha seats soon in the 
States where the legislatures are proposed to be dissolved. 
Electrol rolls may not be immediately ready to hold elections to 
the State Vidhan Sabhas. But this will not creat a constitutional 
problem in the coming Budget session of Parliament, It will mean 
that same seats in the Rajya Sabha will remain vacant longer than 
they should have. 
49. DIKSHIT (Uma Shankar). Sound and fair structure. Link. 16; 
25, 1974; January 26, 27-29. 
Describes that the constitution has the advantages both of a 
federal system and a unitary Central Government. In respect of 
measures of social welfares the States have all the authority and 
all the freedom and scope for action. Considering the basic 
responsibilities related to defence of the country, maintenance of 
law and order, raising and distribution of finances for plan deve-
91 
lopment and preservation and consolidation of the integrity of 
the country which the Centre has to discharge, the basic struc-
ture of disbursal of resources between the Centre and States 
appears to be eminently justified. As we grow and develop, as 
our parliamentry democracy strikes deeper roots, as national 
integration becomes stronger, the entire Indian people will be 
required to provide new responses to the new challenges of socio-
economic change. 
50. KATYAL (KK). Expediency, not principles. Hindu (Madras), 
1981; January 20. 
Describes that the constitution does not specify any size for the 
Ministry either at the Centre or in the States. Tendency to buy 
dissidents in the ruling party has led to the formation of King-
Size Ministries. No serious thought is given to fix any limit 
for, while the A,P. Chief Minister is asked to prone his cabinet, 
expansion is allowed in Haryana. In the absence of an agreement 
on the exact size, the committee decided to present the different 
points of view as expressed by members to provide a useful basis 
for discussion in public and Parliament. Constitutional stipula-
tion is an extreme step but a convention is not. It is a pity 
that despite the useful spad work done by the committee on defec-
tions, worms and guidelines have not acquired the force of a 
convention. 
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51. RETHINKING ON States. Link, 11; 29, 1969; March 2, 8. 
Describes that the Centre is faced with the ticklish problem of 
having to deal with those whom it wanted to destroy as political 
entities. Not with standing this pathological thirst for power, 
sober Congressman as well as administrators realise that the 
pattern of thinking and administration in relation to the States 
must be changed if Congress is to relieve some of the lost ground. 
It is how being felt that whatever the constitutional provisions 
and their interpretation, the Centre and the States cannot func-
tion in isolated compartments; nor can the Centre asume the role 
of unwanted overlord. Sharing of power between the Centre and the 
States necessarily involves more frequent exchange of views 
between the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister, 
52. SAHAY (S). Close look: tasks before Sarkaria Commission. 
Statesman (Delhi), 1983; June 16. 
Describes that the commission will be the master of its own proce-
dure. It will be free to set up study teams, examine persons and 
papers. Gazette notification asks ministeries and departments to 
co-operate with the commission and make available to it such docu-
ments and papers on it may want. It is more a matter of expertise 
and facts and figures than an assay in statesmanship. There is a 
good case for a hard look at the relevant constitutional provisions 
including the three tests, even at those institutions, for example 
Planning Commission that have existed without the express consent 
of the constitution, and making the States less dependent on the 
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Centre. Anyway, the Centre's autocratic exercise of financial 
powers is bound to dwindle with weakness in Central-leadership 
and all signs point to that. 
53. SARKAR (Subrate). Centra and the States, Journal of Consti-
tutional and Parliamentry Studies. 7; 3, 1973; July-September, 
129-133. 
Author analyses relations between the Centre and the State in 
India with this perspective. Increasing pov^ e^rs with the Centre 
are analysed in terms of constraints of the constitutional provi-
sions and the intentions of the ruling at the Centre. National 
unity cannot be maintained by force, or by artificial device. Loud 
talks about strong Centre, 'national integration, etc, will not 
solve the problem of Centre State relations, unless positive 
measures are taken to make the people of the States and regions 
feel that they are equal partners in the Nation-building activities 
Unless the federating units have their separate resource base, the 
Indian political system cannot be called a federation with any 
justification. 
54. SEMINAR ON Centre-State Relations. People's Democracy. 43; 2, 
1978, April 2, 3. 
It reviewed various provisions of our constitution regarding 
Centre-State relations, the unhappy experience of the States in the 
past and on that basis, urged many changes in the prevailing frame 
work of power distribution between the Union and the States, 
Reserving and Bill passed by the State Assembly for the considera-
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tion of the president constituted not only complete repudiation 
of the principle of federalism, but of democracy as well. This 
seminar in Calcutta, organised by students, and in which the over 
whelming participation came from students, amply demonstrates that 
the debates on Centre-State relations is by no means confined to 
Chief Ministers and governments. It is already percolauing to 
wider and wider sections of the people, intelectuals, students, 
lav(/yers and other professionals groups. Theory and practice of 
federalism has interlinked with the democratic aspirations of the 
people. 
55, SOUND APPROACH. Times of India (Delhi), 1983; June 15. 
Describes that the Central Government notification announcing the 
terms says that "the commission will keep in view tho social and 
economic developments that have taken place over the years and 
have due regard to the frame work of the constitution which the 
founding fathers so sedulously designed to protect the independence 
and ensure the unity and integrity of the country". Important thing 
is for all controversy over whether or not the commission has been 
given a mandate to propose constitutional reform to cease while it 
is fully constituted and gets down to brass tacks. Without the 
co-operation of the Centre and the States, it will not be able to 
do so, and such co-operation will be of little avail to it if the 
political environment in which it functions is vitiated by the very 
misgivings about Centre-State ties that it has been charged to 
dispel. 
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56. STATES ARE THE Union. Times of India (Delhi), 1983; April 17. 
Describes that our constitution is nothing but a glorification of 
the Government of India. This is reflucted in the constitution 
that they gave us, a constitution that is more unitary than fede-
ral. It appeared fine so long as the same party that ruled in tne 
States ruled at the Centre and so long as the Prime Minister was a 
lofty personality who transcended party loyalities. In 1971 
Rajamannar committee, appointed by the DMK government in Madras, 
to report on the subject made for-reaching recommendations. Consti-
tution, we must remember, is in the nature of a working hypothesis 
that is constantly tested. Its effectiveness, however, depends on 
the individuals who work it. No constitution can provide an 
apparatus for all time. Centre-State relations will perhaps shape 
themselves as we grow as a nation. The mode of government, a 
philosopher has said, is incomparably more important for a nation 
than the form of State. 
CORDIAL. 
57. ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. Hindu (Madras), 1984; March 30. 
Describes that tribunal for the Central staff has comprehensive 
work assigned to it as it has to deal with such matters as 
seniority, promotion, confirmation, pay and allowance and discip-
linary matters. Centre now has decided to persuade the States also 
to set up similar tribunals for their own staff. In the kind of 
bureaucratic set up in the country and the constant attempt to 
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politicise the services, cases of in justice in the matter of 
placements, promotions and pay arise with increasing frequency. 
Senior men are transferred to posts which have no more than 
sinecure value as a sort of punishment. Discrepancies in pay for 
officers similarly placed also occur, while instances of seniority 
being over looked are not rare.' And if the employees are forced 
to take resort to courts on the only way of obtaining justice, it 
is going to be difficult for them. 
58. BADAL (Prakash Singh). Who should be more powerful-Centre or 
State. No more president's rule. Illustrated tVeeklv of India. 
99; 13, 1978; March 26, 14-15. 
Describes that it is not necessary to equip the Centre with the 
power to develop the police or any similar forces in any State. 
This would amount to the exercise of emergency powers without a 
proper contingency. Even at present the constitution powers in a 
State in specific circumstances. States should be permitted a 
measure of freedom commensurate with their requirements and capa-
city for growth. Centre exercises considerable financial power 
and certainly the States have benefitted greatly by the keen 
interest that the Central Covernment and the Planning Commission 
have evinced in stimulating growth and development in the States. 
There is no question about it. But it is a point worth examining 
whether a single apparatus, in a country of such vast regional 
variations, can encompass the needs of the four corners of the land 
and reach out to the 600 million people of India. 
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59. CENTRE-STATE: New dimension. Mainstream. 7; 6, 1969, March 1, 
5. 
Describes that in the new situation developing in the country, the 
party in power at the Centre has no bussiness to arrogate to it-
self the right to decide how each state will be administered. 
While national unity and integrity require perfect co-ordination 
between the Centre and the states, attempts to meddle in the 
affairs of states ignoring or bypassing the state Governments can 
have the most disastrous consequencies for national cohesion and 
even for internal peace. Not only in the matter of appointing 
Governors or posting officials but in number of other matters 
harmony in working has to be established. It is time the Centre 
took the initiative to sit down with representatives of the States 
and work out satisfactory arrangement without delay. If there is 
need to ammend the constitution for this purpose, there should not 
be any hesitation, to undertake the task. 
60. CONSTITUTION NEEDS amendment. Mainstream. 7; 20, 1969; 
March 22, 5-6. 
Describes that the responsibility of the Centre is much greater 
than that of the States; it is a fact that under our constitution 
greater power is concentrated in the hands of the Centre than is 
good for democratic growth in a situation when a single party does 
not run the administration in all the States framers of the consti-
tution could not clearly visualise the future possibilities: for, 
at that time there was virtually no party of significance except 
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the Congress, and it looted as if the Congress woula continue to 
rule indefinitely. That the States should have much greater 
autonomy than they have at present is a principle long recognised 
even by the leadership of the Congress in the past. 
61. ESWARAN (W). CENTRE-STATE relations-II. Hindustan Times. 
1983; July 22. 
Describes that another aspect of Centre-State relations is planning 
commission and the finance commission-states get two types of 
grants. One is a grant made by the Finance Commission under 
Article 275 of the constitution. Another is a discritionary grant 
given to the states on the recommendations of the Planning Commi-
ssion. Mr Desai expressed himself strongly in favour of Central 
planning. He said "if the country is to develop as a whole unless 
there is a Central Planning Commission, the States will go on 
doing things differently and there will be no development, but 
cancellation of each others development. Finance Commission should 
be made a full-time permanent body and the Planning Commission 
should be made statutory body. 
62. PURI (Rajinder). Advice to the States. Hindustan times, 
1981; August 1. 
Describes that you must understand first of all what the responsi-
bility of this department is your first duty is to find out what 
the public wants. But how to do that? You must find out what 
people each other. Till we get colour TV our main problem is 
getting good TV programmes since good programmes are few, we must 
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make the best of the ones that are there. Give your officials 
legal permission to take bribes, so long as they buy black bonds 
with the money. This way not only will everyone behave legally 
and therefore end corruption, but the black bonds scheme will 
succeed. Also government files will move more quickly and bring 
in efficiency. Main task is to educate the people about the basic 
cause of law and order breakdovms, only then will people be alert 
and fight the forces of disruption, 
63, SARMA SARKAR (j). Governments are for governing. Amrita 
Bazar Patrika, 1981; March 10. 
Describes that Governments at the Centre and in the States in 
India rule but do not govern. Government is one and indivissible 
Party Government of the day may change but the government as an 
institution remains responsible for good government. Wide gaps 
between the party outlook and national outlook is the basic cause 
of the failures of governments of the day. Bureaucracy is like 
fire-invaluable as a servant but ruinous when it becomes master. 
Bureaucracy may have its defects which may be removed or changed 
to suit the changing pattern of society but no useful purpose will 
be served by decrying the bureaucracy or the police when the 
political heads, including ministers, have neither the knowledge 
nor the experience to run the administration. Unity discipline 
and dedication the essentials of bureaucracy, have been delibera-
tely destroyed by political parties. 
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64. SETHI (JD). Balancing Centre-State power. Indian Express 
(Delhi), 1983; August 5. 
Describes -cnac ciiGre are many ways of looking at Centre-State 
relations. Perhaps these can best be analysed in terms of the 
political power structure, its balance and functions, within the 
framework of a written constitution and the dynamics of conflict 
and co-operation among political and economics forces working 
both at Centre and in the States. Actors in the game are the 
Central Government, the Stace Governments, the political parties, 
various bureaucracies, the judiciary, the legislature and finally, 
the people who are the final arbiters but remain grossly ill-
informed and are manipulated. Centre-State relations may be 
vertical or horizontal vertically, the relationship is between 
the Central and the State Governments and the local bodies. 
Horizontally, the relationship between the legislature, the execu-
tive and the judiciary. 
65. SHARJVA (UK). Centre-State relations in India.Janata, 28; 20, 
1973; June 17, 7. 
Describes that demand was raised on different occasions by diffe-
rent regions for greater autonomy and sometimes such demand led 
to friction between the Centre and the Stace. whenever the Central 
Government was in a weaker position, different regions pressed 
their demand for more autonomy and when there is a powerful 
Government at the Centre, this to some extent subsides. Sufficient 
powers have not been given to the States and it is also a fact that 
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the policy of giving grants and loans to the States is pursued 
in such a manner as to give rise to doubts about the impartiality 
of the Central Government and proper appreciation of the require-
ments of the States, 
DECHNTRALISATION. 
66, IvlATHUR (PC), Future prospects. Seminar, 156; Agust, 35-39. 
Describes that decentralisation, it is true, has been an old 
theme in Indian public life but it would be highly unrealistic 
to advocate a policy of all out decentralisation and tocai rejec-
tion of the existing system which has shown its viability in no 
uncertain terms. Federalism is a pre-requisite for maintaining 
political cohesion in the case of nation states like India whore 
decentralisation should be regarded as primarily performing the 
system maintaining function of developing a loyalty-structure 
which aggregates and orchestrates the multiple and of ten mutually 
repulsive primordial loyalities of the different segments of 
Indian society. Only when one recalls-that the sustained compaign 
for constitutionalization of Panchayati Raj fizzled out with no 
tangible results, can one realise the significance of this modest 
proposal being implemented. To hope for a drastic remodelling of 
the Indian system, specially at a time when it has demons traced 
its capacity to surmount internal as well as external challenges 
and cleavages, is not only realistic but also self defeating. 
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LAW AND ORDEi-i SITUATION. 
67. KATYAL (KK). Casual and diche-ridden. Hindu (Madras), 1984; 
March 30. 
Describes that under the Indian constitutional system the respon-
sibility for law and order and policing of the country devolves on 
the States and Union Territories. Proposal for a code of conduct 
for political parties, though no more than a set of platitudes, 
got bogged down in polemical exchanges. Course of cne compaign 
for national integration remains unclear. Proposal to constitute 
the other two services and cadres of services, which was earlier 
dropped, is under the consideration of the Government Indian 
Administrative service is controlled by this department, while 
the Indian Police service is controlled by the Home Ministry, 
Indian Forest Service is controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
If cliches not shed and some precision introduced in official 
formulations, that may lead to greater clarity in thinking. 
TAMIL NADU. 
68. RANuA RAJAN (R). Time to review Centre-States ties. Hindustan 
times. 1983; May 7. 
Describes that populist schemes whether at the Centre or the 
States have also no place in the current financial situation in 
the country. In this regard, the states appear to be the more 
capable, though in sheer spites. Some of them tend to point an 
accusing finger at centre for organising the recent ninth Asiad. 
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No greater defence of this event was put up than the one by Tamil 
Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran who watched the Asian Games 
on all the days. He said Mr. Nehru's vision in setting up huge 
hydroelectric projects and steel mills had proved right in that 
the country had now become self-relient in-agriculture and by 
large in industry. Important field neglected since independence 
had now been nourished, he remarked. State Governments should do 
some real heart-searching eschew schemes not yielding lasting 
benefits. 
DECENTRALISATION, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
69. SINGHVI (LM). Dilemmas. Seminar, 156; Agust, 30-34. 
Describes that there is little doubt that decentralization was 
not the dominant theme of the national elites thiniing when our 
constitution was being drafted, although the leading and articu-
late members of the constituent Assembly were not obvious of the 
strong Gandhian predilection for decentralised democracy based on 
village communities. Although Gandhis scheme of village Swaraj 
failed to win acceptance in the operative scheme of the constitu-
tion, the broad idea of local self-government through Panchayats 
has been an important issue in the nations thinking on political 
institutions. A purposeful examination of these concrete institu-
tional proposals for making the districts, and in turn the 
villager, the basic units of Indian democracy would lead to a 
reconstruction of our polity making our federalism a three-tier 
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relationship and changing the legislative and executive distribu-
tion of powers into a more directly responsible, representative 
and responsive apparatus. 
DEMAND FOR AUTONOMY. 
70. AUTONOMY HOME-truths. Indian Express (Delhi), 1981; 
November 3. 
Describes that these are home-truths which, for that matter, we 
are not hearing for the first time. But coming from the President 
at the present puncture, the words have an added significance. 
Congress-I embressment is understandable, but the obiter dicta of 
a Kalpnath Rai will not help the party get over it. Issue concerns 
the health of the federal system. There is no dispute on the need 
for a strong Centre and on preserving national integrity at any 
cost. Question is whether the way to serve the cause is to concen-
trate all powers in Delhi and reduce the States to the level of 
municipalities. Unfortunately, even the Janata government, which 
talked so much about devolution of pov»^ ers, did nothing to correct 
the distortions in the federal structure. Mrs Gandhi require has 
of course different ideas on the subject. 
71. BASAVAPUNNAIAH (M). Centre-State relation. People's Democracy. 
43; 2, 1978; July 23, 14. 
Points out that a strong and unified India can only be one in 
which the democratic aspiration and distinctiveness of the people 
of different States are respected and not treated v^ ith dis-dain. 
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We are definitely for strong States, but on no account do we want 
a weak Centre. Federal system of tenure was prevalent almost 
every where. Lords of the land had even retained the jurisdiction 
over their tenants. Deprived of their political privilages of the 
right to control the princes, they had preserved almost all their 
medieval supremacy over the peasantry of their danesnes as well as 
their exemption from taxes. Federalism was more flourishing in 
some localities than in others, but now here except on the left 
bank of the Rhine was it entirely destroyed. Demand for greater 
and real autonomy for the States is essentially a democratic 
demand. 
72. GANDHI (Rajmohan), Autonomy but not on paper. Indian Express 
(Delhi), 1981; June 17. 
Describes that we crave laws or devices that would reduce our 
troubles speaking for myself and not only share the craving but 
have been reckless enough to suggest some measures to fulfil it. 
Thus I have frequently joined the ranks of those who ask for 
greater autonomy for the police, for radio and television and for 
the bodies that allot governmental franchises to private indivi-
duals. If the politicians do not wish to share power, autonomous 
institutions will never be created. Getting politicians to 
surrender some of their political leverage is harder than propos-
ing independent panels. "Possibility of prosecuting for conspiracy 
to pervert the course of justice" was apparently looked into, but 
again there was no evidence. Policemen remained silent, which they 
were legally entitled to do. 
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73. JHA (Prem Shankar). Autonomy Erosion in State Sector. 
Times of India (Delhi), 1982; February 16. 
Describes that the encroachment of the bureaucracy on the public 
sector has not, unfortunately stopped at to managerial posts. 
Government official also sit on the boards of all public enter-
prises. Groundwork for bureaucratic dominance was laid when the 
government turned down the proposal that the public enterprises 
should be statutory corporations answerable to Parliament, and 
made them government companies instead. Changes that are needed 
virtually dictate themselves. It should be obvious after three 
decades of in-fighting that the bureaucracy and the public sector 
managements can not live together in comfort. Time has therefore 
come to separate them by forming statutory corporations answerable 
only to Parliament. Technical capacity of the Parliamentary 
committee on public undertaking to monitor the performance of the 
public sector needs to be increased. 
74. NAMBOODIRIPAP (EMS). Autonomous stronglism. People's 
Democracy. 43; 2, 1978; March 26, 14. 
Describes that almost all the Janata led State Governments have 
not only supported the demand for a debate, but also endorsed the 
position that the constitution should be amended to provide greater 
autonomy for the States. Advocates of greater autonomy for the 
States are not, as is alleged by their opponents, advocates of 
disintegration of India. On the other hand they content, only 
greater autonomy for the States would help the preservation and 
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strengthening of Indian unity. Being an under developed country, 
aspiring to develop its material and human resources in such a 
way as to transform itself into a developed country as rapidly 
as possible. India is interested in co-ordinating the activities 
of all the States with those of the Centre. Every State while 
enjoying the higher measure of autonomy, requires the help and 
co-operation of the Centre as well as of the Sister States, 
75. PLEA of autonomy. Tribune (Chandigarh), 1982; May 13. 
Describes that Indian federalism, constitutionally as well as 
politically, has always leaved towards a strong Centre guiding 
the destinies of the States, V^ hile the defining areas of power 
between the Centre and the States the constitution makers ensured 
the dominance of the foiroer over the latter on the very valid 
ground "chat a newly liberated country with vast regional imbalances 
required a centrally planned development a thrust. This was also 
the reason why the constitution includes a long concurrent list 
with residuary and overridding powers with the Centre. And those 
who cry for state autonomy are not too keen to extend the same 
principal to local bodies in their own states by holding popular 
elections. It has been years since elections to local bodies were 
held in most states. Autonomy like charity, must begin at home. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
76. JAISINGH (Hari). Politics of autonomy. National Herald. 
1981; November 11. 
Describes that the problem in our country is not one of lack of 
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powers for state governments. Chief Ministers can do anything 
worthwhile, if they want to. Problem is actually of proper 
utilisation of powers for the good of the masses, specially for 
the uplift of the have-nots of society. Constitutionally, the 
states have enough powers and no progressive measure has suffered 
because of any constitutional constraints. If anything, some of 
the most progressive measures have floundered because of the lack 
of political will and half-hearted administrative response. Even 
if these were no demands, mischief-mongers would create them just 
to keep themselves in the business of politics. But we can not 
make the country's unity and territorial integrity a matter of 
business and politics. 
DMK, TAiMIL NADU. 
77. DIVIK AND THE alibe of autonomy. Organiser. 26; 40, 1974; 
May 11,8. 
Describes that there is one manifestation of the secessionist or 
separatist sentiment which is motivated by a defeatist raertality 
which makes the protagonists realise their impotence to impose 
their will on the rest, while at the same time, they are allergic 
to work in friendly.or fraternal relations with the rest of their 
neighbours. Differences of language race, religion and culture 
tend to be over-emphasised and, in their name or for their preser-
vation, the demand for separation or succession is pressed with 
such plansibility as to invest the movement with justice fair play 
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and high idealism. Actual course of the Dravida Kazhaga or 
Nunnetra Kazhaga politics is full of turns and twists to prove 
how realistic any real demand for separations or succession is, 
but how, at best, it could be used to extract some special or 
favoured treatment from the rest as a condition of continuing 
association with common Centre. 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWER, SARKARIA COMvlISSION. 
78, AHWA (DR). Sarkaria panel on Centre-State ties. Tribune 
(Chandigarh), 1983; March 25. 
Describes that the Centre had been thinking about the matter for 
quite some time. Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi, denied in the Rajya 
Sabha that the appointment of the commission had anything to do 
with the setting up of a Council of Chief Ministers of the 
Southern States. Opposition leaders condemned the violence 
perpetrated by the extremist in Panjab was causing anxiety and 
deep concerns to everyone. "We deeply regret to note that in the 
vacuum created by the suspension of the separatite talks, 
irresponsible elements were letting loose an orgy of murder and 
assauli: in the State". They appealed to the Akali leadership to 
condemn the cult of violence being spread by the extremists. They 
also wanted to know whether the Government had started an informal 
dialogue with the Akali leaders for this purpose. 
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79, CENTRE-STATE relations. National Herald. 1983; June 10. 
Describes that no less significant is the categorical declaration 
by that Union Government that the Commission will devise its own 
procedures for the discharges of its functions. Commission has 
not only been made the master of its procedures, it can seek the 
assistance of any person or a group of persons to make its investi-
gation. Importance the Union Government attaches to the task 
assigned to the commission is obvious from the directive that the 
Ministers and departments of the Government of India shall furnish 
information and documents and provide such assistance as many be 
required by the commission. This directive has been coupled with 
the hope and trust that the State Governments too will extend 
their fullest co-operation and assistance to the commission. 
80. CHAWLA (GS), Sarkaria panel may have wide terms of reference. 
Indian Express (Delhi), 1983; April 17, 
Describes that the Sarkaria commission on Centre-State relations 
is likely to have v;ide-ranging terms of reference enabling it to 
go into the complete federal structure vis-a-vis the states. 
Appointment of the Sarkaria commission is viewed no less important 
than the states reorganisation commission appointed over tv/o decade 
ago. There are a number of subjects falling within the purview of 
the States on which the Centre has been feeling concerned but could 
do nothing as these issues fell within the purview of the states. 
Education is one such subject which needs a lot of improvement. It 
was primarily for this reason that the Government decided to appoint 
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a commission in place of a committee of experts as decided at 
the tripartite talks with the Akalis. Commission's report will 
be presented in parliament while the experts committee's report 
could have been ignored. 
81. CHOPRA (VD). Reviewing Centre-State ties. Patriot. 1983; 
April 4. 
Describes that the appointment of the Sarkaria panel by Prime 
Ministers, Mrs Indira Gandhi to go into Centre-State relations 
with in the existing constitutional framework too suggests that 
a fresh look needs to be given to this basic question. Tension 
between the centre and some of the states are only a reflection 
of this Centre-State hiatus in our political super structure. 
Emergence of a nation wide power system, the inter-dependence of 
various states of river waters for irrigation, growth of heavy 
industries, particularly steel in certain regions, tapping of 
petroleum potential for the entire nation and the creation of 
modern in-frastructures all these have contributed emorraously to 
the integration of the Indian economy. This leasts one to the 
basic question; should this process continue and the integration 
of Indian economy allowed to continue? 
82, EXCUSE For erasion. Statesman (Delhi), 1983; July 19. 
Describes that the Sarkaria's commission's appointment has provi-
ded a ready excuse to Mr, P.C. Sethi for refusing to consider 
seriously the suggestion by members of the Home Ministry is 
consultative committee that the centre should now set up the Inter-
11 9 
State Council. Existence of Inter-State Council as a constitu-
tional body need not preclude discussion and settlement of issues 
through informal talks vyherever possible. ARC took the view, and 
quite rightly in the opinion of many, that in the absence of 
machinery such as the Council, there was a tendency to exaggerate 
Centre-State or inter-state problems so as to focus public atten-
tion on them. It accordingly recommended a compact and high level 
body which would enable effective and confidential discussions 
which, though only recommendatory or advisory, would carry weight 
with the Centre and the States, 
83. KRISHNAMURTHY (Vijaya). Sarkaria takes up a challenge, 
Indian Express (Delhi), 1983; April 3, 
Describes that R.S. Sarkaria, a former judge of the supreme court 
who has been named one-man commission to go into Centre-State 
relations hopes that his terms of reference would be ready, when 
he has been called to the law Ministry in New Delhi. Though he 
was chaired many commission as a judge and answered presidential 
references as a lav;yer, Mr. Sarkaria became known all over the 
country when he was appointed one-man commission to inquire into 
allegations against the DJvlK leader, Mr. Kamnnedhi, and others, 
"That is why the entire south knows me, and I have been accepted 
by all parties for the present assignment. In fact, even as 
Mr. Sarkaria is av/aiting a formal letter of appointment, people 
have started coming to him with their own stories or Centre-State 
relations. 
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84. MALHOTRA (Inder). Centre-State ties: A family quarrel. 
Times of India (Delhi), 1983; April 17. 
Describes that no family is or can be free from quarrels. It will 
therefore be absurd to believe that the family of 880 million 
Indians will not have its share of friction and disputes. There 
is no warrant therefore for taking an alarmist view of the Centre-
State tussle that comes to the fore from time to time and has 
become something of a major issue at present, Mrs Gandhi's deci-
sion to appoint the Sarkaria commission is an adequate and sensi-
ble response to this need. All that is required now is that the 
commission be allowed to function constructively and in a clean 
atmosphere, not in one vitiated by contention, bitterness or wild 
rhetoric. To decry demands for greater powers to states as anti-
Centre or'even anti-national is as foolish as the complaint that 
the States are being treated as the Centre's "Serfdoms". 
85. MALHOTRA (Inder). Centre-State relations: need for a sense 
of proportion. Times of India (Delhi), 1983; March 31. 
Describes that it is entirely typical of the inflamed State of 
Indian politics and intellectual life that the crucial issue of 
Centre-State relations- once again to the fore, thanks to the 
appointment of the Sarkaria commission, to say nothing of Bangalore 
conclave of four Southern Chief Ministers is often discussed in 
highly partisan terms, and some times was irresponsibly. On the 
one hand, there seems to be a tendency to denounce as anti-Centre 
and even anti-national any plea for transference of more money or 
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greater powers to the States. On the other, there is no dearth 
of votaries of devolution who talk of the States being run by the 
Centre as its "Serfdoms". They also brush away, with a flippant 
have of the hand, arguments by anyone that, faced with the myriad 
strains on national unity, the country must do nothing to weaken 
the Central authority. 
86. MOHLAJEE (BN). Sarkaria panel a non-starer. Indian Express 
(Delhi), 1983; June 17. 
Describes that the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State relations 
so far is nothing more than a non-starter. Mr Sarkaria would like 
to get the views of a wide cross-section of people and then hold 
seminars and discussions in non-political forms. He would meet 
politicians from all areas and parties to get their views and 
suggestions. Finally after the commission completes its task and 
makes recommendations, there was no guarantee that they would be 
accepted or implemented, he conceded. Coming back to the scope 
of the commission he said that it would encompass the planning 
commission, the finance commission and the National development 
Council. Mr Sarkaria was of the view that once funds and accommo-
dation had been given the commission would finish its preliminary 
work in 8 to 10 months. 
87. MR SARKARIA'S Task. Tribune (Chandigarh), 1983; June 9. 
Describes that the commission can set its own parameters and norms 
of work taking advantage of the clause assuring it the "fullest 
co-operation and assistance" from the States and the Union 
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Territories. Although the Government has-^ set a deadline of one 
year for the commission to submit its recommendations, the Centre's 
leisurely v;ays so far do not suggest a sense of great urgency. 
Demand made by certain states for a role in deciding the scope and 
composition of the enquiry body has not been conceded. When the 
commission submits its report the Union Government will still be 
the one to decide whether to accept it or consign it to the limbo. 
Heavy responsibility rests on Mr Sarkaria to make the document a 
worthwhile exercise for future Governments to establish a broad 
framework of smooth Centre-State relations, 
88. MUKARJI (Nirmal). Beyond Centre-State relations, Indian 
Express (Delhi), 1983; April 26. 
Describes that doubts have been expressed in some quarters as to 
whether the Sarkaria commission on Centre-State relations has been 
appointed in good faith. It is said, for instance, that the Prima 
Minister's announcement of 24 March initiative of Mr Ramakrishana 
hedge and his fellow Chief Minister of south. The contrast between 
hurry with which the announcement was made and the delay in settl-
ing the terms of reference and the name of additional members is 
certainly intriguing it is also said that Mr Sarkaria was chosen 
because he is a Sikh, and that might prove useful in the Punjab 
context. Underlying feeling among sceptics is that there is no 
genuine concern at the Centre for the policy issue involved. In 
what follows, and do not purpose to question the bonafides of the 
decision to appoint the commission. 
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89. NOT A ONE man Show. Hindustan times. 1983; March 26. 
Describes that the appointment of the Sarkaria commission is a 
welcome step towards rationalising and strengthening over federal 
ties. Commission will have to examine Centre-State relations from 
various angles. Constitutional aspect, hov;ever, is the most 
important because it has a significant bearing on othor aspects as 
well. State autonomy has been a consistent demand by the Akalis as 
well. In these circumstances the centre has acted wisely and 
realistically by initiating the review of Centre-State relations. 
No doubt, the appointment of the Sarkaria commission will take the 
wind out of the Akalissails and deter Chief Minister from gangling 
up against the Centre. But to contend that some state Governments 
are not adequately effective because they lack povi/ers is to pass 
the buck. As the Prime Minister has pointed out, most states do 
not fully exercise their fiscal povi/ers. A strong centre and strong 
states are no longer viewed as a contradiction. 
90. FIANGACHARI (K). Terms of reference: Importance of v;ords and 
phrases. Statesman (Delhi), 1983; June 17, 
Describes that the Union Government's Fabian policy of dealing 
with demands from the states which challenge its authority or its 
interests was further illustrated by the second instalment of steps 
to activate the working of the Sarkaria Commission when the first 
step was taken for setting up the commission following the Banglore 
conclave of Southern Chief Ministers, Delhi was forced to explain 
that it was not a response to that meeting but the result of much 
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earlier consideration of the idea of an inquiry. This was plausi-
ble as a fresh review of Centre-State relations would be seen as 
part of the concessions to Akali demands. It will probably 
require many more such developments to complete the composition 
of the commission and let it start its work. 
91. SAHAY (S). Close look: Sarkaria Commission, Statesman 
(Delhi), 1983; March 31. 
Describes that the need for changes in the constitution can not be 
over emphasised. Even in its memorandum to the Eighth finance 
commission, the West Bengal Government has asked the commission 
not to take a literal view of its constitutional duties and rest 
content with the allocation of shares between the states and the 
Union but also take a hard look at inadequacies of the constitu-
tional provisions and suggest amendments. Some states have sugges-
ted that just as there is no provision for President's Rule at the 
Centre, so also there must not be any provision for President's 
Rule in the states and that if a stable Government cannot be formed 
in a state, then the alternative, as in the case of the Centre, 
should be general election. Thus far, the provision for President's 
Rule in case of financial emergency has never been applied. It needs 
to be retained. 
92. SETHI (JD). Regionalism or decentralisation? Indian Express 
(Delhi), 1983; April 1. 
Describes that the Indian people have got the worst of both worlds. 
Whenever power shifted from the Centre to the States, it was not 
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used for further decentralisation or strengthening institutions 
which nearer the people. In the developed countries efforts were 
made to provide counter vailing forces in the form of democratic 
devolution. Struggle between the centralising tendencies produced 
by the system and a conscious attempt on the part of society to 
check these tendencies has been going on in all past-industrial 
societies. Mrs Gandhi does things at a time and place of her own 
choosing often she can exhaust the tempo of any particular move-
ment. Assam is one place where these calculations have gone wrong 
and Punjab may be another. Had she appointed Sarkaria Commission 
a few days earlier, there may have been no Southern Council of 
Chief Ministers. 
93. SETURAMAN (V). Office to be kept above party politics. 
Hindu (Madras), 1983; September 26. 
Describes that the appointment of the Sarkaria Commission provides 
an opportunity to go into the subject of Centre-State relationship. 
It is in deed unfortunate that the issue has not engaged the 
requisite attention of public that it deserves. One of the areas 
of possible conflict is in the appointment of a Governor. There 
was of late been some murmurs in well-informed quarters about the 
Centre making such an appointment on its own, without due consulta-
tion with the State concerned. It would be interesting to recall 
how the framers of the constitution expressed themselves on this 
subject. How far practice has kept pace with solemn words uttered 
by such eminent persons on the basis of which the Assembly passed 
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the relevant Articles is for all to see. Contemplated convention 
requires to be codified now. 
94. WELCOME MOVE. Times of India (Delhi), 1983; March 26. 
Describes that all the opposition parties have jointly supported 
the move to have the four Southern Chief Minister who conferred 
on this subject in Bangalore only the other day. Since an agree-
ment on the need to set up such a commission had been virtually 
reached lost month at the tripanstite talks between the Union 
Government, the Akalis and opposition leaders, the decision on the 
Sarkaria Commission has come as no surprise. Restructuring of the 
existing pattern of Centre-State relations should go, opinions 
inevitably differ even, though there is a v/ide spread feeling that 
the states needs a greater share of resources for development 
framework within which the commission should be allowed to under-
take its task has been succinctly srummed up by the Prime Minister. 
It is not a question of a strong centre and weak states or vice 
versa. India needs both a strong centre and strong states. 
STRENGTH. 
95. AHUJA (DR). Sarkaria panel may have 2 members. Tribune 
(Chandigarh), 1983; March 31. 
Describes that the Union Home Ministry has not so far drafted the 
terms of reference of the commission. States of Tamil Nadu, 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and West Bengal and the Akali Dal have 
been demanding substantial changes in the framework of Centre-State 
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relations to give more fiscal pov/ers and autonomy to the states. 
According to the senior officials of the Ministry, the terms will 
be finalised after consultations with the head of the commission 
and some legal experts. Minister of law and finance are also 
likely to be involved in the drafting of the terms. Following the 
Prime Minister's announcement that the states are free to present 
their view points to the commission, several non-Congress-I ruled 
states have started preparing their cases. 
TERMS OF REFERENCE. 
96, AHUJA (DR). Sarkaria panel terms. Tribune (Chandigarh), 1983; 
May 2. 
Describes that terms of reference have been drafted after discu-
ssions between Mr Justice Sarkaria and the Union Home Secretary, 
Mr. T.N. Chaturvedi certain experts from the Union lav/ Ministry 
were also involved in the framing of these terms. According to 
informed sources the terms of reference have been SG framed as to 
cover the entire gambit of Centre-State relations. Terms will 
include the question of giving more powers to the states, includ-
ing administrative and fiscal to discharge their duties. These 
will also include a review of the devolution of the Central taxes 
to the States. Commission is also likely to take into account the 
fact that financial resources should be used in such a manner as 
these did not damage the overall economy. 
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97. BASIS OF Unity. Statesman (Delhi), 1983; June 10. 
Describes that the existence of another party, the states, deeply 
interested in the work of the commission cannot be ignored, and 
it would have been in the fitness of things if appropriate gestures 
of consultation had been made by the centre or the Chairman. That 
would have enhanced the commissions prestige and authority. Terms 
of reference would have been more balanced, without losing their 
basic purpose of underlining the unity and integrity of the nation, 
if they had also given some recognition to the fact that, under 
the constitution, India is a Union of States and as district, if 
subordinate, entities the latter enjoy a separate list of legisla-
tive and executive powers which in practice is accepted as their 
area of autonomy. Such autonomy could come in the way of the 
nation's unity, integrity and independence. 
98, OBJECTIVE REVIEW. Hindustan times. 1983; June 7. 
Describes that the Sarkaria Commission's terms of reference are 
reasonable and realistic and it can now go ahead with an objective 
review of Centre-State relations. Sarkaria Commission more impor-
tant than the Rajamannar Committee appointed by the DivlK Government 
in Tamil Nadu and the Administrative Reforms Commission, although 
these also examined Centre-State relations. Its appointment is a 
major gesture on tne part of the centre towards the states demand-
ing greater autonomy. Centre has an open mind in the crucial 
question and there is no reason to fear that it will not redress 
the legitimate grievances of the States. What may have to be over-
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hauled are fiscal and economic relations between the centre and 
the states. Fiscal autonomy will help the states considerably and 
that is what they clamour for 
99. REDDY (GK).. Centre forestalk states action. Hindu (Madras), 
1983; March 26. 
Describes that Prime Ministers secretariate is still v,/orking on 
the terms of reference of the Sarkaria Commission which will oe 
required to look into the political, constitutional, financial and 
administrative aspects of Centre-State relations, before suggesting 
appropriate changes in the light of past experience. Centre has to 
decide also whether the commission should consist of more members 
other than Mr Justice R.S, Sarkaria, who has been named Chairman in 
terms of the announcement made by the Prime Minister Mrs Gandhi, in 
Parliament. Text of Prime Minister's statement referred to the 
proposed panel as a one-man commission, but in the official version 
released to the Press later, the word was struck out in the light 
of Mrs Gandhi's own observation in the Rajya Sabha that, if need 
be, more members could be added after ascertaining Mr Justice 
Sarkaria's opinion, 
ROLE OF GOVERNORS. 
100. NOOPANI (AG), Ensuring Governors' impartiality. Indian 
Express (Delhi), 1983; April 25. 
Describes that it would be a thousand pities if the wide acclaim 
which greeted the appointmenc of the Sarkaria commission on Centre-
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state relations were to be dissipated by a narrow approach on its 
terms of reference or its composition. Consultation with the 
Chief Ministers, particularly of the non-Congress-I State Govern-
ments will be in keeping with the appropriately non-partisan 
character of the entire exercise whose magnitude brooks no under-
estimation. It will, in effect, be the first authoritative revi-^ w 
of the working of the constitution in tho last three decades, and 
it cannot erade the gross abuse of the one whose impartiality the 
autonomy of the states and the soundness of Centre-State relations 
depend the Governors. 
impact of FEDERAL STRUCTURE. 
101. VENKATARANGAIYA (M). Impact of political parties on Indian 
federalism. Journal of constitutional and Parliamentry 
studies. 6; 1972; January-March, 25-35. 
Describes that the regional parties that have shown or distinct 
tendency towards the viev\/ that the balance as between the Centre 
and the States is unreasonably titled towards the former and that 
drastic changes should be brought in the constitution so that the 
states might have more autonomy than they posses today. Proposi-
tion therefore that when the same party rules at the Centre and 
in the states, federalism disappears and a unitary system comes to 
function is only true to a limited extent. There the written 
constitution provides for federalism. But in its actual working 
the Soviet System is unitary. This is primarily because the 
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communist party, the only party that can legally exist, is a 
highly monolithic one. No regional party can emerge -co express 
regional sentiments. Such an emergence is illegal under the 
constitution. It is under these circumstances that a monolithic 
communist party is able to have its own way both centre and the 
Units, and convert what is federalism in theory to complete unitary 
from in practice. 
SrUDHNTS UNRHST. 
102. STUDENTS UNREST baffles Chancellors. Commerce, 138; 3534, 
1979; March 10, 356-57, 
Describes that the student unrest and wanted the centre to take 
firm steps to curb the growing student indiscipline in the country. 
This is a rather strange coming as it did from the Governors, many 
of whom are also Chancellors of Universities in their States, It 
is in the University campuses that the situation is unsatisfactory. 
If to-day the students are restless, at least a part of the expla-
nation lies in the unrest among the non-teaching and teaching staff 
of the universities and the colleges. It seems the staff at the 
monent are agitated even more than the students regarding their 
real or imaginary grievances. But at least in the Universities 
and colleges, special attention should be paid. There are various 
schemes formulated and assisted by the Centre which the States have 
to implemented. 
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influenced by MONOPOLY BROADCASTING. 
103, MLIK (Iqbal). Joys of monopoly broadcasting. Indian 
Express (Delhi), 1983; April 18. 
Describes that the joys of monopoly broadcasting is untimited. 
More so if it is a monopoly of the central Government. Government 
uses and regulates this monopoly as it wishes. Even when there is 
talk of additional channels it is taken for granted that they will 
be under the central Government. To create high standards in 
broadcasting there must be an independent organisation, not a 
government monopoly. Monopoly tend to create complacency, lack of 
enterprise, top-heavy bureaucratic staff and general doodling. It 
is good to know that Mrs Maneka Gandhi plans to compaign for total 
autonomy for radio and television she reportedly beleives that 
whereas the objectives of the emergency were correct, what went 
wrong was the feed back which mass media were not free to provide. 
That is only part of the truth. 
need for INTERSTATE COUNCIL. 
104. INDERJIT. Inter-State Council needed. Tribune (Chandigarh), 
1983; February 15. 
Describes that Centre-State relations are begining to get the 
national attention they deserve at long last. Many Chief Ministers 
and other leading public men have demanded a review over the past 
decade and more. Present atmosphere can be greatly improved through 
small but significant gestures to Chief Ministers if more states are 
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not to opt for regional parties as a reaction to Delhi's ill-
advised centrism. Mrs Gandhi for instance, could have invited 
Mr Rama Rao and Mr Hedge to sit with her on the V.V.I.P. Sofa 
meant for digritaries and not talked to them acroos her office 
tables as shown on Doordarshan. Likewise the president, Giani 
Zail Singh, could have graciously hosted dinners in their honour 
on than first visit to Delhi as Chief Minister. iVe need both 
personal report and sound institutions to make our Republic truely 
strong, 
105. INTER-STATE Council does not find favour with Mrs Gandhi, 
Capital, 162; 4054, 1969; March 20, 515-16. 
Describes that the Council can make recommendations after a dis-
cussion or investigation of the subject under dispute. There is 
no clear indication as to whether such a recommendation is binding 
on the parties concerned. Nor is it clear as to how the recommen-
dations will be implemented. President, no doubt, is authorised 
to lay down its duties and the procedure but as long as the 
verdict of the Council is not binding, there is doubt as to its 
efficacy as an instrument of co-ordination betv/een states or as a 
body to settle disputes that arise between the Centre and one or 
more states. National integration Council too has not made its 
impact so far, and it has, in fact, been boycotted by some politi-
cal parties as being purposeless and in effective. Some leaders 
have even questioned the wisdom of the Prime Minister presiding 
over the National integration Council and as such, it is obvious 
it cannot assume for itself the role of a Council for mediation. 
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106, RANGACHARI (K). Inter-State Council: Limits of informal 
coaxing. Statesman (Delhi), 1983; August 12. 
Describes that the informal methods may have had som:3 success in 
the case of State Governments belonging to the ruling party at 
the Centre but the outstanding disputes in respect of States under 
the rule of other parties show that informal coaxing and cajoling 
provided no real alternatives to formal discussion of problems in 
case in which party discipline cannot reinforce decisions imposed 
from above. This is a pity. Some constitutional experts had at 
one stage hoped that the Inter-State Council could gradually 
evolve into a second level national Council of advisers to the 
President available for consultation on controversial matters in 
federal relations on which the Union Council of Ministers will 
necessarily be partisan in its advice, 
PANCHAYATI RAJ, 
107, MANY FACES of autonomy. Thought. 24; 25, 1972; June 17, 
4-5, 
Describes that there is need for greater devolution of financial 
resources and of decision-making in the sphere of agricultural and 
industrial development to the States, There is for too much of 
Central Planning to-day based on the Centre's access to major 
revenue sources and on the plethora of laws for industrial licenc-
ing and control. But autonomy is a concept which applies not only 
to the relationship of the States to the Centre but also within a 
State, between the district and sub-division on the one hand and 
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the State Government on the other. Three tier scheme of Panchayti 
Raj was designed to promote autonomy all along the line, from the 
village Panchayat upwards. It is a pity that the scheme is yet to 
be implemented in most of the States. Apparently the State leaders 
who want autonomy vis-a-vis the Centre are not equally enthusiastic 
about parting with some of their own powers in favours of grass-
root democratic institutions. 
108. SHIVIAH. Decentralisation and Panchayati Raj: Developmental 
perspective. Indian Journal and Public administration. 24; 
3, 1978; July-September, 678-89. 
Describes that decentralisation has a more complex dimension: 
political-cum-administrative. Elected functionaries enjoying 
statutorily defined autonomy have certain political States. For 
this autonomy to be real, there should be a corresponding degree 
of administrative autonomy. Administrative decentralisation 
removes congestion at the Centre, facilitates a speedier and more 
effective action with reference to urgent or peculiar problems 
'on the spot'. Real challenge lies in combining broad vision with 
higher performance goats. Two aspects of the growing gulf between 
management techniques and human needs deserve attention: the 
triumpa of tacties over strategy and the retrect from human value. 
A well designed system of Panchayti raj should help restore the 
balance in some ways. 
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ROLE OF GOVERT^ORS. 
.109. CENTRE-STATE relations. Indian Express (Delhi), 1981; 
August 1. 
Describes that treating Governors in this fashion does not rebound 
to the credit of the Centre-Constitutional provision that a 
Governor holds his office during the pleasure of the President 
does not mean a licence to deal with him arbitrarily. Nor can a 
conscientious Governor be expected to send made to order reports 
on tha functioning of a state government. Role of a Governor is 
particularly uneviable in states ruled by a party different from 
the ruling party at the Centre. It need not have Oeen so, had 
Centre-State relations been in a healthier state. Assurance is 
welcome as far as it goes the appears to have soothed the friction 
with the Kashmir Government during her visit to the State. But the 
healing touch is yet to be applied to west Bengal and Kerala. Even 
the i'amil Nadu Government feels troubled by Mr Makwana's occasional 
sabre-rattling. 
110. INDERJIT. Vital office of Governor. Tribune (Chandigarh), 
1983; April 19. 
Describes that thinking people anxious to see Centre-State rela-
tions function smoothy and develop along heal-chy lines will need 
to devote greater attention to the office of Governor, Impartially 
and objectivity are important at any time for a Governors who is a 
link between the State and the Centre, But they are even more so 
to-day on two counts. First, Centre-State relations are under 
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strain and there is need to turn our thoughts to the ways and 
means of ensuring harmonious and co-operative relations. Presi-
dent has clarified that a Governor has to exercise his own judge-
ment and discretion in the appointment of a Chief Minister w/hen 
no single party commands an absolute majority. One Governor, it 
may be recalled, had sought clear guidelines in the matter, which 
related to the most important power exercised by him, 
INDIAN ADMINISTRAflVE SERVICE. 
111. INDEFENCE of all-India services. Hindu (Madras), 1984; 
January 14. 
Describes that Indian Administrative Service is so structured 
into State cadres and Central deputation quota assignments that 
it provides some kind of interchange of experience between the 
Central and the State Governments. Recruitment is done on a 
National basis by holding a competitive examination to which every-
one with a prescribed educational qualification is eligible. Aside 
from reservations for the scheduled castes and schedul'-d tribes, 
selections are made strictly in order of merit. It is not usual 
to find a recruit from one State working in another distant part 
of the coun;:ry. This feature is predominant in resp^ c^t of all the 
Central Services and is an objective factor in promoting national 
integration of anything there is need to crea'ce more such services 
as, for instance, the all-India judicial service, the Indian 
Engineering Service and the Indian Medical Service. 
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PAR/uvlILITARY FORCES. 
112. BHAM3RI (CP). Role of paramilitary forces in Cen-.re-State 
relations. Economic and political weekly, 13; 17, 1978; 
April 29, 735-37. 
Describes that the significance of the coercive instruments of 
the Indian State, including especially the paramilitary forces, 
can be understood by relating than to the total process of social 
and political development in the country and to the nacure of 
social contradictions and antagonisens. Indian state has had to 
continuously increase its expenditure on the army and the police 
during the last thirty years, because the ruling classes feel 
threatened by the emerging social forces which are struggling 
against exploitation. As the crisis of capitalist development 
deepens, the coercive role of the state assumes greater importance 
than any legitimation provided by the democratic instruments of 
electrons and citizens participation. 
ZONAL COUNCILS. 
113. SHARVIA (PK). Zonal Councils in the Indian federation. 
Economic and Political vVeekly, 4; 4, 1969; January 25, 
263-65. 
Describes that the federal idea has to be constantly kept alive 
by various devices of co-operation and adjustment. After the 
reorganisation of states in India this was sought to be achieved 
through the constitution of zonal councils comprising groups of 
neighbouring States. Councils have mainly a two-fold purpose 
first to facilitate co-operation between the States, and secondly 
to assist the Centre and the States in the trial and co-ordination 
of various social, economic and political measures. Not unsuccess-
ful record of some of the Councils in the country holds promise of 
their further development and usefulness. Zonal Councils in India 
may serve an important purpose, by simplifying the working of 
federal government and by preparing the ground for fresh measures. 
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114. CENTRE STATE RELATIONS RULINGPARTY 
MISHRA (RK). Rolling the Chief Ministers. Patriot, 1981; July 24 
Described that the fall of a chief minister should no longer 
cause much of a surprise because it is no secret that Mrs Gandhi 
believes in rolling the Chief ministers. Replacement of the system 
of elected chief ministers "by centrally appointed state leaders 
is that an unnix^d blessing. It has relievednthe chief minister, 
appactional pressures and counter pressures. At the same time, 
it has entranced the importance of building an effective lobby 
in Delhi, an exercise in which most Chief minister rare currently 
engaged. In the absence of such a mechanism, the state units will 
continue to suffer from acute factionalism and advantages which 
the otherwise controversial institution of appointed chief 
ministers could give to the ruling party would be lost. Chief 
ministers, will'neither be responsive to publis opinion in their 
states nor will they be accountable to the centre, 
115. UNCORDIAL 
ABOUT CENTRE-State relations. Thoaght, 21;13,1969;March 29,4 
Describes that it is apparently no coincidence that they 
have been trying to create the impression that there is an interesi 
conflict between the centre arK3 the states. Impresson is evidently 
intended to create an atmosphere of a warbeteen the centre and 
the states, as if the former were annimposition. Those who are 
making so much noise about the so-called new relationship between 
New Delhi and the stateccapitals would indeed have us setire that 
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the centre is less representative of the wishes and aspirations of the 
people than state Governments when the fact is that the Union Governmeni 
is as much anserrable to the people at large if not more only the 
disruptionists of the unity of India canribe a party to the cry, 
UNGORDIAL 
116. 
NEW CLASH i n I n d i a , T h o u g h t , 24gi3,1972; J a n u a r y 1 5 , 5 - 6 . 
Describes that two trends are stning to come to the surface in 
Indian politics , One is towards increasing centralization of authority; 
the other towards assertion of regional autonomy, Cemtralization of 
authority is undetectable from the personality and politics of the 
Prime Minister, Strength implies benovolence. But Benevolence and 
respect for democracy are by no means interchangeable terms. In fact, 
benevolence becomes an estimat virtue only when democracy has either 
stultified itself or nendered itself contemptible through corruption. 
Fortunately, no head on collision is in sight . Centre is quite tolerant 
and the antonomist are not too assertive. Nevertheless, the potentiali-
ties of mischief of a collision should not be minimised if produce 
is not to be over whelmed by passion on either side. 
117, UNCORDIAL, REASON, ADMINISTRATIVE DEFICENCIES WEST BENGAL 
TIT FOR Tat. Patriot, 1980; February 19 
Describes that the Union Government has nov; done precisely *hat 
its processor did three years ago to in precisely the same nxomber of 
states. More relevant reason for suspended judgement may be the appreh-
ension in some quarters whether further drastic moves are to follow. 
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Centre is already reported to have instituted "discreat" inquiries intc 
alleged electoral malpractices in West Bengal. Probably there were some 
that they are of nature or extent to have decided the issue there is 
enormously inlikely. KTiatever may be the administrative deficiencies 
of this state, Mrs Gandhi's own good faith will be largely judged by 
the extent to which she restrains them, both from colourful fights of 
this nature from common rondiness, 
118. UNCORDIAL, REASON, ADMINISTRATIVE REPORI-IS COI-MISSION R2P0RT 
CHATTERJEE (Sunanda). For an advisory council to President. Secular 
Democracy, 19;12,1978;June 11,16-18 
Present paper seeks to revive a proposal mooted by the Department 
of Administrative Reforms (Ministry of Home Affairs) in 1967, which 
still appears to be relev nt. An Advisory Board to deal with emergency 
situation in India, composed of the members of the Lok Sabha & Raj 
Sabha resembling the joint committee of federal Republic of Germany. 
Such a Board can effectively safeguard the rights of the constituent 
states of the Indian federation and fundamental rights of the Indian 
citizens, as well Federal President in Germany is elected by a majority 
of votes of the Bundestag and his position is strong in aa much as he 
determines the general policy guidelines, for which he bears the 
responsibility. 
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119. UNCORDIAL, REASON, AGITATION, STATES 
BHAMBHRI(CD). Strong Centre a must Patriot, 1983; Augusts 
Describes that the Existing distribution of power between 
the Central and the State Governments is not acceptable to many 
refinal political formations in the country, and administration 
been made by the Akali Dal, Tehgu Ddsam and the national conference 
for more powers to the state Governments, and amendment of the 
constitution. To sum up, the central Government has a legitimate 
leading role in a federal set-up if hostile international environ-
ment has to be confronted. Leading role of the Central Government 
can be ensured if it is actively involved in socio-economic 
transformation of the country. In the past many area of coopera-
tion and bargaining have been observed between the Central and 
State Governments and they provide a healthy framework for 
governance in India. And finally, lobby its wearing regional caps to| 
weaken the Indian political system need to be exposed, 
120. AKALI DEMAND, PUNJAB 
CENTRE'S RESPONSE. Tribune (Chandigarh), 1983; March 26 
Describes that Prime Minister herself and her ministerial 
specimen said on quite a few oecasions in the past that the 
question ofi state antonomy raised by the Akalis in Anandpur 
Shahib resolution did not Punjab alone. It became obvious from 
that stand that any move which the centre might take in response 
136 
to this particular Akali demand would have much wider application. 
Pinal verdict on commission's recommendations will lie with the 
centre and will, of course, be open to debate in permanent since 
that was the form where the Prime Minister made her announcement. 
Time limit has not yet been prescribed, but it should be possible 
to la^ down the period within which the commission's work must 
be completed. Will Prime Minister also now make unilateral 
announcement on the two other outstanding issues of territorial 
adjustments between Punjab and Haryana. 
121. PRESSURES BUILDING up. Tribune (Chandigarh), 1980;January 22 
Describes that political pressure is being stepped up for 
the disolutions of the legislative Assemblies in states where the 
local ruling parties and coalitions were routed in recent general 
election for the Lok Sabha , Punjab branch of the Congress (l) 
was decided to stage demonstrations at Chandigarh at major centres 
in the state to agitate for an early dissolution of the legislature 
Assembly, General Secretary of the organisations has cordially 
stated that so far as Punjab, is concerned, the intention is to 
"topple the Akali Government". Ruling parties these are throughly 
demoralised, that is not wholly true of Punjab, Haryana and 
Htmachal Pradesh where the ruling parties are turn by divisions 
but still have enough stamina to carry on. Their own desire to 
remain in office v/ill not, however, be enough to save them should 
the centre decide otherwise. 
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122, MORE POWER for States. Link, 15; 4, 1973 January 26, 44 
Describes that Punjab is perhaps one of those few states 
in the country where at least a section of the political opinion 
started developing a certain hostility tov/ards the centre long 
before the constituent Assembly adopted the nev/ federal constituti-
on. This peculiarity in the case of Punjab arouse out of the fact 
that pro-imperialist trend among the Akalis led to the slogan of 
an independent Punjab in early forties. Every economic problem 
particularly shortages in pcser and other essential commodities 
is sought to be utilised to plant mistrust in the minds of the 
people against the Centre by these forces. In this sense, the 
controversy over greater autonomy forthe states has only 
temporarily receeded into the background, 
123, STRENGTH IN Unity, National Herald, 1983i March 3 
Describes that it is time are event deep into all dimensions 
of the problem, refixed our priorities and worked out various 
alternatives, ^ est of the Akali demands are purely political in 
nature and they have to be grapjiled with politically. We know for 
sure how Akalis behave when they are out of power. Despite manifold 
problems, the country has done welj in key sectors of the economy 
and we can took forward to meeting the fut^ lre challenges with 
confidence. In fact, the tendency in a section of Indians to 
decay all that the country was achieved is shocking. First we 
must learn to generate confidence within ourselves and instead 
138 
of decrying everything, we shoudl learn to took at things with 
a degree of critical appreciation. This should be applicable as 
much to the thinking class as to the rank and file of the oppositioi 
parties, 
124. AGITATION, U.P. 
TRIPATHI(KP) U.P. - A Flasly State. Nagpur Tenles, 1984; January 1 
Describes that peaceful Assam state has been continuing an 
agitation for theee years. Meghalya agitated and obtained separatioi 
from Assam. In this back ground of the country, Uttar Pradesh lies 
flabby and inert. The only thing you hear about it is its decoity 
menace , and murder on personal count and seems it has to mind of 
its own. It lacks sense of identity. Agricultural potential of 
the state is high but utilisation in consequential. Its power 
generation is meagr. Its industrial development is the lowest for 
its size. Its literacy is also lov/est and its per capitor income 
at the bottom. Its record in all India service examinations has beei 
going down steeply. Its universities are strike bound,. 
125. CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT 
RAMU(PS) Dissolving the state assemblies. Nagpur times, 
1980; February 21 
Describes that the change of Government at the Centre 
appears to have injected an element of instability to Indian 
politics. It is obvious that the congress (2) made capital out 
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of the weakness of the opposition parties and got a comfortable 
majority in the Lok Sabha on a minority vote. Vote Mrs, Gandhi 
has secured is also a negative vote against the failures of the 
Janata Administration which acceptinated pxiblic history. But the 
way ^he Congress (l) has started functioning it is doubtful if 
i^ s two promises of stability and a "government that works" 
would be fulfilled. Here is lies the responsibility of the 
opposition parties to prevent a recurrence of the dreadful, 
126. CHANGE OF POLITICAL SITUATION 
SO IT came, Indian Nation^ 1980; February 20 
Describes that in India today Mrs Gandhi can say in her 
own style that the toppling of governments of her political 
opponents in nine states may be unfortunate, but their continuance 
would have been disastrous in the changed political situation 
in the country. Supreme court upheld the constitutional validity : 
of the decision and the governments concerned were shown the 
door. SeqTaence of events in throwing out the state governments, 
disolving the assemblies and ordering elections by Mr. Gandhi's 
government is strikingly similar. People would not be generally 
concerned with the debate on the propriety or impropriety of 
their removal. Their paramount interest lies in speedy and 
effective steps to improve the law and order situation and 
supply of power and water. 
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127. STRUCTURE AND STATES 
PROBLEM. Seminar, 156; August, 10-14 
Describes that the Indian system can come into its own 
if and when we forget the western political maxim that 
'modernisation' must first lead to 'centralisation'. We have 
to put decentralisation at the centre of the stage. We have to 
give it all the priority - and work towards the realisation of 
the total 'system' from the rankage ground of a decentralised 
democracy. New design will put decentralisation at the very base 
of our polity and lead to real scularisation of the great 'Indian 
society'. Much of volence today is the function of the stiffing 
state structure. As the structure changes and a true secular 
approach emerges, giving every group a position of ligitimate 
power and control, violence will become dysfunctional, system, 
the Indian system, with its own dimensions and perspectives 
will arise from its ashes. 
128. CUNCURRENT LIST, MODIFICATIONS 
CRz^ NDRA SHEKHAR. Who should be more powerful - Centre or State i 
There is no need for change , Illustrated Weekly of India, 99; 
13, March 26, 13-14. 
Describes that there are Government of different parties in 
many states and we have not found'any difficulty in dealing v;ith 
them. But there should be a measure of understandin:' and communi-
cation chanels should not be stopped between the centre and the 
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states. Modifieations in the concurrent list should be the 
exclusive concern of the Centre subjects like Foreiqn Affairs, 
Defence, Railways and foreign trade are some v/hich should be 
under the purview of the centre subjects like Agriculture, Forests, 
and Healths should be the concern of the states. That has been 
defined in our constitution and there is no need for any 
modifications. States have many powers currently and if they use 
them they can deal with the people , Sometimes demand for more 
autonomy by states is a political slogan, some times it is on 
ideological considerations, so I do not find fault with them-
these things will go on. But this is not coming in the v;ay of the 
working of the state Government. 
129. DECENTRALISATION 
BHATTACHARYA (Mohit). Decentralisation : some conceptional issues, 
Indian journal of Public Administration, 24;3, 1978; July -
September, 770-774, 
Describes that a functional theory of decentralisation has 
to be related to organisational task performance and ultimate 
survival. Organisations depend critically on the feedback of 
information from the environment in order to excertain the 
results of their actions and to take corrective measure. 
Contemporary thinking on decentralisation can be looked at from 
those angles. First, it is thought of as a means to spiritual 
enrichment and growth of the individual both as worker and 
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and citizens. Second decentralisation has an instrumental value 
as a means to Improving performance of organisations. Third, 
the curfent thinking/ very importantly, reflects a paradigmatic 
shift in Public administration as a discipline. Bureaucratic 
model which has so long dominated the field seems inadequate to 
explain the contemporary politico-administrative situation, 
130, SESHADRI (K). Unresolvable debates of centralisation versus 
decentralisation, Indian Journal of public administration, 24;3, 
1978; July September, 668-677. 
Describes that the debates on decentralisation versus 
centralisation, which in itself seems interninably indecisive, 
Irads on as it grows in operational intensity to further debates 
on decentralisations versus democracy and decentralisation versus 
development and decentralisation versus planning. Again in 
contemporary Indian political scene a disingenious debate because 
it is a false and pernicious poser. It has among other things an 
implied suggestion that planning, a centralised strategy for 
development, with an accent on heavy industrialisation, was 
Nation's brainchild which is antithetic to decentralised rural 
developmental strategies of Gandhi, 
131. DEFEAT OF CONGRESS PARTY 
TUSSLE OVER State autonomy. Capital, 180;4500,1978;February 9, 
187; 188 
Describes that there was indeed nothing to review in as 
much as the provisions of the constitution were clear and unoun 
143 
bignous on the relations between the centre and the states. 
Subject relating to the centre state relations has cropoed up 
once again following the defeat of the Congress Party at the 
Centre and in many states and with thfe assumption of power 
of non-congress Governments in some of the states, Janata 
Party came out successful at the centre and in quite a few 
states, while in the rest of the country parties apposed to the 
Janata formed Go«rnments. Very fact that all the states are not 
evenly developed and their Resources are not uniformly of the 
same standard makes it necessary for the centre to intervene 
to correct such distortions. This can be done only when it has 
enough powers. 
132. DEFEAT OF NON-CONGRESS (l) 
DUTTA (Sukumar). Absence of reaons makes it unique. Amrita Bazar 
Patrika, 1980; February 19, 
Describes that the defeat of the non-congress (l) ruling 
parties apart , the deterioration in the lav; and order situation 
in some of the states is a cause for concern. For instance, if the 
reasons of people's mandate was given the petitioners would have 
argued against it . Again if law and order was taken as the reason 
it might have been said that the lar and order in certain states 
e.g. Gujrat- was much better compared to many other states. 1977 
proclaimation did not however, give any reason for disolution. 
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But the Home Minister, Mr, Sharan Singh, wrote a letter to all 
the nine Chief Ministers in which he raised five points. They 
included the unprecedential defeat suffered by the ruling 
Congress in these states, 
133, DEMAND FOR AUTONOMY 
DAS (Sandip), Perspective of centre-states relationship, Janata, 
33; 10, 1978; April 16, 5-6 
Describes how in the present-day Society , the state directly 
or indirectly interferesnv/ith the autonomy of other social 
institutions. In an age of technology and magnitude, the other so-
cial institution's dependence on the state is no doubt increasing. 
But if our level of consciousness about the nature of the state 
dips to unconciousness and we consider the state as ovipotent, 
then spiritual canstrastrophe would be the onteome, as it happened 
in many countries-the worst experfession being fascism. It is 
unfair to explain the nature of Indian nationalism in the light 
of the Western concept of 'nations state'. It was only to fight 
against British imperialism the different linguistic and religion 
groups had combined themselves to be Indian, has to substrance. 
134, DEMAND OP AUTONOMY BY STATES. 
SARKAP. (Subhash Chandra), Centre state relations in India, Commerce, 
129;3306,1974;September 21, 513 
Describes that the acuteness of the problems basetting 
centre. State relationship in this country finds it expression in 
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in the demand for autonomy raised from various political quarters. 
In Tamil Nadu the demand has been made by the ruling party, the 
DMK, while in Gujrat the nearly formed party under the leadership 
of the former chief Minister, Chamanbhai Patel, has made the 
demand for autonomy as one of its main plants to base its public 
appear . conservative, anti-state and pro-centre bias of most of 
the participants robbed the discussions considerably of academic 
objectivity , It is a pity that a vast amount of resources in 
the academic field is seing wasted on effort at rationalising the 
stfetus quo while, the objective of academic enquiry should be to 
consider the alternatives. 
135. DISPUTES 
JAIN(Girilal), More power to states or - - ? Times of India (Delhi) 
1983 July 17 
Describes that the problem of defining the proper relation-
ship between the centrenand the states is older than India's 
independence. It for instance, figured prominentlynin the 
Government of India Act of 1935 and the debate this British 
enhancement toouched off. ivhile the intensity of the concern has 
varied from time to time, the issue has always attracted 
interest. Even during the Nehru era. Chief Minister sought wider 
powers for themselves, though they invariably belonged to the 
Congress party and Nehiru was known to defer to them on questions 
relating to their states. Weak and ineffective centre would produce 
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anarchy and not strong and viable states. By the same logic, 
a strong centre need hibt necessarily mean weak states, 
136. AKALI AGITATION, PUNJAB 
NARAYANA (V?N?). Task before Mr Sarkaria. Tribune (Chandigarh), 
1983; April 1. 
Describes that many members of the constitutent Assembly 
were almost prophetic in oredicting that the static would be 
reduced to the status of municipalities, and Dr. Ambedkar sought 
to alloy their fears by invoking "the good sense of the rulers" 
in Delhi rather than constitutional guarantees on behalf of the 
units. Problem has been accentuated and the quibbling continues, 
Nownthe debate is over what really clinched the appointment of the 
sarkaria commission. Most people in the region say it is the 
Akali agitation, while some attribute it to the formation of the 
Southern Regional Council by four Chief ministers. Both events 
must helped but the proposed review has been necesitated by a 
more basic cause the dawning of the realisation that a time may 
come when a party may form the national Government with a wHide 
diversity of parties being in power in various states. 
137, DISPUTES, BIHAR 
FOISTING A Leader. Statesman (Delhi), 1983; August 17 
Describe that the former Chief Minister of Bihar cleai^ 
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has a large number of supporters whO/ equally clearly, were in 
a tr^centent mood. They obviously took their lead from Mr. Mishra 
»ho described efforts to remove him as "political blackmail", accu-
ssing a handful dissidents of "forcing the High Command to act 
in accordance with their wishes". Whatever the reason for this 
uncharacteristic allegiance, it must have convinced the centre 
that Mr Mishra's dismissed was long overdue , His positions was 
obviously reinforced by the absence of serious challengers, 
especially after Kedar Pandey's death, emboldening him to make 
dangeriously artical references to the centre, Mr. Shandra Shekhar 
Sinqh does not yet have a majority, and he cannot claim much of a 
political base in Bihar, Inspite of centre's backings he may 
find it difficult to establish his position, especially Mr, Mishra 
is allowed to whip up dissent. 
138. CONSTITUTICJTAL PP.OVISION 
CENIRE-STATE relations. Patriot, 1983? July 21 
Describes that the constitution, in spite of its sereal 
identifiable shortcomings has guarented a fairly libral political 
frame work within which the states have exercised a large measure 
of autonomy. While the states autonomy should be made real within 
a defined area so as to make the nation strong, it v;ould be 
blunder if the opposition were persuaded to lend support to the 
demands for a weak centre. Contemporary world conditions should ba 
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not be lost sight of situation after the second world war and the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons is such that the national soveri-
gnties of smaller nations are more unsafe than ever before. If 
nation states are to retain their independence they have to 
be as strong as they possible can be. National independence can not 
be a guaranteed by weak nation. States India is not a federation 
in the sense o£ the U.S. 
139. GUPTA (Bhupesh), This smacks of authoritarianism 
Mr, Prime Minister. New Aqe> 28;19,1978; Many 1, 21 
Describes that the constitution, so far as the distribution o 
powers and functions between the states and the centre is 
concerned, as they have been prescribed in the constitution must 
remain . Great change the political map of the country has under-
gone has not made any impression on Morarji Desai, though he 
himself now heads the central government not as a congressman but 
as a leader of Janata conglomerate. Mere Morarji Desai has 
given out not only. His narrow conservative class outlook but also 
his authori:^arian mental make up , One can searcely imagine or 
more perverse way of looking at our national affairs, particularly 
centre state relations. Prime Minister's unreasonable and authori-
tarian stance has to be met and defeated precisely to take the 
struggle for democracy forward and to safeguard the integrity of 
the nation. 
1 4 0 , DSCENTPvALISATION 
DHARMAVIRA, Two way traffic . Seminar, l56;August,15-19. 
Describes that the few items of disputes and strain between 
the centre and the states can be adjusted satisfactorily by 
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evolving naturally acceptable conventions and oractices. It is 
important that these conventions and practices should be evolved 
as soon as possible , But all talk of Decentralisation with a 
view to weakening the centre is irresponsible. Our past history 
is a sufficient warning against any movement to weaken the centre. 
Whenever the centre has become weak, as we can see from repeated 
instances in our history, the country has fallen apart and this 
can never be allowed to happen again. We can do so only to our 
integrity . But even to our independence. We have a member of 
enemies on our frontiers who would be only too happy to see the 
dismemberment of this country and to see it destroyed. I have no 
doubt in my mind that nobody in this country would like our 
enemies to rejoice, and our country to suffer. 
141, JAGANNADKAli(V), Decentralisation in administration: A pettit 
of view. Indian journal of Public Administration, 24;3,1978; 
July - September, 571-576. 
Describes that the requirement of uniformety has to be 
balanced with the demand for freedom to adapt execution of 
programmes to local conditions. Adaption and appropriatness of 
decentralisation very from function to function. Mere administra-
tive decentralisation is not enough in a welfare state. It must be 
accompanied or preceded by political decentralisation because 
the pirotal aspects in welfare administration is to see that 
the service provided reaches the person requiring it at the time 
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and in the manner specified by the specialist. Distinguishing 
feature of v/elfare administration, as against the maintenance 
of low and order collection of revenue, is to see that consumers 
of sejTvices derive benefit and satisfaction; otherv/ise, public 
investment on the provision of services is wasted. 
142. DEFEAT OF B.J.P. 
BALASUBRAI-IANIAM(K) . Closer among three states. Tribune (Chandigarh 
1983; June 15 
Describes that the dessersions in the B.J.P, feflect the 
clash between the old leadership andnthe new one. Both representing 
different political ideologies. Differences between the two groups 
came into the open at the workers meeting at Banglore Mr. Subblah' 
followers who were Irritated. Because he was not invited to the 
meeting created a furore. Interestingly, Mr. Subblah is also at 
loggerheads with the C,P.(M) in the trade Union front even though 
both parties are supporting the Janata Goverament. Defeat of 
the B.J.P, in the telbunga parliamentary by election has eggrava-
ted the tension in the party. New leadership has also been accused 
of encouraging casteism. 
143. D.M,K.ATTITUDE , TAMIL NADU 
NAGARAJ(G.S,). visible shift in DMK) stratedy, Janata, 28;22,1973; 
July 1, 8-9+ 
Descrlbes that the DMK must be ready for a direct confron-
tation with the centre. So also it should taken control of the 
entire production of sugar and uarn in the state and distribute 
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it to the needy consximers. Through such actions only mass support 
for state autonomy could be built up. Anger of the public 
should be focussed against the centre for failure to implement 
prohibition as a national policy or for payment of compensation 
to states which came forward to implement it , It is not known 
whether the DMK is aware of the various political and economic 
aspects of the issue of state autonomy, and this is being 
discussed separately. 
1 4 4 . FUNDA1-4ENTAL RIGHT 
RAO (Subba). Fundamental rights abrigement will end rule of 
Law. Times of India, 131; 1969; February 28,12. 
Describes that the Bill empowering Parliament to amend the 
constitution to take away or abridge the fundamental rights , 
nov; on its anirel, ran counter to the supremencourt judgement 
which the constitution enjoius on every authority in India to 
obey • If the supreme Court felt that it was wrong it may change 
its ruling. 0 ther way would be to convene a constituent assembly 
or to hold a refrendum to ascertain whether the people did not 
want their rights or they wanted the party is pov/er to abridge 
their rights whatever their opinion the people would deserve the 
result. Under the federal set»up soverign power was divided 
between the centre and the states. Centre had extraordinary powers 
but these had to be used only under extraordinary circtimstance. 
But the constitution resolve differences between the centre 
and the states. 
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145. NAGALAND AND MANIPUR 
NORTH EASTERN tremors. Statesman (lahl), 1982; October 28 
Describes that the worst outrage is, however, attributed 
to the MNF whose depredations have clearly not been contained 
Ultimately ordering the Chief Minister, his cabinet colleagues 
and villages members to resign, failing which "their fate will 
be decided accordingly. But as in Nagaland and Manipur, this 
violence has less to do with tribal grivances than with 
Mr. Lai denga's anxiety to assume office, an ambition that has 
in the past seen fostered by both central inaders and the 
Mizoram unit of the Congreee(l). Mizo rebellion is complicated 
by political rivalry; there are similarly distinguishing local 
features in Tripura, Manipur and Nagiland , But what the centre 
cannot affort to overlook is the danger of all these hostile 
movement, seeking to unite. 
146. OIL EXPLORATION, OFF-SHORE 
KALE (DC). VTho owns offshore oil? Economic and Political weakly, 
3;6, 1968; February 10, 307-309. 
Describes that there is also an opportunity here to 
establish a strong, base in the new technology of offshore oil 
production, somewhat similar to India's position in the nuclear 
field. Uncertain situation in West Asia, which is a principal 
source of crude oil supplies to India, should bet as additional 
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incentive for stepping up petroleum exploration programmes. 
New pertoleum technology , no less than the relatively meage 
reserved of crude whithin the country and their geographical 
distribution, make it appear certain that offshore oil will be 
fully competitive with other energy sources in south and west 
India. Fortunately this is one field where many future inter-
state disputes, similar to the river water disputes, could be 
tackled before they arise. 
147. PLANNING COMMISSION 
PLANNING, THE Centre and the states. Hindu (Madras). 1983; 
August 10 
Describes that in the field of the centre state relations, 
the Planning commission has come to symbolise the concentration 
of pov/er in the hands of the Union Government States have, 
however, resented the Planning Commission's growing encrochment 
into their domain and hence no doubt the suggestion made at the 
seminar on Centre stat"^  relations organised by the Government of 
Kurnataka that the comifaissiDn should be an autonomous body 
fdnctioning not under the Union Government but under a restric-
tised National Development Council in which states would have a 
greater way. It is, however, difficult to s^ e hov/ centralisation 
can be avoided & how the problem of functioning the resources for 
a national plan can be solved through such a reform . There 
is nevertheless, a need for some meaningful change-for ibstance 
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the commission can show a greater sensitivity to the special 
requirements of each state and promote and continuous discussion 
on policy and performance with them rather than regard them as 
were atfent meant only to carry out instructions, 
148. POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
SHANKAR (t^ ). Imperative necessity. Seminar^ 156; August, 25»29 
Describes that a strong and nolent external influence 
intervened in shaping the destiny of the country; and the Muslim 
rule which began in Sind earlier but commenced in Delhi some what 
later was an alieu factor in the Indian system. After independence 
and until recently, the tendency has been towards more and more 
centralisation. What encouraged this tendency was the fact that 
a monolithic political organisations for a number of years existed 
both at the centre on in the states, Fromnthis brief summary 
of political organisations for a niomber of years existed both at 
the centre an in the states. From this brief summary of pdilitical 
and other developments in India it would appear that Indian 
nationhood is a concept of recent growth, that there are aspects 
which throw doubt as to whether that nationhood has attained 
maturiting, that it is difficult to maintain that Indian unity 
has been or is a fact and that conditions and circumstances 
prevalent in the country show contrary trends of centralisation of 
decentralisation. 
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149. RAJMANNAR COMMITTEE, TAMIL NADU 
KATYAL CKK). New compulsions, fresh look: Centre-state relations. 
Hindu (Madras), 1983; March 28. 
Describes that the position of retxirn to the centre's 
dominance-continued till recently and the change of government 
in New Delhi made no difference to it. Centre did not concede 
any substantive point but at the same time avoided any abresi-
wenshy away from dealing with inconvenient demands. In any case 
several othes factors led to the increased ascendancy of the 
ceritre (and the consequent till in the balance) among them being 
hostilities with neighbouring countries, predominance of the 
Congress party and its unitary character centralised planning 
and licencing some years ago the Rajmanwar committee in Tamil 
Nadu suggested that the power of the Government be curtailed 
and the planning commission may be replenced by a body independent 
of the Union executive and political influence. 
150. SOUTHERN COOPERATION COMMITTEE 
R'LDDY(GK). Southern coooeration committee in offing, Hindu 
(Madras); 1983; January 18 
Describes that the idea is being moted provately by some 
opposition leaders that the three southern states of indhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu with non-congress(I) Governments 
should set up a coordination committee to settle their inter-
state dispute and also work out a positive programme of coopera-
tion for ensuring that their collective interests are duly safe-
guarded and they are able to exercise an effective voice in all 
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matters of national importance. One of three chief Ministers who 
has already been sounded is reported to have evinced keen 
interest in the idea, while suggesting that the reactions of the 
other two should also be ascertained informally before publicing 
it. 
151. TAMIL NADU 
MAJUMDAR(Samir). Tamil Nadu wrangle. Link, 15; 23, 1973; 
January 21, 3, 
Points out that the Indian constitution can, however, at 
best be described as 'federal innforni but unitary in spirit". 
Assuming that the constitution is federal, the states, nevertheless, 
do not have full liberty to do whatever they like. Full liberty 
or autonomy does not mean that states should strain laws, throw 
the democratic machinery out of gear, indulge in all sorts of 
randelism and subversive acts threatinq the security of the general 
people and the public bodies-foreing the latter to yield to the 
power and pressure tacties of the local Governments, There are some 
well defined tknits within which the states are to function and 
the Governments thereof to exercise their powerss 
152. WEST BENGAL 
BEGGINING OF Civil war. Thought, 21;16,1959; April 19,3-4 
Describes that it is for constitutional experts to decide 
where and to what extent studied disrespect to the constitution 
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i s Involved In a l l th i s . West Bengal 'Jovernnent's "differences" 
with the centre are of a bas ica l ly d i f ferent category often 
by Implication and sometimes openly rul ing gro'-; in .^ost Bengal 
has been suggestuig that the centre is an imposition. I t s aim 
is not adjustment with but replacement of the centr;: l Governrr.on!:.. 
I t vyould be wrong to assume tha t i t s quarrel is only v/ith the 
congress s t i l l in power at the cen t re , ^uarrel would be with 
any other party at the centre if i t did not opt for aommunism* 
That is what m.aJkes the controversary between Calcut ta and 
ilew Delhi the opening barrage of a c i v i l war. I t would be a 
tragedy Is soft phases in New Delhi proved exr-ressions of a 
sof t mind, 
153. CHITR..^  POLICY towards V/est Bengal: A study in depth. 
Cap i t a l , 169; 4A8, 1972; November 9, 783. 
Author has not indicated the p o l i t i c a l r a t iona le that might 
or ff.ight not have underlaid suoh a centre at aporoach, and has 
been content with enumerating the economic consequences tha t 
have flowed from such a m o^ve. But he has l e f t enough suggestiors 
t h a t unless the trend is reversed and the agony of (Vest Bengal 
i s properly attended t o , the s i t ua t ion may de t e r i o r a t e f a s t . 
Unity of the country can be preserved by a ' s t rong ' centre with 
the help of the police and the army in the short run. Other 
m.ethod the one tha t the congress preached un t i l before 
indeperidence isnto ackno*ledge tha t the country is varied 
one and tha t the autonomy of the s t a t e s should n t t be fa te 
as under the present cons t i tu t ion but rea l with r e q u i s i t e 
f i nanc i a l and p o l i t i c a l powers and guarantees against cen t r a l 
in ter ference open or hidden. 
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15A. DISSOLUTION OF STATS A33E.4ELISS 
DISSOLUTION Ind ian Express ( D e l h i ) , 1980; February 19 
Desc r ibes t h a t the expected d i s o l u t i o n of s t a t e 
Assemblies where the congress ( I ) un i t does not runhhas come, 
O s t e n s i b l e ground fo r the a c t i o n i s t h a t in the nine s t a t e s 
where p r e s i d e n t ' s r u l e has been in t roduced , the e x i s t i n g 
Assemblies do not r e p r e s e n t t h e popular v ; i l l . Somewhat l e a d i n j 
atmosphere had preva i led a f t e r t h e rou t of the fo rces of the 
emergency and t h i s made for an u n c r i t i c a l acceptonce of 
measures which sought to undo the mtcshief of the e.:ier2ency. 
This gave the J a n a t a a c t i o n what must now be seen in h inds igh t 
as t h e dubious cover of s e rv ing publ ic m o r a l i t y . There i s no 
need to be wholly on the de fens ive in c o n s i d e r i n g the mer i t s 
or demer i t s of therCongrefiS ( I ) a c t i o n . This would be absurd 
and ye t t h i s is where the logic of t he argument of popular 
w i l l lead us t o and make a mockery of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l processes , 
155. DISUNITY .^ i-ONG THE DQiOCRATIC PARTIi^ 
STATEo RIGHTS - and d u t i e s . Thought, 23 ;24 , 1971; June 12, 
3-4 
Desc r ibes t h a t t h e e l e c t i o n manifes to of t h e CPI (M) 
f o r t h i s y e a r ' s mid term p o l l ca l l ed fo r t hebsc rapp ing of the 
Ind ian P o l i c e s e r v i c e by p lac ing t h e i r members f u l l y under t h e 
c o n t r o l of t h e s t a t e Governments to which they are a l l o t t e d . 
This was a f rank s ta tement of t h e communist i n t e n t i o n t o 
t u r n i n t o Yenans any s t a t e s in which they might be p i t c h -
f o r t e d i n t o power due t o d i s u n i t y among t h e de-^ocratic p a r t i e s , 
A g r i c u l t u r a l income take f a l l s in t h e i r purviev/, and t h i s 
power has been conspc ious ly u n u t i l i z e d , I t has been l e f t a 
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t o t h e c e n t r e t o t ap p a r t of t h e increased incomes of the 
b igger farmers by taxin-^ such a g r i c u l t u r a l i npu t s as 
f e r t i l i z e r s and t r a c t o r s . T h e s s t a t e s have pEeferred to e x e r c i s e 
t h e i r powers to t a x e l e c t r i c i t y , motor v e h i c l e s , road use 
through o c t r o i , e t c . , and thus add to the a l ready heavy 
burden on idd us t r i e s and t r a d e , s i n c e they are both to 
a l i e n a t e t h e r u r a l vote Banks. 
156. DMK'S DH^ IAi'iD TAiMIL NADU 
CEMTRE-STATS r e l a t i o n s . P a t r i o t . 1983; March 26. 
Desc r ibes t h a t Prime M i n i s t e r i s to be apolanced fo r 
t h e d e c i s i o n t o r e f e r c e n t r e s t a t e s r e l a t i o n s t o a commission. 
There a re s e v e r a l p a r t i e s v/hich want the c e n t r e - s t a t e s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p to change. But not a l l of them are animated by 
t h e same aims. In a somewhat d i f f e r e n t ca t egory are t h e 
demands of the AIA DMK, the DMK and the Akali Dal . Tamil 
p a r t i e s emphasis on autonomy (been use i t o r i g i n a t e d in 
s uccess ionism) acqui res a n e e d l e s l y s t r i d e n t overtone which 
can only give comfort to those who want to p e r s i s t in a 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s t po l icy towards t h e c e n t r e . Only a commission 
of i n q u i r y can go i n t o the mer i t of t h e sugges t ion^ being 
made f o r redesegning c e n t r e s t a t e r e l a t i o n s . But such an 
i n q u i r y must proceed from t h e assumption t h a t the luiity and 
i n t e g r i t y of I nd i a is paramount c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Indian uni ty 
i s s u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n p ropef i s i t i es and the dangers s temining 
from- them. 
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157. DI-X DILEMMA* Link, 15;25,1973; Janu^.ry 26, 44-47 
Desc r ibes t h a t the DMK, of Tamilnadu b e l i e v e s t h a t no 
s t a t e In I n d i a is " subord ina t e" to t h e Union and t h a t " s t a t e 
s o v e r i g n t y i s as comprehensive as P a r i i amen t r y sove re ign ty a t 
^he c e n t r e . Not merely does i t wants more powers arid a u t h o r i t y 
f o r the s t a t e s i t in f a c t s seeks t o reduce t h e Union Covernrnant 
t o a "non -cen t r e " to be run by a vaguely def ined" composite 
Government , I t says noncha l an t ly t h a t the Union Governmenb 
should be run by the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of va r ious p o l i t i c a l 
pa i t t i es in power in the s t a t e s , DMK's demand for g r e a t e r 
f i nance r e sou rces fo r the s t a t e s I t accep tab le to the l e f t 
p a r t i e s , but does not command any suppor t as an i ssue of 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n wi th the c e n t r e . DMK i s i t s e l f s p l i t in two, arid 
t h e new Anna DMK ( s t i l l t o demonst ra te i t s p o l i t i c a l r o o t s ) 
wants autonomy for the people t o get r id of the unpopular 
DMK regime" , 
158. RULL T.'^ J'IIL KADU 
TMIL NADU Commands s t a t e autonomy. Commerce, 123; 3285, 1974; 
Apr i l 27, 584,587. 
Desc r ibes t h a t t hey s t r e s s e d the need to have a strongs 
c e n t r e t o p rese rve the un i ty of the c o u n t r y . Nationwould have 
Jo ponder deeply over t h e demand for autonomy by people who 
"were born and brought up in s e p a r a t i o n " . They considered i t 
a s t u n t by t h e DMK to ge t over i t waning p o p u l a r i t y . Ruling 
DNK p a r t y had abused the e x i s t i n g powers and did not deserve 
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to be entrusted with increased powers in the name oi s t a t e 
autonomy. Chief Minister , he sa id , faced with the s i t ua t i on of 
his party losing public support and confidence was trying to 
untouch a f rezly among his partymen in the same of c t a t e 
autonomy , I t was dangeroua to arm t ion and his party with more 
powers. If provisions in the present cons t i t u t ion were properly 
enforced the s t a t e s would get adequate powers. 
159. ECONOMIC, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION PLAN 
RAO (NVasuki). s t a t e s not cooperating on NCR/Plan, ind ian Exp, 
(Delhi ) , 1983; June 9 
Describes tha t the c en t r e ' s plan for a National Capi tal 
Region (NCR) v/as once again been s ta l l ed for wait oi co-operatiot 
from the three neighbouring s t a t e s of Delhi , I t was proposed 
to take up the integrated development of the region in sectors 
l i ke water supply, flood con t ro l , t r anspor t , power housing 
and soc ia l amenities , V/hen the congress(I) returned to power 
in 1980, i t revieved the concept of NCR, leading to several 
meetings with the chief Ministers concerned and re su l t ing 
in the agreement. Under the agreement , a cen t ra l s t a tu to ry bo::.re 
w i l l be se t up to prepare plans at the regional Ivee l , channel 
funds ynd f a c i l i t a t e implementation by the s t a t e s concerned. 
Board w i l l have the Union works and Housing Ministers as 
Chairman, Chief Ministers of U.P. Haryana a'ld Rajastnan, the 
governor of Delhi and some cen t ra l Ministers as .:;embers. 
IG o 
160. PLATINING 
3 I N G H ( V B ) . oomp i n s t i t u t i o n a l requireffients f o r Incii-n:i Ploznin^', 
Mainstream. 7 ; 45 , 1S69; Ju ly 1?, 1 3 - l 6 . 
Descr ibes thc^t t h e forffiulati-n and execut ion of a s o c i a l 
and econonic plan i s a mat te r of c o n s t i t u t i o n . j u r i s d i c t i o n oi 
both the Union and the s t a t e Governnnant, CounLry has chosen 
p lann ing as t h e ins t rument for e f f e c t i n g econon'ic dev^loon^ent. 
Union s t a t e s r e l a t i o n s are to be shaped in t h e conte>ct of 
planned economic development of the count ry wi th a vlev; to 
e l i m i n a t i n g pover ty , ignorance and d i s e a s e from our anc ien t 
land w i t h i n our l i f e - t i m e , Ind ian c o n s t i t u t i o n has i nhe ren t 
t e n d e n c i e s t o weaken the ope ra t ion of c e n t r a l i s e d d i r e c t i o n s 
by the planning a u t h o r i t i e s , : iynthes i . sa t ioa of th :^- needs of 
s t a t e s and s u b - s t a t e s should be viewed as an e s s e n t i a l 
f e a t u r e of IndiGin s o c i a l i s t t r a n s i t i o n . Dynamic s o c i a l fo rce 
comes i n t o motion for s o c i a l i s t transform;-,tion the prfsen" 
Union s t a t e s c o n f l i c t s w i l l be coverted i n t o a ha,i l thy 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of f u i c t i o n s fo r the f u l l f i l m e n t of the commonly 
accepted g o a l , 
1 6 1 . ELECTIONS 
EMD of u n c e r t a i n i t y , Amcita Bazar P a t r i k a , 1980; Feoruary 19 
Descr ibes t h a t i t i s easy t o find poe t i c j u s t i c e in the 
c e n t r e ' s dee i s ion t o d i smiss the non-Con r e s s ( I ) ;overnn':;nt3 
of n ine s t a t e s , d i s o l v e the Assemblies , cnn impose o r e s i d a n t ' a 
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rule as a prelmde to fresh Assembly e l ec t ions . Only the 
Assembly e lect ions in these nine s t a t e s w i l l shov, to *hst 
extent the cen t r e ' s contention tha t the dissolved Ht^seinblies 
did not r e f l e c t the wi l l of the people is cor rec t . Cffshoot 
of the verdic t wi l l be the r e l a t i v e s t rengths of the rul ing 
party and the opposition in the Rajya Sabha one thir-d of 
whose members w i l l r e t i r e in about s i x v/eeks tirr.e. --jtability 
of the dismissed Ministers had been undermined by the opl i t in 
the Jana ta , and the staggering victory of the Congress (I) in 
the Lok Sabha poll had Ins tan t ly given r i s e to soec alatio-.s 
over v/hether the new Government at the centre woul:- act on 
the precedent l^f t by the Janata . 
162, KAICATl(3""tis C.)» Saving the cons t i t u t i on : Doubts about 
the Scrkar la Commission, statesman (Delhi) , l983;July 27. 
Describes tha t Sarkar ia comm.ission is thu.^ unique both in 
i t s scope and potent ia l impact. This is borne out by the fact 
t ha t Mrs, Gandhi is cons t i tu t ion of the panel was very favour-
ably recived even by her c r i t i c s , though and few did consider 
I t to be only a gimmick to cope with p o l i t i c a l developments 
in the South and the Punjab ag i t a t ion . Relations between 
New Delhi and the s t a t e s l i e at the core of ou>v cons t i tu t ion , 
and are an ic ia l for the proper functioning of the accepted 
system of governance, whether i t be called federal or 
un i t a ry . Whatever favoured term, the Indian cons t i tu t ion is 
a mixture of the s t rength and weakness associated with the 
governance of advanced democratic countr ies from which the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n Assembly draw in sp i r a t i on . Sarkaria commissi on 
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has been appointed to address i t s e l f t o the d i f f i c u l t 
t a s k of r e s u r r e c t i n g the s p i r i t t h a t i n sp i r ed the founding 
f a t h e r s of our c o n s t i t u t i o n , 
153. REDDY(RK). Big shadow over c e n t r e - s t a t e t i e s . Hindu. 
1980; February 3 
Descr ibes t h a t t h e foremost t a s k before the Prime M i n i s t e r 
now i s t o complete t h e format ion of her c a b i n e t soon, s i nce 
many of M i n i s t e r s inducted dur ing the f i r s t phase w i l l not be 
ab le t o c o n c e n t r a t e on the work of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o r t f o l i o s 
u n t i l they have shed t h e i r a d d i t i o n a l c h a r g e s . Threatened 
d i s s o l u t i o n of a number of s t a t e l e g i s l a t m r e s t o pave the 
way f o r f r e s h Assembly e l e c t i o n s con t inues to c a s t a big 
shadow over c e n t r e s t a t e r e l a t i o n s a t a t ims when they should 
a l l be working t o g e t h e r in c l o s e coopera t ion to r e s t o r e law 
and o r d e r , r ev ive the economy and provide the necessa ry t h r u s t 
a t v a r i o u s l e v e l s fo r g e t t i n g over the p r e v a i l i n g s t a g n a t i o n , 
Nev/ Government can not afford to waste any more t ime In comin^ 
forward wi th q u a l i t a t i v e l y b e t t e r s s o l u t i o n s t o we l l defined 
problems to r e s t o r e the warning conf idence in the c o u n t r y ' s 
p o l i t i c a l sys tem, 
1 6 | , FII^ !i\I>yCE 
AFTER A year in o f f i ce . Tr ibune(Chandlgarh) . 1981; June 10 
Desc r ibes t h a t t h e r e i s not a g r e a t d e a l of ^ i f f e r e n c e s 
i n t h e performance of t h e e i g h t congress ( I ) Governments. Much 
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of the i rn time has been spent In dealing with serious law 
and order problems (notably in U.P., Bihar and Gujrat) , or 
in attempts to sor t out leadership problems (as , for example, 
in Madhya Pradesh, Gujrat and Punjab), In these condi t ions , 
and in the general ly unsa t i s f iac tory economic s i t u a t i o n , 
development work has not by any means proved to be s ign i f i can t . 
Punjab has not done badly inso i t e of unfirmdly oulls and 
pressures from within the suling party and Akali h o s t i l i t y 
a r i s i n g from in ternal s t r i f o anci ::, chi ci.ic d i s l i k e of those in 
power, including themselves, Mr. Darbara Singh's "Mr. Clean" 
image has for tunate ly remained unimpaired over the year. 
Whether his refusal to add to his min i s t e r i a l team is good 
for htm or otherwise is another matter . 
165. AID TO Sarkar ia . Indian Express (Delhi) , 1983; August 9 
Describes tha t the autonomous planning commission, should 
confine i t s e l f to overal l planning and investment =aid d ives t 
i t s e l f of the r e spons ib i l i ty for a l l forms of gronts . This 
should be l e f t to the Finance Commission and monitored by a 
na t iona l expenditure commission. How exactly cen t r e - s t a t e 
r e l a t i o n s should be redrawn is what the sa rka r i a commission 
i s a l l about, Basic point is the need to reduce over-cent ra l -
i s a t ion which has resul ted in the decl ine of federal i n s t i t u t ions 
Argument tha t strong s t a t e s mean and weak centre is spur ious . 
Problem must be examined from the nat ional view ooints and 
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i t goes v/ithout saying that the v/hole cannot be strong if 
the parts are weak or discontented. Greater autonomy means 
grea;feer r e spons ib i l i t y and fever excusses for f a i l u r e s . 
I r r e spec t ive of which party rules at the cent re and which 
pa r t i e s govern the s t a t e s , a greater say to the l a t t e r in 
managing t h e i r affa i rs w i l l s trengthen and not weaken the 
na t ion . 
166. BARRS:-! C0^ ;FERK1CE. Hindustan Times (Delhi) , 1967; 
April 13 
Describes tha t ce r t a in procedural and operat ional gro'una 
ru les have also to be agreed upon and these r'ules have necess.ari 
ly to be in conformity with the federal pr inciples of our 
cons t i t u t ion in more meaningful ways than it:- the case a t the 
moment. Leadership at the centre has been far too busy with 
p o l i t i c a l manoeurlngs of various kinds to have found the 
time to s o r t out i t s own ideas on these m.atters. I t ia impo-
s s i b l e to quarel with Desal ' s de f i c i t Budgets, running 
expensive overdrafts with the Reserce Bank and incurring 
addi t ional expenditure on administrat ion in the expectation 
of automatic cen t ra l a s s i s t aace . I t would be necessary for 
the cen t ra l Government as a whole to demonstrate th^jt i t 
shares Desal ' s assesment of the s i t ua t i on before Chief 
Minister find such assessment credible and one t h i t they 
are obliged to respect . 
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167. BHATTACHARYA (Asoke), Centre .Sta te syndrome. P a t r i o t . 
1981; April 13 
Describes tha t the cen t r e - s t a t e economic r e l e t ions ti, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y between V/est Bengal and the cen t re , have long 
been s t ra ined since the f i r s t United Front came to oower in 1967. 
Slogan for more power to the s t a t e s is a brain cliil^ of the 
Bengal Marxist and had various dimensions during verioLj;s s ta res 
of p o l i t i c - 1 development. Supreme court has in th i s t a t e of 
West Bengal Vs union of India case held a s imi lar vein suprenie 
Court observed. "In f inancia l mattore though the s t a t e s anci 
the Union have consolidated funds ofntheir own, the sources 
a l lo t t ed to the Union appear to be parennial ; the s t a t e s 
also depend upon the Union for a l locat ion of funds from 
and out of taxes collected by i t and also for grants ; 
though there is no d i r ec t control of the Union over the 
f ie ld of finance of the s t a t e s , 
168. CENTRE AIID S ta t e s . Hindustan Times. 1984; i-iarch 23 
Describes that some s t a t e governm.ents which accused 
the centre of being unfair to them did not properly u t i l i s e 
the funds given to them for specif ic purposes. Not only the 
s t a t e Governments but thf= centre also commits such mlsta'^es. 
There i s , therefore , no point in the centre and th^ s t a t e s 
pointing the accussing f inger at each other . P o l i t i c a l d i f feren-
ces between them should not influence f i s c a l and f iaanc ia l 
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s t r a t e g y . Mow tha t most s t a t e s have presented the i r ?nnual 
budgets, t he i r f i s c a l s t ra tegy is c l e a r . There is har'dly a 
s t a t e tha t has not sought and received a higher olan alloc at ion. 
These has been l i t t l e attempt to enforce financtcsl d i sc ip l ine 
or to s lash non-plan expenditure. But i t i3 equally true thi-t 
the centre has not exactly se t an exaaiolc in presently mana:;:ing 
i t s f inances, 
159. CEI^ TRE STATS t i e s . Indian Express (Delhi) , r9S3; :-:arcn ?6 
Describes tha t the f inanc ia l re lat iDnshtp betv/een the centr 
and s t a t e s has become a thoring issues severa l s t a t e s feel ti'i-,;t 
they are not get t ing t h e i r due share o± t axes . Centre has been 
inclined to increase corpor- te tax, cu:::tDms duty and surchc.rges, 
none of v;hich is shared v i t h the s t a t e s . Administered prices 
in the cen t r a l sector have also been l iked considprc.uly, L;vin 
revenue, once a maftor source of incoTie, has become noribuTid. 
Agricul tura l tncom.e tax is not levied by the s t a t e s in power, 
i r r i g a t i o n axid road t r anspor t , but the i r operation r e s u l t s , 
in losses of over Rs. 1,000 crore and year instead of a p ro f i t . 
Sarkar ia commission must go into a l l these mat te r s . I t myst 
not be seen merely as a device to t ransfer miore Dov;ers to the 
s t a t e s or the cen t re . I t must also f ix r e spons ib i l i t y for thc-
non-use or misuse of powers tha t already e x i s t . 
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170. GH4TRE-STATES l i e s . Tribune (Chandigarh) . 158:;; august 19 
Describes tha t the Union retained the power to Sci/ictlon 
ne-; units which are of National importance, Thlo is as i t shoalc 
be . Eat in course of time i t s tretched the l i s t by adding 
the nev; categories with the r e su l t tha t i t ^vas acquired the 
author i ty to perrrtt nearly 95 percent of the nev/ industii&l 
u n i t s . S ta tes have been le f t with only marginal power. i-.;esr 
t o t a l domination in the matter of finances is yet ai'iothtr^r 
po in t . Ratioaal formula evolved af ter deta i led discussions 
between the centre amd the s t a t e s and binding on both at l eas t 
for a f ive year period would be more acceptable and less 
humiliating than the present "discret ionary grc-ints". Ranglore 
seminar seems to have overacted in demaiiding the revocation of 
Ar t i c l e 365, v;hich enpowers the Union to disf.oiss ^;und st;!te 
Government if i t refuses to enforce any cen t ra l d i r ec t ive or 
l e g i s l a t i o n . 
ly* . CKAV/LA(G3). CMS ignore warnln_; on overdraf ts . Indian 
Express (Delhi) , 1983; June 30 
Describes that at the time of formulatioxa of annucil 
plan outlays ear ly th is year, a l l s t a t e s had giv-a unJertakin.^' 
to mobilise addi t ion?! resources and very r^artictl,>r a t i e s . But 
almost a l l of them avoided lying ne\: t-ixes in the i r annual 
budgets for fear of :i;bl:.c c r i t i c i s m . Four s t a t e s - Bihar, 
Haryana, Karnatalca and -/est Bengal are going in for huge tuaaati-
c touted overdrafts for the l a s t four months. ThoU:^ h, siirpr Is In.^ly, 
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these s t a t e s have already been given advcuices ai'ii obhe.' firiafici,,:! 
f . ' c i l i t i e s by the centre to manage the i r bijdget, but t^ey hf.ve 
s t i l l been going for huge overdraf t s . P o l i t i c a l coxoulsionc 
pr^event the finance Ministry and the Reserve Bank frop^ enferci::^; 
d i sc ip l ines in Haryana and Bihar, though the i r finaric-- have 
been unmanageable for a long time. 
172. CPM ELUSPRmr. Times of India (Delhi) ; 1S83; Augurt 31 
Describes tha t the centre v/oulJ have l i t t l e ; or no Is-ver i.ga 
over how ghe s t a t e s behave , especia l ly those where governments 
or par t ies adhering to r igid ideologis of one kind or aziotner 
hold away. No doubt, v/here one party is in office at the centre 
and opposing par t ies sum one or more s t a t e s the former may be 
inclined to use the power given to i t to re in in the s t a t e s frorr. 
overstappfcng the l imi ts of t h e i r aatonomy for par t isan ends. But 
t h a t does not Jus t i f ied wanting to throw out the baby with trie 
bath water. I t also suggested se t t i ng and side 75 percent of t'ne 
t o t a l revenue raised by the centre from a l l sources for d i s t r i . -
bution among the s t a t e s with the finance commission responsiblt; 
only for determining how tha t take must be divided dtiiong tnem. 
There is room for accomodation on th is score . 
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173. DIWAivi (Paras) , Roots of centre s t a t e StrzSnz, Tribune 
(Chandigarh) 1982; October 2 
Describes tha t federalism as a form of government is 
how prac t i sed , in v.arious modes. By 19 countr ies around trie 
world, including the U.S.A., the U.S.3.R. and India . In a country 
l i k e India , with such d i v e r s i t i e s in r e a l , r e l i g ion , langu^^o 
and c u l t u r e , na t iona l in tegra t ion can be achieved only through 
conscious voluntary e f f o r t s . Devolution of power may help 
ward off f i ss ioarous tendencies instead of encouraging them. 
Strong and unt i t led India can only be one in which the deinocratlc 
asp i ra t ions and the d i s t inc t iveness of the oeoole of d i f fe ren t 
s t a t e s , but no account do we v/ant a week cen t r e . 3ince economy 
i s regressing and the s t a t e s are poor f i s ca l managers the 
c ry for more f i s ca l autonomy acquelder brother ro le to the 
Union, 
174. SIuS .(\iMD A?:G, People's democracy, h\ 9, 1958; Karch 3,2 
Both Gopalan and Nambood iripad said that the intent ion 
behind a l l these ulterances and statements of the members of 
Central government and congress leadership were only to topple 
Kerala 
the present tKxdtE^Government, Both of them strongly f e l t tha t 
the Hyderabad statements of the congress and these calculated 
a t tacks on the volunteer corps of the Party were part of t h i s 
s i n i s t e r move. Asked if he expected any danger to his government 
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from the centre, Nainboodipad told that the danger v/as 
there from the Centre. Hyderabad resolution of the congress 
and Press reports indicated that. To overthDow the Kerala 
Government/ Gopalan pointed out, the centre had launched 
a "pincer movement" - malicious propaganda againfct the 
party's volunteer organisation, attack on the party, 
pressure through slopping subsidy on food supplies, non-
supply of the promised quota of rice threat of withdrawn 
overdraft facilities to the State from reserve bank. 
175. HIGH TIME to review centre-state relations. New Age, 
17; 12, 1969; March 23, 2 
Describes that different parties, representing 
different social and class intereste, are taking the place 
one monopolised by the congress. In fact even in the railing 
congress circtes there are open moves to prepare for the 
forge reactiontry coalitions. Centre has concentrated too 
much economic power in its hands and, worse still it has 
got into the habit of treating the states as so many 
charity boys. States on the other hand are consoled with 
small mercies. Centre state relations can not be maintained 
on an even keel, much less developed, by rigidly hugging 
intact the farmers of the constitution laid down two decades 
ago. At the Union level centre state relations should be 
a direct responsibility of the Prime Minister, Other changes, 
agreed conventions should be evolved for the conduct of 
centre state relations. 
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175. LIMAYE (Madhu). Pour pillar state. Seminar, 156; August, 
19-24 
Describes that the British irulers created in India a 
highly centralised state system which was qualitatively different 
from the centralised empires which arose in the long course of 
Indian history with the rise of Indian national consciousness, 
the demand for self-government rapidly gained ground. Cities 
and districts should be given well defined pov/ers of taxation 
such as octroi/ property taxes, etc. Taxes on goods and 
passengers within city limits ought to be handed over to them. 
They must also be given a share in the revenue from state 
excise duties and sales tax. So far as possible, the states 
should be made financially independent of the centre, the local 
bodies, two, should have their own sources of revenue not 
dependent upon the sweet will of the state legislature. Clearly, 
the creation of four pillar state and socialised economy alone 
will ensure a fair deal for the down-troddon sections of our 
society* 
177. LOGIC OF distance. Statesman (Delhi), 1981; November 3 
Describes that centre's control should not extend beyond 
defence, finance, communication and foreign relations may be 
cited as showing what the President may unwillingly have 
encouraged. That they should now be made by the Head of State 
under them much greater force. Any controversy over whether we 
should have expressed these views while still in office should 
not obscure the merit of his arguments. Indeed, it can no 
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longer be convincingly argued that demands for greater state 
autonomy are made by people unfamiliar with the centre's 
inescapable responsibilities. Central authority can necessarily 
claim "greater competance, wisdom and objectivity or greater 
immunity from extraneous influence. Kind of autonomy the 
President and many others have in mind need not be a threat to 
national integrity, it could even be a harmonizing force. 
178. MATHUR IPC) . Centre state relations in economic sphere. 
Hindu (Madras), 1984; January 17 
Describes that the problem is looked at by "opposition" 
groups as the product of the dominance of the Congress (l); 
and some of the demands for change flowing from the perception, 
leek perspective and, if accepted, would have adverse consequence 
on the stability and development of the country. On the other 
hand, the supporters of the ruling party percieve the contro-
versy only as one more challenge to the congress(I) and its 
leadership; and they resist even those suggestions which are 
realistic and which, if implemented, would remove some of the 
anomalies that have come to light over the last three decades. 
Trouble arises because of the differing perceptions of the 
Central state Governments with regard to the subjects in which 
coordination by the centre is called for. 
175 
179. MEHTA(Balraj)• Why states cannot but be in the red. 
Amrita Bazai: Patrlka, 1981; March 30 
Describes that state financial in the red is a pheno-
menon inherent in the present financial and fiscal system and 
average went of central state relations. Marked feature of this 
system arrangement is that state Governments options and powers 
for resource mobilisation are severely restricted even while 
their accountability for carrying out takes of administration, 
development and public welfare are vest and constantly grov/ing. 
This feature is duly recognised in the statutory provisions for 
devolution of financial resources from the centre to the state 
under Finance Commission's awards and nor statutory arrangements 
for financial assistance for development plans of the state 
through the Planning Commission. But the smooth and meaningful 
working of these arrangements depends critically on the initfetive 
and purposeful leadership of the Union Goverranent, 
180. NEED FOR Harmony. Northern Indian Patrika, 1967; 
April 13. 
Disagreements that croppednup between the representatives 
of the centre ancl the states at the Chief Minister's conference 
on certain outstanding financial issues underline the urgency 
of an early mutual adjustment of relationship in this behalf 
states have been made to part with certain important sources 
of income over the past years. Right to levy sales tax on 
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textiles^ sugar and tobacco in return for additional excise 
duties on them to be distributed in a manner to be decided 
upon by the centre may be cited as a gloring instance. Protest 
put forward on that occasion by Chief Ministers of certain 
prominent states were not heeded at the time. But what was 
feasible at a time when all the state Governments were run by 
the congress may not understandably be easy now in the 
changed background, 
181. NO PEAR of breaknup Hindustan Tlmes^ 1983; March 3 
Describes that the Prime Minister has done well to 
repudiate the persistent camerd fleated by those whose motives 
cannot but be suspect that India is in imminent danger of being 
balkamised Prime Minister's speech was a masterly demolition of 
the various charges levelled against the government . She 
rightly reminded the nation that India's economy could not be 
completely isolated from the international economic environment 
which was far from element. Despite that and a year of disastrous 
drought, India rechained one of the few countries to keep the 
average rate of inflation down to a low rate. Her comment that 
she was looking for a new Bay, not a rehash of old ideologies "-^i 
should silence her critics. In the midst of prophecies of doom. 
Prime Minister successfully set the record straight by high-
lighting the diverse achievements ;r)f nbhe nation. 
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182. NOV/ AGAINST Kerala. People's democracy, 4; 6, 1968; 
February 11, 
Describes that the congress centre had promised a supply 
of 17,000 tons of rice a month to Kerala when that state under 
President's rule. But after the United front Government assxamed 
office, this supply, the absoluterminimum required to maintain 
a 603 rationhad never been made. It has not been due to supplies 
from the centre but due to the fact that the United front 
Government had been able to do effective procurement inside the 
state Congress centre refuses to honour its promise of making 
these supplies, it xjses all the powers it has illegally unassed 
to deny the right to Kerala to buy food grains from other 
states nLn the country or from abroad the only aim is to starve 
the people of Kerala for the Crime of having voted the congress 
out of office and, if possible, generate discontent amongst the 
politically backward sections of the people and use them as the 
lose for a new "liberation struggle", 
183. O'/ER TO Sarkaria. Indian Express (Delhi), 1983; June 9 
Describes that there is no categorical limitation other 
than the "scheme and framework of the constitution", vjhich may 
or may not preclude constitutional amendments. Opposition hss 
been particularly insistent on a fiscal com^ i^ssion as an 
eye wash , It v/ould be premature to adopt such a view and uniwise 
to boycott it. To do so would be needlesly to sharpen confront-
ation and even give the Government an opening to with draw 
the commission or devalue its importance. On the other hand. 
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the commission should be given full cooperation and influenced 
into taking a broad and liberal view of its role even if the 
suggested time schedule could pre-empt centre state relations 
being made an issue if a snap election is called before next 
June • In any event the Government stout lose no further time 
in completing the membership of the commission defining its 
status, 
184, PARANJAPE(HK). Centre state relations. Seminar, 156; 
August, 44-46 
Describes that the states were put almost at the mercy 
of the centre for an increasingly large part of their over-all 
financial requirements, and especially the requirements of 
developments finance. As a result of the strong fincncJaL positic 
of the Centre, the states authority and autonomy even in subjects 
which where within their sphere under the constitution had 
been significantly reduced. Central authorities through schematic 
assistance related to specific pattern of expenditure, and 
centrally sponsored schemes, were almost in a position to lay 
down the law for the states no only in the matter of abroad 
priorities , But regarding many details of projects and 
prograiranes- their formulation and implementation. This was not 
useful from the point of view of effectively meeting the states 
developmental requirements, nor did it help to develop a sense 
of earnestness and responsibility among the state authorities. 
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185. POOR WAY TO function. Indian Express (Delhi), 1983; 
June 20 
Describes that it is also insulting to the eminent public 
figures who have been asked to give their time to labour on 
a delicate and complex issue of state policy. This was a weighted 
tax rebate offered to industrial iaouses and others for making 
donations tonor directly undertaking approved rural development 
programmes. Flow of funds to many useful and ever poineering mral 
development projects had dried up on account of the uncertainty 
cast on both procedures and programmes. It is odd that a new 
fund should be proposed when there already is an official rural 
development fund managed by the peoples . Action for develop-
ment (India) or DAD , a registered society sponsored by the 
Ministry of Agriculture of which the minister is President. 
Once again Governments intentions are suspect and good work 
gaining acceleration has been scuttled. This is anti development 
and immical to voluntarism. 
186. RANGACHARI (K). Centre state issues: Grievances and 
mistakes Statesman (Delhi)» 1983; April 1 
Describes that the states should not disown responsibility 
for proving where the centre can stop its spending to divert the 
saving to the states, on the groundnthat the balance of advan-
tage to the nation is decidedly in favour of such diversion. 
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centre frequently commits avoidable mistakes like therecent 
increase in the income tax sxircharge, which presumably the 
disingenous bureaucrates in the finance Ministry suggested 
as compensation for securing further concessions for the 
salaried persons at their nlevels. While the centre is ready to 
invoke the residuary power of taxation to tap other sources 
like wealth and gift taxes andnthe interest rate tax, it has 
not fully explored the scope for taxationwwhhich it alone can 
levy and collect but should assign the revenue to the states. 
187, REDDY (Narendra). Budgets shift focus on Centre-state 
tries, Indian Express (Delhi), 1984; xMarch 25 
Describe that the several state governments had left 
deficits hoping to cover them up not only through higher devolu-
tionoof resources expected from the Eighth Finance Commission, 
But also through the higher central assistance which had been 
promised by the centre. Though Finance minister Pranab Mukerjee 
had promised in his budget speech a special scheme of additional 
assistance to those states which had managed their finances 
well. Deficit in the Budgets ofithe state governments also has 
a different connotation than the deficit indicated in the central 
budget. Even though there are revenue surpluses, several state 
governments deliberately present deficit budgets, Negative 
cash balances indicated at the time of the presentation of the 
budget are expected to be covered up later through advance 
plan assistance from the centre and other means. 
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188. REDDY (Narendra). Plan dificits to strain centre state 
lies. Indian Exoress (^ Delhi), 1983; July 25. 
Describes that all the states are understood to have 
agreed to reduce the six Plan allocations with no immediate 
sources of additional revenue surpluses in view. Centre on its 
parts, is not committing any extra assistance and is pressing 
the state governments to improve their financial position by 
improving the state-run undertakings performance and also by 
resorting to additional taxes. Centre is also not in a position 
to salvage the situation. Paced with rising prices and a not to 
bright monsoon prospects, there would be limits to deficit 
financing . Demand is also likely to be voiced, if the present 
mood of some of the state governments is any indication, that 
the terms of Sarkaria commission which the centre has already 
agreed to set up to go into the centre state financial relations 
to be broader and also include such issues. 
189. REDDY (Narendra). Plan panel caught in controversy. Indian 
Express(Delhi), 1983; September 22 
Describes that of late, the Chief Ministers of West 
Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh have been demanding 
allocation of plann funds on a statutory Basis like the devolu-
tion of funds by the Finance Commission. They are also deman-
ding that the state Governments should be given more freedom in 
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the preparation of plans and distribution of sectoral alloca-
tions, Mr. Jagannath apparently had a grouse nthat he v^ as repla-
ced on the ground of financial wishramagement of the state. 
Planning commission was no doubt concerned over the Bihar 
Government joining the ranks of West Bengal Government by 
resorting to continued over draft on the Reserve Bank centre 
which was planning to discipline the West ^^ engal Government 
wasin a quandary as to how to take action before it set the house 
of the state ruled by-its own party in order. 
190, REGIONAL AUTONOMY, Hindustan times^ 1981; December 18 
Describes that theere are many faces of exploitation, 
economic, social and political. In the tribal belt, mahajana 
have captured local markets, they buy up the villagers produce 
cheaply but sell them goods dear, ^ n the mining and forest areas 
wages for contract labour are invariably belovi? the staturory 
minimum, Non tribal or plains people cantractors, traders, and 
government officials from an exploitative nat work which manif-
ests itself in many ways including the rape of tribal women. 
Allocation of resources within each state tends tonbe frossly 
imbalanced. More dispersed localised industrial activity establi-
shed better average income than activity based on a few large 
projects unrelated to the local economy. Employment generated 
from the large mining undertakings has ilways benefited outsider^, 
rather than the local people. 
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191. REMOVING AN0I4ALIES in Centre State relations. Capital, 
162; 466, 1969; June 19, 1172-1173 
Describes that under the Indian federation, the territorial 
jurisdiction of each of the states can be changed, the states 
themselves abolished and new states created, v/ithout restoring 
to the orocedure prescribed for the amending the constitution. 
In other words, the territorial pattemnof the federal system, 
as it exists today, can be reorganised with suitable adjustments, 
without resorting to the comparatively difficult process of a 
constitutional amendment. Centre has created big g±ants to 
regulate irrigations and generate powerful fledged Minist3ry of 
irrigation and power is planning and financing these projects. 
In pursuit of ideoldgy the centre is to subsidise Prohibition and 
the propagation of Hindi. All these have had adverse effects on 
centre state relations, ^ t has made the states lethargic and 
even indifference to mobilise resources tonfinance their consti-
tutional obligations, 
192. RUSTAI^ JI (KP). Relying on central help, Indian "Jxpcess 
(Delhi), 1983; *^ ctober 7 
Describes that the real dilemma of centre. State relations 
is in the realm of law and order , Hardly any state in India 
today can stand on its own feet when a difficult situation arises. 
It has to asked for central assistance in the shape of para-
military forces of the Union , it has to depend on central grants 
for improving policing, it has to take the help of central 
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intelligence agencies, particularly of thej?e is insurgency, 
terrorism and organised sabotage, even take central abuse and 
insult if any thing goes wrong yet police as a state subject, not 
even on the concurrent list, and decentralisation, so important 
in other sphere, is not even mentioned in the context of law 
and order by those who seek a new centre state relationship. 
193. STATS FINANCES. Patriot (New Delhi), 1967; April 13 
Describes that there may be weight in the complaint by some 
states that the centre has been occasionally partial and that a 
scientific study of resources has not been made nor the most 
equitable way of apportioning them work out, but public opinion 
will not generally accept the plea that the states have tried 
for economy or even efficient financial administration and that 
their behaviour as borrowers deserves either licensing or kindnes, 
It is equally true that state Government employees demand for 
increase in DA at per with central Government servants is 
unexceptionable ; but by themselves they are not reasons for the 
Central Government to resort to steps that lead to uncontrollable 
inflation state and the centre face is a single problem. It is 
one of intelligent financial administration on the basis of 
self-reliance, 
194. STATES IN the red. Inian Express (Delhi) , 1984; March 24 
Describes that the states are obviously depending on the 
Finance Commission to boost their income. In the oast, the 
Finance Commission award has transfered thousf-.nds of crores of 
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irupees from the centre to the states. But this time the 
Finance commission is simply not going to plug the revenue 
gap of states but base its award on certain noums to be follo^ r^ed 
by the states in regard to revenue from irrigation, transjpert 
corporations and state electricity boards. Faced v/ith a financial 
many states have sought to raise extra revenue in their 
budgets. There has been a cavalier attitude in the states towards 
the public sector which has become a porX barrel to line the 
pockets of politicians and bestow patronage. States have long 
demanded a greater share of finances. But this must go with a 
much greater sense of financial responsibility. 
195. THAYARAJ(MJK), Mobilisation and transfer of resources. 
Main stgeam, 16;24,1978; February 11,28-30 
Describes that the seriousness of economic and social probler 
in India call for bolder plans. Bolder plans need bigger effots 
in mobilising resources. Yet resources are not always mobilised 
from those who have the ability to pay. Nor they are applied 
where they would confer quick benefit to those whose needs are 
most urgent, 75% of the central revenue should be shared with the 
states. Needs of the centre are often exaggerated. Defence expen-
diture keeps on mounting even when there is no serious challenge t 
our security from any of our neighbours. Centre could tax indistrd 
and commercial property and wealth more intensively and the states 
could a© so with agriculture income especially in the higher 
brackets. Population without protected portable drinking water 
supply should also be given considerable weightage. 
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196, URS (Devaraj). Who should be more powerful centre or state; 
Restrict the role of the CRP, Illustrated weekly of India/ 
99; 13, 1978; March 26,15 
Describes that arming the centre with special pov/ersnin ordej 
to maintain unity, will not, in my opinion, le?d to integration. 
On the contrary, it will lead to disintegration in a situation 
when different political parties rule innthe states and at the 
centre. Such special powers smach of lack of faith in the people 
which is violently in contradiction to our basic democratic 
principles. There is scope for the transfer of economic and 
financial powers by the accelerated economic development of the 
country. In the present scheme of things, the states have to 
discharge the major responsibility of looking after the developmei 
works, whereas fiscal resources, more particularly the areas work; 
and taxation available to states, are not only extremely inelasti' 
but also politically explosive, 
197, VENKATESWARAN(RJ), States luring investors. Tribune (Chand 
garh), 1981; December 18 
Describes that state Government have been competing with one 
another in attracting investor and contrepreneurs to set up new 
industries and undertake schemes of expansion and diversification 
of the existing units. Many state Governments have introduced 
packages of incentives and concesions to give a strong stimulus 
to new investment. They have also set up several specialisedi 
institutions to provide prompt advice and existance. Incentives 
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offered are broadlyn^e same though they differ in detail from 
state to state. They consist of Lanson soft terms, lower rates 
of electricity tariff, exemption foom sales tax, octroi and other 
local taxes for a certain period of years, financial assistance 
for undertaking feasibility studies, preference in purchases by 
Government departments etc. 
198. FINANCES PRADESH 
CHAWLA(GS), AP'S letter on power surprises centre. Indian Express 
(Delhi), 1983; April 4 
Describes that the stand taken by Andhra Pradesh has been 
debated earlier, but the fact that this suggestion has come at 
a time when the centre has appointed a commission to go into 
centre state relations indicates the thinking of these states 
on this issue. In this regard it is necessary to note that at 
least fourty del power project potential exist in st"tes which 
are unlikely to have resources to develop them on theirnown. 
Unless basic changes in plan take place, there is every possibi-
lity that the nation wide power problem will assxime the shape of 
a national crisis. Gap between demand and supply will widen 
and it will become more difficult to protect the init;erest of the 
agriculturist against the onslaught of the demanc for allocation 
of power to the heavy industry. 
199. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
CHARI(ASR), V,rhat states can do :Constitutional provisions 
analysed, Ne\v Age, I77II, 1969;March 16,34 
Describes that it seems to me that Indian political and 
constitutional developments have reached a stage when thesstate 
governments are increasingly standing up for their rights to 
manage the affaiES of the state on best they can demand help and 
cooperation from the centre, pen defiance of the centre's power 
under the constitution, a failure to use the state power to bring 
about immediate solution of labour disputes and this precent 
capital labour relations from Bursting out in the streets, fields, 
or factories and demands for disintegrating central poers would 
like wise duly hinder solution of our problems, -^ 11 there are 
matters oh which a firm and realistic stand has tonbe taken by 
the various states. 
200, RESOURCES DISTRIBUTION 
CENTRE STATE tension. Link, 15;4, 1973;January 26,43 
Describes that the favourable position given to the centre in 
regard to financial resources reflects the strong centre theme 
running through constitution. Allocation of recourees and functions 
in the constitution has consistently produced surpluses at the 
centre and deficits In the states. Centre has been giving large 
grants and lowna under plain outlays on the recommendations of the 
Planning Commission, It is uneonceivable to talk of building a 
socialist society in India if the states were allowed to permit 
development of monopoly houses in their own sphere, IVhile it is 
necessary to democratise the decesion making process and decent-
ralise the instruments of implementation, this has to be done in 
the context of a strong national fabric. 
• MO 
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2 0 1 . CV-.T:?R;-.L 0? t h e m o v i e s . ; j n r l t a '^azar P g t r i k a , 1:^81; 
7-^pril 1 6 . 
D e s c r i b e s t h a t t h e c e n t r e a l r e a d y has a cora:o;:a'hensive 
c o n t r o l o v e r t?;8 I n d i a n movee i n d u s t r y i n g e n e r a l t h r c u c h 
i t s f i n a l say i n nia':tGrs of y e r r a i s s i o n of r.he -^en:jOr '^o^rc, 
t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of rav7 f i l m s and ex^'Crt and ir:r'~ort of 
p i c t u r e s . Only t h e t o x a t i o n r i n h t s has -rii-h t h e s ' ; a t o 
G o v e r n m e n t s . I f t h e y r o y o s a l c o n t r o l ai:as -•:':. d s ' ^ r i v i n g the-
s t a t e of t h e n o t i n C ' n s i d e r a j l e r e v e n u e i t c o l l a s t s t h e 
amusement t a : : e s on m o v i e s , t h e Cen t re o^^os i t t^ "b-^ ru ' - l io 
and t h e i n d u s t r y i t s e l f t o mabe i t c l s a r and f i s c l c e i t : 
argur. ients f o r such a movee. Governmi-jnt o^ j I n d i a idnould "r.fere-
f o r e , a l l o y t h e s u s y i c i o n of many \/i':ri i n t h e indvis-'-r:' c"r 
o u t s i d e , t h a t i t s c - : n t r o l of t r ie I n d i a n f i l m s -f.i; ' n e t -a 
u s e d t c f a i l t h e a t t ;m^^ts of s t a t e Government::; t''~ s e c u r e 
l i a l l s f o r t h e shov;inr' cf l o c a l " ' r c r l u c t i s n . b'vvi-rentl ' . ' 
u n n e c e s s a r y c c t a y l i c a t i o n s-;en^s t o nave V'-en c u s e d a^' t h e 
l e n t r a l Governm-;nt. 
R IL- a? t^dI\L lCm.y:TLa: 
2 0 2 . Ii.-j:iyG Ist.F:::^;-...Ida f e d e r a l i s m vrcrl: d indu (lladnas) , i - " ' 
I-.arch 22 : 
D e s e r i b e s t h a t t h e s o n a l c o u n c i l s •--1 r - - J r- - J 
::-e;> i 
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a forum f o r c i s c u s s i n r - i n t a r - s t a t e ;^roblG;a;: v",ry r:ucri •"i-:.r.i" 
t h e d i v i s i o n of 7'0:;Gr l i m i t s l a i d dcvn in rho c-:n::-;it--ti '"n 
v ' i t h f u n c t i o n s s :^clt C'Ut i n t h e s t a t e s " e o r o s ' ^ i s - i ' :n , i:V--;'V 
a r e su"a-o3ed t c ^iclc u ' m a t t e r s of cornmen in ' : r^ '^ t vc a uncLl 
members , i n c l u d i n a aa";^ects of c e n t r e - s t - ^ t a r ' : l : ^ t i a n " . Dam n-' 
t h ~ t t h e t r a n s f a r of -^ha b u l k of r e s aura :s f r a.-: t h e •^saar:; "'• 
t h e s t a t e s s h r u l d be on a s t a t u t o r y b a s i s , r-oaamTr; ahe 
d i s c r e t i o n a r y e l e m e n t , must a l s o be t~y:en s e r i a u - l y . Id's-^ 
of ^mending t h e c a n s t i t a t i o n t o b r i n o a b o u t m :^f i f i a - t i t a n s 
i n c e r t a i n a s s e a a s of f a d ' r : ! r e l a f i a n s , •:riC{ t h e s e v e r s 1 
s a e c i f i c y r o ^ o s e l s r e l a t i n g t o such ( a r r a y t s a h n i ^ d j m" : t s r s 
on t h e fo rmula f a r c e n t r - l e l a n a s s i s t a n c e , t h e r"'.ss'ri''^'!-sui'~a 
v/EJT 3 2aa;.L :^ c Y db .L:Ddc::^Y(a:) 
A n t i - C e n t r e c o n s a i r a c y . P a t r i o t , 1980; J a n u a r y 2 ^ : 
D e s c r i b e s t h a t a f t e r t h e Lok oabha r e s u l t s v e r e 
announced "heef h i n i s t e r J y o t i i 'asu and Finan-^s b i n i s a s r 
,-iShok ; - ; i t ra r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r conc:::':t of a "a-^sa: 1 s t r a s t u r e 
of thiS c o u n t r y . ..'ast b e n g a l Government submiat-: : : - :-a-i. -::"t:r" 
camina i n t o "^over SL memorsndum t o t h e J a i - a - : TS^/- s":r-nf .^ "' 
t o t h e v a r i o u s s t a t e qovernments o r - e n t r s z.r^.'^ a"d;^ti.:'a •' 
be 'scrandum csm^-'lrinc'" t h e t aha c o n s t i t ' i . t i - : a "brit s'^srs •; 
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a f t a r in(:"e .)3ndence, t hou j i i do^crib-:;;" c"i ' ' "e": 
3:: . j s n t i i i l l y u n i t a r y i n c h - r a c t e r . I t clotiV^c 
v / i th n c v 3 "'O'-MiJT^  o t t h 3 e;;"''Gii.J'3 or '':\~.~, "uton"'" 
s p a t e s . ^-Cernorand;:::: . a i n T - - t - d , " t h e 'rzr:'.':-! z " 
t i o n s h c u l d bo n.v:'Ond::;d t c i n c l u d e t h a v;Cr:d 'o 
t h e d e : : c r i ' v t i c n o ' t h a ' o a u b l i c o": I n ; " i - . " 
; . d l . 
204 dO d U i : 
J u l v 15 : 
/-^ '^.r-i r l e c e n c v . • "im-:: O'r Tr i^^(D-l:-^i). 
D33 p •^ i^ "''-T- ''c'' ' T t'"" ^''—'t''"C h'"^ /'"^ ' no t '^~*~ "^  
l o : . e i n s t i o u l a t i n o t h e i r rc^ouir".oentc of r -
o l ^ n n i n n r o o i o n o l '""^rr-ets . The / h-ve- d."o '-;-• 
tO' oirGvido end. ovoo -^len " - ' T - t i i s i r m-.'tcijin-"' 
f " r th~ "'rocur ?oont of - >aeticidG^;; v ^ d i c T e c , 
end oi;h''-;r 3 .?i "oi.^nt 'oid e;:-df^. o t e t e c;;.V3^"eie 
^";erti"' t o dl^nie "''..^ t . l e . I^nion h 3 ~ t t h ^ i n i e 
d ,en oni t t^^ -•'^  elc; i'"in" -d- .nnin ' ' . '"or c--':?•''' 
of i n i t i ' - t i v o . P r i n c i ~de r'^~oon r 3r trd..; e "• 
c :;:nplernency eener -d ed ey e t a t i e t i e e l - e t i - " 
incid-"::r-~e o" n ' l - - r i v i , "heee e ^ t i ' n e t e e - r - !"d. 
dhe*/ ~r"; d •," ed on ^ntn"' "^ol'~di'in dr *.• O ' ' ; "^"^  
or ••'/,ieh '••v '^ do t ~r ioree--" ' e'-eee'^dv ov r !e";3 "" 
•n r e l 
-e 
n - 1 
m 
t h a t t h e r e c o n d ' - s c e n c e of mjlo . r io h - s continAvxT un-'-).-t-^d 
s i n c e t h e e a r l y s c r e n t i e - ' ' and tb.e d e p t h h - s r-I-.;:en shary. ' ly . 
i:3:iD£;-::'3, HARI J J \ I : i:iLLi:^~s,u.P.i:A;-i.\i:;:i3a 
2 0 5 . iTRCNG C..ua-;2. I n d i a n Expres s (Delhi ) , 1930; r e b r u r - r y 5 : 
Describe;- ' th^-U t h e c c T . n c s i t i o n of s t a t e l e g i s l a t i r e s 
3l"C"'il(; c^n^f^rr^n t c thie ^art'^/ "3cs i t i ' . n£ in t'n'! n'"!''!-'/ ?1 '^rt;'""' 
-'a.rlie;nn :?nt i s i t ' e l f c o n t r ' i r y t o t h s l e t t e r --nd :; i^-i':v --: 
cf t h e cons tit',"'"" i o n . ' u t t c orev-cr^^ t h e 'Tvun:;' f" r di3-:"clv 
.-;.": .-.er^ibli OS On f i l r n s y , u n s u b s t r i n t i a t ^ d c:]-_r:-^^3Z -;"• in : ; t t h e 
3"tete GcvpmiTient-":' ccncemo' '^ i s corn"Oundinc tr.cj c : " ' " ' j . "tL". 
' . ' / i l l be G e t t i n " 'J. a 3?juOerou.s 'Precedent f ' r ";"'" ""^jlir.' 
p a r t y a t th-; c a n t i 
m c ic'.ent.- a'l e i 'cu^e 
o"3t r i d of i n c o n v e n i e n t s • " • ' V i r -
-^ ! - ' ^ -,- n • 
.•crai e m OK c.:v/n ir 
-1 c; 
a r -" o u t of t V e : 
i n j ' s t i c e on "th^ v i a t 
ha v"Mlar:era i:: f h^ 
V..: . , o i h a r and d a h - r -
h a v e m.anaoed t c s"^arvive i^"ia l a ' t e s t atte^ra^tc i a ' 
.•.'.-: V - U w-L-.t:; i , a n i . ' 
? 0 6 . IdiddA (d:nal) . ^ e n t r "  1 i'" a t i o n Daa-mtr-li^a": ' i a a 
ornc t a e " r a t i ::al n o t a c . I n d i a n J o u r n a l of "u 'a l ia a 
a i o n , ;]4, 3, 1":78, J u l y , -:e"a-r-'faar, 7 ^ 5 - 7 6 ' ' . 
De'""arib?s t h a t c e n t r a l i a a t i a n an-^ d a a c n t a - l i 
iW 
d i f f o r e n t i a t i o n i s a m u l t i d i s c i o l i n a r y c o n c e p t u a l c - t c c c r Y . 
••:anv t h e o r e t i c - 1 ^nd ^^c l i cy - o r i e n t e d c c n t r o v c r : •-;;'•, r ^ d c l ^ 
a n a d e s i g n s c e n t r e r o u n d t h e ' ' r e f e r r e d d e g r e e c ' c ' • n t r ~ l i s a -
t i o n a n d / o r d e c e n t r a l i s a t i e n . d o n e e t u e l c e t : - g i r ie .^ ' e r ; : 
i n v e s t e d v : i th s-;-re im, l i c i t , e x e l i c i t o r e ^ r t , i x ^ ' d i e i t 
v a l u e p r e f e r e n c e s , i d e o l o o i c a l c v e r t c n s and ' ^ h i l o s o ^ i i c - 1 
o r e s i l e c t i o n e . i^xttemot i c rnede t o i n t r o d u c e s c n e modicum of 
o r d e r i n t h e s e i n t e r m i n a b l e d e b a t e ; " 'cr- " ':xoduc.ln" a c n c ^ ' t u ^ l 
"r-- ;^-rio v"'.rb i n ' d i i c h c i i s cuc^c i cn on t h e t h e " r i t e .'^1 'n:^ e'";'"^li'~ " 
a c e e c t s of c e n t r e l i s a t i o n d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n c h c i : : e - . r^ay '-e 
m e a n i n g f u l l y c ^ r r ' a d o u t . .Ano the r a t t e m p t i " r"~ :e e e b e ^ r 
on s->me of t h e i s s u e s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l c r o - n i s -'..icr^.al n a t u r e 
c o n c e r n i n g • ' d e n n i n o ^nd g u - ^ l i c i n t e r c e n t i e n i n I n d i a . 
LA?TGUAGE 
2 0 7 . g y i ^ T h d h .JJji:": ( " . d . ) . ; J e m o c r - c y -nd c e n t r e s - t a t e r e l a t i o n 
H a i n s t r e a ; a , 1 6 , 4 3 , 1 9 7 3 ; J u l y 29 
D e s c r i b e s t h a t fevj •.••ill d i s o u t e t h e n e e d f o r a l i n h 
l a n g u a g e i n t h i s v a s t m u l t i l i n g u a l c o u n t r y o r t h e ::-^ct t b a t 
d i n d i , d u l y e n r i c h e d a n d p o - ^ u l a r i s e d ::s e n v i s - p : . ' i n t h e 
c c n s t i t ' ; t i o n , h e s t o b 3 t h a t l a n g u a g e . - f - t e '> •.: -^ • er^^ 
t r y i n g t o c ^ n t r c l t h e c \ n t r e , and t h e r e - ^ s t i c r s . - ' a r e b:,-;..^.-
on - : h e t c a l c u l a t i o n a m c i n o t h : : : r 3 . dov/ i/e h a v e ::~-^c\:~'j. r-. :ur;-:-^ar 
11'5 
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S t a g e i n t h e deve lopment cf t h e s t e t - s t ' 3.^ r e c h l e ^ n t l t i e r ; 
a d d i n o s t r e n r t h t o t h e c e n t r e , n o t as ao • ^nd-'^ .^'-' c ' ?:'.>;:• 
c e n t r e de""end.--nc on d o l e s and ch^.rit '-/ ' . ^.-elt: ";r n'^^t'' " c t 
l i k e t h a t of Oihar on l a n g u a g e n o r c h i l d i : ^ h •r::nh.: l i l ce 
r e f u s a l t o s^aak or reo-'oive l e " t t e r s i n ZncXiE' or ^ i j n i n 
l e t t e r s i n T a n i l ; ; i l l V-lca us ?nvv/here . Der'^^nd : 
f o r a a n u i n e d r n o c r " c y ba- 'ed on d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , 
.,. __ _ T 1 „ 
* % • 
103, T\''^.2. :^ound t h e 
Ld ; -:.:D CdDER 
s t a t e s . h aa_2ui 
•:^:"L.3:-
^ , 1 9 ; 
Da-"cr"'-ha3 t ' : a t 'Q^! D e l h i i s s e r L o u s l v c o n e rn^-d cv'--r 
t h e lav.- a n d o r d e r s i t u a t i ' . n i n sen?.:: of "-he Kt--=dc. I t h.-.s 
e x t e n d e d t o t h e m i t s f v l l s u p p o r t a n d h - s a s h ^ d t;;?-^ t s 
t a l ' e e : : o e d i t i o n s s t o p s t o c u r b a l l l a c l e s s a c t i v i t i e s . 
d e c a u s e t h e e c c n o n p i s o n c e c c e i n t envd ing to- '-r-a •.iu:-;,-nt t''; 
c e n t r e \ ; o u l d n o t l i h e t h c t t : i s ^^el c i m e t r ' ^ - ;d ' j r~~ ' ' : ;d --^t-
t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e c e n t r e b u d g e t chC'Uld ^"2 r ; : : a-f-^d, 
m e a n v / h i l e , t h e d a v ^ l o mant.-' i n G u j a r a t ar^^ ''^-y'n" s" \^ '^ ias .^ : 
a n a l y s e d c a r e f u l l y . T h e r e h a v e b e e n de-^1 ar--':d. j i n s - ' a ^ n . : 
t h e r e f c l l o ' . ; i n g t h e n g i t a t i c n o v e r t h e i . ' s u e •'•"': r :" : e a v s t i "• 
f a r b r ' chv / a rd c l a s s e s i n t h e p o s t g r a d u a t e n - d i c a l c d u a a t i : : n 
G u j r a t h s s b e a o m a t h e h i r e of i n d u s t r i e s 3r:d t h e a t - . ' : e s ne : 
p l a c e f ': 'r s t e p p i n g u p p r - ' d u c t i o n a n d f a r a s t a o l e s h i n g neu-
195 
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i n d u s t r i e s e n v i s a g e s under t h e s i x t h p l a n , 
LINGUISTIC PRC3LEi-: 
2 0 9 . £3/;AR;U^ ( V . V . ) . C e n t r e - S t a t e r e l a t i o n s - l . H i n d u s t a n 
T imes , 19S3; J u l y 2 1 . 
D e s c r i b e s t . ^ a t t h e Rajmannar Commit tee roTOr t r e g a i n s 
r e l e v a n c e i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of t - ie oa r l r a r 
i s com.m.ission. More t h a n t h a t decadoi; have massed s i n c a t h e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n com.es i n t o f o r c e . I t i s a t i m e t o hav-^ a fEosh 
work a t i t s p r o v i s i o n s i n t h e l i g h t of t h e devolcom -nts l i k e 
t h e r e c c b r g a n i s t i o n of s t a t e s on l i n g u i s t i c B a s i s l t h e 
emergence i n t o pov/er of di" '^fersnt p a r t i e s i n d i f f e r e n t s t n t o ^ 
, ' | ho the r ,^ l^«?^tance c i r c u m s t a n c e s vrhich v/as e f f e c t e d H e n t r e -
o t a t e r e l a t i o n s i s t h e c r e a t i o n , by an e x e c u t i v e o r d e r of 
t h e C e n t r a l Government , of t h e . - lanninn Commission '•;' i c h v;ss 
n o t c o n t e m p l a t e d a t t h e tim.e of t h e d r a f t i n g cf t h e c c n s t i t ' s * 
t i o n and which hss t h r s w n i n t o t h e backg round t 'ne ? i n ~ n c e 
Commission f o r which e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n was made i n t h e 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
: - - ; LOK SABH;^ S L E C P I O P S 
210MCCRAMI (AG.) D i s so lu t i c^n of s t a t e a s s e m - d i e s . I n d i a n 
^ 
E x p r e s s ( D e l h i ) , 1930; J - n u a r y 1 9 . 
D e s c r i b e s t s i a t i s t h e new e l e c t i o n s t h e Ccnnrass 
1^ 96 
suffered reverse in the nine states ~nd tho ":ec:le r'^ lcol-yed 
com\':^ lete laclc of confidence in the "onnrc'C :oarty. -\raul-tiv-
effect of the circumstance rnentionac -bove iTi.-;y Le~d to -^  
resonable inference that the people had given a-.d -n-^ aiva 
verdict not only aqain3t the Congress candidate^ a/;: f''"^ ught 
the election.? to the Lok iaabha but '^l:.;o aqrinct the poliai?F 
and ideologies fcllov/ed by the Congress Governrnant "s 3 v'a'.le, 
whether at the Centre or in the Ctates during tha ta'enty 
.months -receeding the elections. Dissolution of state 
assemblies in 1977, therefore, can not serve as a -•^ resident 
for similar action today-* On the other hand, if the assembl-
ies are dissolved nov/, merely because of the results of the 
Lok Sabha elections. 
MBBS. ADi-:I3.SICr-C 
;il.DANGER .IGbAL. Indian Express (Delhi) , 1932; February 24. 
Describes that the immediate arovocatian f :r t':e 
tension v:as a judaaraant cf the Kerala Pi^ -'a -Jaurt i.a the 
admission of stu-'"ents frcm Lakshadv.'cep tc the Pa:S c~u-"::; 
in Kerala under the rules, four seats are raaarveJ in the 
::erala Cclleges f:r students fr:m the Islnnas 200-''la 
emaloyaa.s, most of -,;hom are frcm tha mainl-.nd, ara I^sC' 
tre.cta''; as loc-ils for this aur'iose. .^ ut tfis ov :;rriCi:-:g 
prafarence nj.ven to the scheduled tribes h-';s tl.a a'""^ ast of 
IM7 
t a k i n g away w i t h t h e l e f t .he.nd what has been g i v e n by t h e 
r i g h t . VJhatever b e t h e p r o v o c a t i o n / t h e s e deve loomen t s a r e 
u n f o r t u n a t e and c o n s t i t u t e a d a n g e r . Lakshadx\?ee • i s a 
s e n s i t i v e a r e a of s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e . 
MIGRATICM OF L.-\B01IR 
2 1 2 . NOT BY C o n f r o n t a t i o n a l o n e . S o u t h e r n Economis t , 1 7 , 1 1 , 1 9 5 8 
O c t o b e r 1, 2 - 3 . 
D e s c r i b e s t h a t t h e u s e f u l n e s s of zona l c o u n c i l m e e t i n g s 
l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t p r o v i d e a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e forum f o r 
e v o l v i n g common p o l i c i e s f o r d e a l i n g w i t h p rob lems t h a t 
t r a n s c e n d s t a t e b o u n d a r i e s . E f f e c t i v e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n s q^ f 
m e a s u r e s l i k e p r o h i b i t i o n depends on i n t e r - s t a t e c o - o p e r a -
t i o n s i n c e p e o p l e from e s t a t e which i s d r y can a lways 
c r o s s t h e b o r d e r and b a n e t h e i r f i l l i n a s t a t e which i s we t ' 
Remedy t o t h i s p rob lem l i e s i n h a v i n g dry* b e l t s a l o n g t h e 
b o r d e r s of a we t ' s t a t e , ivages d i s p a r i t i e s have o f t e n l e d 
t o a m i g r a t i o n of a l a b o u r from lox\r wage a r e a s t o h i g h v/age 
a r e a s , . I t i s as w e l l t h a t t h b r n y i s s u e s l i k e t h e demand f o r 
a h i g h e r s u p p o r t p r i c e f o r paddy were n o t r a i s e d a t t h e 
Madras m e e t i n g . Emphasis was more on what can b e done t h a n 
on wha t ough t t o b e d o n e . 
MISUND3STA>7AING BETlffiEN KERALA A^.D CENTRE 
213. DANGEl^CUS GAME. Mainstream, 7,19,1969; January 11, 5 
Describes, that Congress President '^ lijalingappa has 
chosen to cone out with a hysterical demand for Central 
takeover here and now. He has touched a nev/ lav/ in 
vulgarity for at a Congress rally in Trivandrum he is 
reported to have described the lav/ful Government of Kerala 
Government at the Centre is a also knovm to be under 
pressure from the A.merican i-;bby and the Right v/ing generally 
on this account. Centre is fully av/are that the lav/ and 
order oosition in Kerala is no worse than in st,-^ tes admini-
stered by the Congress or by Governors on behalf of the 
Union Government. Yet it is obvious enough that it is no 
position to resist the mounting pressure from the reaction-
aries for long, even its v/ill to resist is not very strong, 
since the dim hope of getting the Congress back into power 
in as many states, 
NATIONAL 5E TURI^ 'Y ACT 
214. ^ ^AY;^(Kuldip) v/orking of ^  dentention law. Tribune (Chandigarh) , 
1981, August 13. 
Describes that the Government of Indir- has d?ne a 
review of the v/orking of the National security act, a * 
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measure to det-'.in people v/ithout trial, not for 'Purpose 
of v/ith draning it or lesering its regours. L^ ut formakina 
its operation fool proof. It has found that th.;; nrajority 
of the determines are able to get reprieve either from 
the advisory board constituted to reviev; the det'ntion 
cases or from the Minh Courts or the Suorene Court. To 
any sensitive Government this should have been a matter 
or concern. But there is no remorse no introspection. 
There have been several technical deficiencies or lacunal 
in the orders of detention. 
NATURE OF POLITi::;^ L ^YSTEK 
215. iMisHRA (:^ K.) Gut lines of a fascist state. Partriot, 1981 
June, 18. 
Describes that for fashioning governm.ent to 
government relations, the nature of the political system 
in a country is, "erhaps of secondary imoortance. But 
between peoples of India and Pakistan the nature of the 
regime is of great relevance. Making of a fascist state 
are prominently discerible in edveational institutions. 
Regime finances and supports the Jamate-Islami strong arm 
Boys v/ho are being organised on the :^ Lttarn of '--.r'v^r! shift: 
They ohysically attaclc leaders holaing demoorGtic and 
liberal viev.'S. For all practical pur poses, the rule of the 
m 
jungle prevails in the Universities, Any student activity 
which is organised without their permission evokes their 
wrsth. It includes even such innocent activity as crg~nising 
a circket match. Scholarship are av/arded and em-lo^ .TT,ant 
given on their recommendation, 
KIATUR2 OF RUL23 
XI6 DS. (Jatindra Ranjan) . iJoed to develop co-operative 
federalism. Secular Democracy, 11,12, 1978, June 11,19-21. 
In this article, author describes that the birth 
of Indian federalism and its later development sufficiently 
testify the pregmatic ap-roach to the solvations of Indian's 
various problem.s - political and in the later stage, economic 
also. India had an unitary form of government till 19 35 with 
devotion of governmental pov/er to provinces. The? e v;ere also 
the autnomous India und^ -r the nature rulers, -^.t the same time 
we can not ignore the fact of too much of central dominance 
running the risk of the birth of a personal ru.le. vvhat we 
need to day is the inculcation of the spirit of federalism 
so long'lying dormat in our constitution to develop it into 
a cooperative federalism. 
FSDSn.iLIola -J.-JD national intanration.3ecul; 
Democracy, 11,14,1973, July, 11, 13T15. 
In this article Dr. 3nehomy Ghak lader (Lacture in 
mi 
Political Science, B.K. Mahavidayalya. Itchuna - Distt. 
Hoogle) argues for restructuring the pre~ent federal or;" ir 
seems to be enevetable. r^ eview of centre - state relation-
ship by the rulers of the national st-;te government scoms 
to the only plansible step at the present mom-^ 'nt. 
HE MRU'3 FX:\':TIZ ;S 
2,(7 NAMBOCDIRIPAD (SMo.) Not confontation, but struonle for 
policies. People's Democracy, 43,2, March 30, 2 
Describes that "ehru's own practice crrrse into 
conflict v/ith the correct ideas embodies in the exore::sion 
"Planning from below". Popular involvement, democratic 
decentralisation etc. is another matter, '/e all •''nov.m that 
the process of making greater and greater incursions into 
the powers and resoiarces of the states startar" in the days 
of Kehru's o\-m l-'rime i-inistership. It was than t'lat the 
Centre started acquiring more and more power over subjects 
which had been allocated to the states under the constitu-
tion. At the dov.rn of its freedom, India inherited a stronger 
industrial structure than China's raizaged by viers and civil 
wars, since 1950 both countries had gone through immense 
uphearto. There is no point indulging in a comolition to 
prove v/hose woes v;ere the '-'Orst. But '-'hatever the nature and 
size of their problems, the picture that has emerged on the 
production front in these two countries is striking in 
contrast. 
m 
REASONS, NCN-CajGREiS 3 ' :A'?E G ::Vi:^ i:I-;Zr3TS 
218. SSiNlTRE-STATE r e l a t i o n s . Economies and o o l i t i - e l v/eelcly 
13, 30, 1973, J u l y 29, 1193-1194. 
Descr ibes t h a t t h e conference of t h e "hief MinisterG 
of four southern s t a t e s and Union t e r r i t o r y of Pcndicery 
which met in Iladaras (bn J u l y 19 appa ren t l y could not q u i t e 
make uo i t s mind as t o whether i t should proj:2ct i t ' e l f as 
an independent coming t o g e t h e r , v/i thout r e f e r e n c e t o c e n t r a l 
government. But t h i s does not mean t h a t t h e r e i s going t o be 
no p r e s s u r e on the CFI(M) - or o the r non-Jana ta r u l e d s t a t o r 
l i k e Jammu and Kashmir t o j o i n in the - a l l oivz-n by the 
Southern Chief M i n i s t e r s . Organisers a re a l s o depending 
on f u r t h e r f i s s u r e s developing wi th in the J a n a t a " a r t y , 
i n e v i t a b l y having t h e i r impact on the governrnGnt.'; in the 
J a n a t a r u l e d s t a t e s as v ;e l l . 
S2;.Ti; GCVE,._;:-..a:T.::. 
219, SENTRE AND S t a t e s , Hindustan Times, 1981, Sentcmber 14 
Descr ibes t h a t T'rs. Gandhi has t h e r i g h t .-:,? well as 
t h e duty t o keep a v/atch on the performance of the s t a t e 
Governments, i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r ^ool i t ica l ccm":>le:cion. 
P o l i t i c a l d i f f e r ences should in f luence c e n t r e - s i : a t e r e l a t -
i ons only up t o a p o i n t . Development of Kerala or Bengal 
i s or an much imoortance t o the c e n t r e as t h a t of the s t a t e s 
m 
ruled by the Congress (I) . Need, therefcro, is of 
cooperation and not confrontation as fl:-~. Gendhi's visit 
must have convinced the Tamil Nadu Government, /."hat 
seems to have gladdened the state I'eaders, ho-rev^r/ is 
her remarh that she did not come to inspect the state of 
affairs. Prime Minister's visit to the stcte ca'sitals 
will remove irritants in centre.-state relations. 
GE^^TP.E-oTATE relations. Link, 11,34,1969, .. orail 6,B. 
220. Describes tha t ins tead of accepting th nav; s i tua t ion 
crea ted by the l a s t general e lect ion snd giving ^ f a i r 
t r i a l to the fedsral aspects of the cons t i tu t ion , 
deferatism in congress ranks and the overbe^iting oostures. 
of the non-congress pa r t i e s allov/ed t o develop in to a 
confrontation between the congress government a t the 
cen t re and th.e non-congress governm£->nt in the s t ^ t e . This 
si tu-st ion, i t i s f e l t should be r e c t i f i e d h ;^ cr^-^tinc h^-^:ltl 
conventions in c e n t r e - s t a t e r e l a t ions ;-vithout i^eslcening 
the centre or depriving the s t a t e s of the i r autonom.y. 
Proposed 3hief Minis ters ' conference? in the middle of th i s 
m.onth has therefore , acguiren added s igni f icance , -o f^ ar* 
as odrainistrat ive aroblems are concerned, the view is 
gaining ground tha t no s t a t e should be •T:i€.'3 to n-el tha t 
unwanted Governors or c i v i l servant are being imposed 
On them. 
•m 
2 21 . CENTRE-STATE r e l a t i o n s : Old a t t i t u d e s , nev' context. 
Link, 11, 36, 1969, April 20, 11-14. 
Describes tha t despi te the Prime MiniGt^:r*s 
concern about the cen t r e ' s s t ra ined r e l a t ions v i th non-
congress governments doubts are being e;c:ore~ced about 
the congress leadersh ip ' s capacity t o put c en t r e - s t a t e 
r e l a t i o n s on an even need. Process of break dci-m of 
congress monopoly of pov/er can not be checked by p o l i t i c a l 
gimmickel, postures of s t rength or exercise in brickmanship 
Major fac t of Indian P o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y i s the emergence 
of non-congress pa r t i e s on rul ing pa r t i e s in a numbers of 
s t a t e s and the c lea r p o s s i b i l i t y of change at the c e n t r e . 
Remaining three years of the fourth Lok Sabho are bound 
t o be regarded as a t r a n s i t i o n a l period by the v.;^rious 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . 
222. CONSENSUS AT Srinagar. Slatersman (Delhi), 1933, 
Oct. 12. 
Describes tha t the proposal of the Al-ali Dal ond tiv:-
Telgu Desam for leaving only offence, foreign a f f a i r s , 
f inance and communications under the cen t r e ' s control did 
not find x;ide approval, nor did Mr. Parakash Singh "I'adal'G 
plea for abolis ing the pOst of Governors. Inste';d i t v/as 
suggested tha t an i n t e r - s t a t e council comprising the r-rime-
Ministers s e t up to deal v/ith disputes between Nev; Delhi 
zm. 
and the s t a t e s , as also to consider a l l mat t - rs o..; nat ional 
inroortance. Although the adoption of the "Consensus docurn-int" 
by a many an 14 pa r t i e s (only Mr. Jagjivan Rai?. su'omittod 
a d i s s e r t i ng not-) may be regarded as a notable -chievanent, 
i t would h2 a mistake to look upon i t as a s-:-eo tov-^rds \:Gro 
•purposeful and conesive ac t ion . Af te ra l l , the norary 
opoosit ion group was come together so le ly . Becau^a of the 
p o s s i b l i t y of an aarly p o l l . 
2 23. GUPTA (Binoy) . :: antra-St a te t i l l /worsen fu r the r . 
Tribune (Chandigarh) 19S1, .--ugust 20. 
I?oints out tha t 3ome f r i c t i on is inevit""":la vhen t-.-o 
opposing partie-? are in oov/er a t the centre -inP in tric " t a t a . 
Very fev/ oeo^ie v/ill be incl ined to support any rriOv^ a to 
dis lodge the government before i t s term expi res . In fact , 
any cen t ra l intervent ion may kindle a renewed sympathy for 
the l e f t f ron t . 3ut the Governors issue may be Vieras from. 
another angle. I t i s not necessary tha t a ch.-;nga of Governor 
wi l l automatically be followed by tha dismissal o- the 
government. Mean while, the centre too has adoatcl en 
obs t ruc t i on i s t a t t i t u d e . I t has been delaying ccnsant to 
coxmany of the b i l l s pased by the s t a t e Assembly on the ground 
t h a t they are mora dssigned to serve the party i n t e r e s t th.an 
the s t a t e . .^ 11 th i s has created an atmosphere of suspicion, 
marring the normal r e l a t ions betv;een the .'est Bengal and the 
Centre . 
m? 
JAIN (Girila) . Centre State relations, No fool-r^ roof colution 
Times of Incia (Delhi), 1983, October 12. 
224. Describes that opposition parties vdll succ -^ d in put-
ing centre-state relations among the top items on the 
county's political agenda. Source of trouble ic the blussinq 
of the distinction between the centre (President in the 
language of the constitution and the Union govornmnnt on 
the one hand and betv/een the Union government and ruling 
party on the other. Centre must clearly stand for the 
Indian state which is an on-going entity and of -.'hich the 
union government of the time is an agent. Distinction is 
not eayy to dxaw is a nev; democracy such as ours but it is 
an important one. It follov;s that in its dealin-:3 vjith state 
government should be guided by its appreciation of the 
interest of the Indian state and not of the oarty or parties. 
2 25. STATE ASSEf-SLIES. Patriot, 1980, FebrUory 1^ .^ 
Describes that the law and order situation in seme 
states is distressing and immediate steps are necessary to 
restove a sense of confidence amongest the people. But the 
political objection of those who are claniousing for the 
dissolution of state assemblies will not be achieved if this 
arbiterion is applied monestly and strictly. If they invents 
facts and exaggerate the capses of non congress (I) govern-
ments in order to dislodge them arbitrarily they \;ill'be 
MF 
straining the dalicate ties between, the centr:^  inc. the 
states and thereby cause in calculable v/arrn to our national 
fabric. Responsible ministers in the Central qovernmont 
must be specially careful in giving v/ant tc their irrespon-
sible desire to topple the non- Gongrosn (I) st-tes 
governments. Union cabinet should v/eigh all there :*-.-ctcrs 
v/hen it considers the central government's futur-:: courne 
of action in this regard. 
2 26. CHOPRA (^/D.) . Dissolution and after. Patriot, 1930, 
February 25. 
Describes that the dissolution of nine states 
legislatures where parties other than the Congress (I) 
have been in office has evoked a shar'> raaction fr'Om all 
opposition parties. Though after the Lok Sabha elections, 
this dissolution v.ras expected what shocked opposition 
parties v/as that it happened only in those st:=tes the 
Congress (I) "affeBEtion topple did not succed. Obviously 
it is the intention of the Congress (I) to ca'Oture power 
in as many states as possible and improve its strength in 
the Rajya Sabha. Its calculations may prove correct in the ' 
end. But in this process the Congress (I) is imparting new 
content to the fedral character of our political system. 
Implicit in this move v^ as the admission that it was not 
2$^, 
necessary that the same political party should bo in 
power at the centre as v/ell as in the states. 
227. DUTTA (Sukumar). Centre may land in a leqalness. 
Amrita Bazar Patrilca, 1980, February 21. 
Describes that despite efforts to close their ranks 
to face the challenge fhrox-m by the dlsrnii'sed or their minis-
non-Congress (I) political circles seem very much exercised 
Over the posibility of an unprecidenced deedlock -
constitutional or otherv/ise - should the qovernm-'^ nt f^ i^l to 
obtain the approval of both mcbpser of Parliament for the 
presidential proclamation v/ithin the stiperte.ted oeriod and 
the election ccraminsion refuse to held. ?.^ '^ ~embly oolls vdth-
out fresh verisicn of electoral rolls. Government is in 
favour of elections to the nine state assemblies at the 
earliest opportunity. But the Chief Election CommissionT^r's 
observations by implications, tned to initiate against any 
such possibility. 
2 28. NCORA"! (AG.) . Sacking a state govc?rnm-nt IncHan 
Express (Delhi), 1931, October 23. 
Describes that the amplitude of the oovrer has bean 
tested through repeated abuse. Successive or9:'d3r--s have 
m 
signed proclamations under arti<fle 356, impossing 
presidents rule, for purposes not even remotely s?nctionecI 
by the provision, namely/ to correct an othisrv/ise hopeless 
situation in which the government of the state cannot be 
carried on in accordance v/ith the provisions of this 
constitution. Judiciary has shovm a marked reluctance to 
adjudicate on a' matter of such sensitivity. Presic.ent has 
certain responsibilities under the constitution -^ nd v.^ anted 
to study the bill before I asseted to it. Unless it v/as 
v/rong intrinsically or offerded the constitjtion or proceed-
ral rules the President was bound to assent to it clearly, 
the President ought not to sign a proclumation imposing 
President rule on a state. 
229. PALKNOVALA,(Nani A). Dissolution of assemblies: 
approval of Rajya Sabha irrelevant. Times of India (Delhi) 
1930, Pebruajry 22. 
Describes that the dissolution of the nine states 
assemblies and the imposition of president's rule have 
raised the question v;hether in the event of the J^ DJya Sabha 
not approving the m.eausres taken, these could be a constitu-
tional crisis arising from the automatic revival of the 
state assemblies as contended in certain quarters. Position 
is fairly simple and is beyond the pale or controversy if 
o 
m. 
one bears in mind that the imposition of oresident's rule 
and the dissolution of the state assanblies are cliff::-rent 
constitutional developments. In sum the cle^r const tional 
position is that whether the state elections are holci^  x,-hetaer 
President's rule ends or dees not end prior to the elections. 
230. PAIJDIT (CS.) Mrs. Gandhi's dilemma to disr-di-s or not. 
Amrita Bazar PatriTca, 1981, April 19. 
Describes v/hat are is witnessing in the non-congress (I) 
rules states like v/est Segal, Jammu and Kashmir an^ ' Tamil Ij-r^du 
can rightly be described as preperations for the next general 
elections due in the middle of next ye^ r^. One would not be 
very wrong in saying that almost all the parties particularly 
the ruling parties in these states and the'ruling partv at the 
centre have been gripped by vfhat may be called the election blu 
It is hovjever a serious matter when this results in deaths of . 
innocent people dragged into political demononstrations as 
happened in -/est Bengal/ xfe under the constitution no action 
can be taken by the centre unless the that the con3tit?.tion-?l 
machineries have broken down in the state. 
GOA 
HYDRA-HEADED monster National Herald, 1982 December 1. 
Describes that Prime Minister IndiEaGandhl has done 
well to remaind people that everyone in India was a right to 
L, i. C. 
move freely throughout the territory of the country and to 
live and work anywhere without discrimination. Indeed Goa is 
not the only area of the country in v.^ hich cert-^in n-dschievou" 
petty politic cians are lying to incite ignorant e.nd innocent 
citizens against non-local people. It is oart of the wavo o" 
regionalism -•.'hich is raising its head in various states in 
various forms. There is evidence of frustrated politicians 
trying to gain popularity by fanning hatrac thr ugh regionp>li;:m 
These m^ .y even be a foreign hand behind it all for a str'ng -^nrl 
united India does not sit many powers. Yet the only way to 
fight this evil through ?. strong positive mov^ r.'^ nt stressing 
the unity of the country and of its people stressing that tha 
whole of India belongs to its people and all the peoole belong 
to India. 
KERALA 
2 32. S^ JCSEMA (N3) ITorms to deal v/ith erring states. Times of 
India (Delhi) 1931, June, 16. 
Describes that the union minister of steta for name, 
Mr. Makwana talked a\->out a repititaon in Kerala today of 
the sitation in 1959 when the n:^ m.e boodripad ministri'' v;-^s 
dismissed by the centre taking this as a hint th:^ .t the 
present Marxist led state government night be tr-".^'.:sc! in the 
same way, the Keralo -hief I^ 'inister, lir. E.". ;^^ yrinar has 
rejected sharply. He hes pointed out that it state qov:rnment 
were to be dismissed according to statestics of violent 
212. 
y. i n c i d e n t s K e r a l a ' s would beib t h e l a s t t o m e r i t t h i s 
t r e a t m e n t . He s a y s t h a t t h e n a x a l i t e v i o l e n c e i n K e r a l a 
was much v/orsa d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d , when Mr. Koyala and • 
Mr. K a r u n a k a r a n h e l d t h e home p o r t f o l i o i n t h e s t a t e what i s 
more a c c o r d i n g t o him even t o d a y t h e havoc v;rong by N ' a x i l i t a s 
i s much v/orse i n B i h a r , Andhra , Tamil Nadu. 
SOUTH INDIA 
2 3 3 . KAKA.TI ( S a t i s c ) . Back t o r e g i e t i a i i s m ; s o u r c e of s t r e n g t h 
n o t weakness s t a t e s m a n (De lh i ) 1983 F e b r u a r y 7 . 
D e s c r i b e s t h a t many o b s e r v e r s of t h e po l i t i - : ^ a l 
seems s u g g e s t e d l a s t y e a r t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s v/ere on 
t h e d e c l i n e and t h a t r e g i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n v-ere r e p l a c i n g 
them as -he nev,- p o l i t i c a l phenomenon r e s u l t s of t h s J a n u a r y 
5 p o l l s i n t h e tv;o s t a t e s d e c i s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t 
s p e c u l a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e d e c l i n e of t h e c o n g r e s ( I ) was 
f u l l y j u s t i f i e d . Rama -^ao romped home i n t h e Andhra P r a d e s h 
a s s e m b l y p o l l s v/ i th a t w o - t h i r d m a j o r i t y t o form t h e s t a t e 
f i r s t e v e r n o n - c o n g r e s s government tind t h a t t o o lanrler a ne .^-
r e g i o n a l p a r t y . S i m i l a r l y t h e monopoly of c o n g r o 3 s r u l e \ras 
d e m o l i s h e d i n K a r n a t a k a v/hen t h e J a n a t a " a n g a combine c a p t u r e d 
po--;er. In K e r a l a where t h e p o l i t i c a l v/eathor i s so f i c k l e t h e 
c o n g r e s s ( I ) l e d f r o n t i s o n l y n o t i o n a l l y i s power r e g i o n a l 
p a r t i e s l i k e t h e K e r a l a c o n g r e s s and t h e K e r a l a c o n g r e s s ( I ) 
a r e s t i l l of c o n s i d e r a b l e conse'-n.ience. 
m 
SRINAGAR CO^TFERE'-^ •::E. 
2 3 4 . SANAY(S) C l o s e Look mixed bag of p r o p o s a l s , s t a t e s m a n 
( D e l h i ) 198 3, Oc tobe r 1 3 . 
D e s c r i b e s t h a t t h e o p o o s i t i o n p a r t i e s S r i n a q a r s t a t e -
men t on c e n t r e s t a t e r e l a t i o n s i s an mixed bag cf s e n s i b l e 
a s w e l l as e x t r e m e p r o p o s a l s . I t \-7B.S ofterx b^en o b s e r v e d 
i n t h i s when t h a t v.hat t h e c o u n t r y wae'k i s a rc -a t b a l a n c e 
b e t w e e n i n t e g r i t y and s e c u r i t y on t h e one hand and t h e s t - ^ t e 
autonomy on t h e o t h e r t h i s r e q u i r e s an e x e r c i s e i n p o l i t i c a l 
w i sdon and s t a t e s m a n s h i p wr.ich s o feir has been v:hol ly l a c k i n g 
i f c o u r s e , f o r much of what h a s b e e n h a p p e n i n g t h e c o n g r e s s ( 1 
m u s t t a k e t h e b a l a n c e f o r i t was b e e n i n pov/er of t h e c e n t r e 
t h e l o n g e s t b u t even t h o s e p a r t i e s t h a t formed J a n a t a i n 1977 
n e e d t o b e r e m i n d e d t h a t t h e i r own r e c o r d as r u l e r s a t t h e 
c e n t r e was no b e t t e r t h a t of c o n g r e s s ( I ) . 
TAMIL NADU 
2 3 5 . SUBR-^ IANYAK (Ka Naa) . R e g i o n a l nnd n a t i o n a l . H i n d u s t a n 
T i m e s , 198 3, A p r i l 2 2 . 
D e s c r i b e s a b o u t t h e r e g i o n a l p a r t y t h a t has been most 
a c t i v e and d e m o s t r a b l y s t r o n g i s of c u r s e i n '.."a.-ril j::^du ^nd 
i t h a s c e r t a i n u n h e a l t h y t r e n d s i n i t t hough t h e p r e s e n t 
AIADKK Government of MGR migh t b e d e m o n s t r a b l y f r e e of t h o s e 
s p e c i f i c d e f e c t s . O r i g i n a l impe tus f o r t h e DMK u DK r e g i o n a l i s n 
2U 
<-. i , i 
came from i d e a s of s c p r a t i o n non s a i d t o b e g iven uo t h e Dr?v.i 
i a n movement v/as an a n t i - c u l t u r a l movement r - th- : ; r t h a n a s c c i j 
reforrf! movement t hough s o c i a l r e f o r m of some k i n d v/^s 
i m p l i c i t i n i t . I t seems t o b e h i g h t i m e t h a t each r e g i o n 
' i n I n d i a which s e e k s t o p r e s e r v e i t s emigners -^nd c h a r a c t e r -
i s t i c c u l t u r e s h o u l d o p t . f o r a r e g i o n a l p a r t y r n d a c t i v i t y 
of i t s O'.vn 'A'ithin t h e n a t i o n a l s p e c t r u m . 
TELGU DSJM-i ;.:3DMRA PRADESH 
2 3 6 . RAJAPPA (S) Truimph of r e g i o n a l e t : . o s . s t a t e s m a n ( D e l h i ) 
198 3 J a n u a r y 3 1 . 
D e s c r i b e s t h a t congressman n o t a c c u r t o met t o s i t t i n g 
i n t h e o p p o s i t i o n f a c e a nev; s i t u a t i o n i n Andhra o o l i t i c s ^n''. 
b e f o r e long many i v i l l j o i n Te lgu Desam. But t h e i r occuo '^ing 
t h e i ^ r easu ry b r a n c h e s i s r emore as Mr. Rema Rao h a s made i t : 
c l e a r t h a t t h o s e w a n t i n g t o change p a r t y l o y a l i t i a s s h o u l d 
f i r s t g i v e up v/hetever p o s i t i o n s t h e y h o l d scjme a r e t r y i n g 
t o g e t c l o s e r t o t h e new r u l i n g p a r t y by j T i n i n g t h e Sanjriy 
V i c h a r Mench as a p r e l u d e t o e n t e r i n a T e l e g a Desam. Mr. Kona 
P r a b h a k a r S a o , a fo rmer APPG(I) p r e s i d e n t , s a i d t h e t many 
p e o p l e had j o i n e d t h e c o n g r e s s ( I ) f o r t h e b e n e f i t s of po^-er. 
i-3ot-; t h e y v/culd l e a v e and o n l y t h e d e d i c s t e a c a d r e v o u l d 
r e m a i n . 
2,15 
OTHER PARTIES liiVCLVi' iCIITi S?:"'E 
2 3 7 . 3UND-\RRAJAN (KR) S t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s h i p . T r i b u n e 
(Chand iga rh ) 19S2, Hoveniber 8 . 
D e s c r i b e s t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p t k t ough t t o e x i s t 
be tv /een t h e c e n t r e and t h e s t a t e i n o u r f e d e r a l s e t u p 
h a s r e m a i n e d a s e n s i t i v e m a t t e r . Any r e f e r e n c e t o t h e need 
f o r a s t r o n g c e n t r e i m m e i d a t e l y a r o u s e s s u s p i c i o u s of t h e 
s t a t e s and any demand f o r mors pov.;ars t o t h e s t a t -r- i s a o t 
t o be^ p u t dovm as t h i n l y v e i l e d s p a r a t i s m c e n t r - . l government 
was ivere be a b l e t o c o n v i n c e t h e s t a t e s t h a t i - i o a n a x i o u s 
t o r e s p e c t t h e i r r i g h t s and d i s c h a r g e i t s o\m r a - - o o n s i b l i t i : i ; 5 
tov /a rds t h e m . Even v.-hen t h e I n d i a n n a t i o n a l c o n g r e s s r^aled a l l 
t h e s t a t a s . 
FOLITia-vL CU:?^UPTIO:-!. 
2 3 3 . ri:\aiFLv.:.: (.0 ocum t h a t f l o a t s on t o p . H i n d u s t a n Times, 
1 9 3 1 , December 1 8 . 
D e s c r i b e ; : t h a t p o l i t i c i a n s , v/hether t h e y b a l c n q t o 
t h e l e f t of c e n t r e or t o t h e r i g h t of i t a r e ecn-ol ly p r o n e n t s 
b e c o r r u p t and t h r : t t h e s o c a l l e d d e d i c a t i o n t o t h e s e r v i c e o r 
t h e poor and t h e doxvTi t r c d d o n i s o v e r t a k e n by s e l f i s h 
p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t has been p r o v e d so o f t e n b o t h i n t h e 
c o n g r e s s ( I ) nnd l e f t r a i l ed s t a t e s . S p r i t Scanda l i n v o l v i n g 
c r o r e s of r^apees and t h e s t a t e s of K e r a l a and Tamil Madu, i:: 
m 
of r e c e n t o c c u r a n c e . E d u c a t i o n h a s a lways b e e n ni^- of 
K e r a l a ' s g r e a t e s t a s s e t s . A f t e r t h e ibrrnat ion of l i n g u s t i o 
s t a t e and t h e a s s u m p t i o n of o f f i c e by l e f t gov;5rnments 
e d u c a t i o n a l s o b e c a u s e t h e most c o n t r i b u t i o n i s s u e i n t h e 
s t a t e . 
POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
2 3 9 . UNHEALTI-JY DECISION. Hindu (Madras ) , 1930, F e b r u a r y 19 
D e s c r i b e s t h a t i n i n d e n p e n d e n t I n d i a ' s c o m p e x a t i v a l y 
s h o r t p o l i t i c a l e x o e r i n c e t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n a t a l a t e hour i n 
t h e n i g h t h a s come t o have t h e same a y m b c l i c c o n n o l s t i o n ?s 
t h e mid n i g h t knock v;i th o r w i t h o u t a l e g a l g l o s s . 3 u t 
u n s u p p o f t a b l e p r e c c e d e n t s and c o n s t i t t i i o n a l r e p e r c u s s i o n s 
a s i d e . The l a t e r a c t i s n o t a b l e f o r t h e u n h e a l t h y p o l i t i c a l 
m e a s a g e i t conveys i n t o l e r a n c e of o p p o s i t i o n and even s a i d 
d i s c e n t m m a n i p u l a t i o n of t h e l a r g e r p o l i t i - a l s t r u c t u r e f o r 
n a r r o w g a i n a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m i n i t s i n i t i a l s t e p s of 
r e e m e r g e n c e . I t would b e i n t e r e s t i n g e s p e c i a l l y t o x/stch 
t h e e v e r y t h e opDOsi t ion p a r t i e s a r e go ing t o c l o n e r a n k s 
a g a i n s t t h e common t h r e a t t o t h e i r s u r v i v a l and s h o u l d t h i s 
w o r k i n g u n i t y m . a t e r i a l i s e t h e s u t e s n e of t h e a s sembly 
e l e c t i o n s i n U t t a r P r a d e s h and B i h a r . 
m 
240. BHAUMIK ( K i r i t ) . Sharp differences at opposition meet. 
Times of India (Delhi, 1983 Oct.7. 
Describes tha t the differences '.-.'•ere br'^ught in to 
sharp focus by i'-'r, Ghit'a 3asu v;hen he fW.estioned the 
descr ip t ion of the centre as conceptual myth. By the Andhr-
Pradesh -"hief Minister, Kr. K.T. R. Rao suggestion for resorvi 
only four subjects for the federal gov€?rnmont h-:'; been o'->iore '^ 
s t rong ly by the "PI leader, Mr. Rajev/ara Ra'o. Left i t s oartiej: 
have generally been emphasising t h a t in proposing the 
r e s t ruc t ion ing or centre&state r e l a t ions they are not actuate 
by any des i re to weather the centre but only -.'ant to or'::TTiOt'^  
harmony. 
241. JCHN ('/V) . Po l i t i e s of i n s t a b i l i t y . Economic and o o l i t i : 
« 
v/eekly, 3,8, 198 3 January 20, 19 3-96. 
Describes tha t there i s no longer any o o l i t i c - 1 
debate in the country, t h t i s the meeting of arguni'jnt T'ith 
argument. Concept of India as one co\antry snd one people 
has been put avay for are on purely ceremonial occusicn.;. 
Ministers are ke^t so busy perforrp.ing on the l i o h t rooe of 
p o l i t i c a l sup'^ort t h a t pressing m.a+ .^t3r'" ccn'j-.rning the ' -elfar: 
of the neople raceins no a l t e r i o n . Svaa if ona -'."ndaned a l l 
ethic-?-l conciderptions one could see th-;t i t i::-' inex'^e'lient 
m 
t o adopt b r ibe ry and blacknai l as the permanent b - s i s of 
our p o l i t y . Author suggests tha t the cons t i tu t ions should 
be amended to give the s t a t e s an irremovable executive 
combining the offices of governer and chief minister while 
r e t a i n i n g the parliamentary fron a t the c e n t r e . 
242. NAY/\R (Kuldip), Unimportance or being C.H.S. Tribune 
(Chandigarh) . 1981, July 23. 
Describes tha t the changes K s . Gandhi has n.-'e or is 
in the proce-^s of making are e s sen t i a l l y h s r . 3ut they 
are a rb i t r a ry if administrat ion or ecr'.ation v/ith the ;oeople 
had been the c r i t e r i o n to assess a chief minis ters capab i l i ty 
Mr. Bhajan Lai v;ould have been the f i r s t to go. Perhaps 
Mr. Bhajan Lai v/as be l e f t cut because the e lec t ions in his 
s t a t e are l e s s than a year among. There v;as a propo-al to wc'l 
the party e lec t ions ne-jt montli but t a t v-as been shalued. Ever 
the t h a t a chief - i n i s t e r can not hold the office of the 
s t a t e congress rsresidentship has been relaxed in favour of 
some. Result i s t ha t for even a minor difference in the p?:rty 
members run to Delhi . 
243. SATINDRA SINGH. Pres iden t ' s 5S to 19 s t a t - ' - i l l s . 
Tribune (Chandigarh), 1982, May 14. 
Describes tha t the President gave his assant to more 
than 560 b i l l s passed by various s t a t e l eg i s l a tu r e s during 
1977-81. Daring the same period he v/ithheld his assent to 
much b i l l s under a r t i c l e 200 of the cons t i tu t ion c Governor 
i s authorised to v/ithhold his assent and kxa and reserve a 
b ' l l for the Pres ident ' s cons idera t ion . Yecirvrlsa br.-^ -alc dovjn of 
the s t a t e b i l l s v;hich did not recenic the Pres iden t ' s c.sssnt 
during 1977-81 is as follows. Three each in 1977, 1978 and 1980 
and 10 in 1981. tlo b i l l was refused assent in 1979. irumbar 
of s t a t e b i l l s awaiting the Presidents assent since 1979 is 
21 . None of there i s from Punjab, Haryana, Him'-^chal Pradesh 
or Jammu and Kashmir. 
244. STATE POLITICS IN India . Patriot, 1984, February 19. 
Describes tha t the s t a t e s in India are large pol i t ic~1 
u n i t s and in terms of area and population are much bigger 
than most of the member s t a t e s of the united nations are very 
under standing of the Indian p o l i t i c a l system depends upon 
our assesment of the pat terns of development within the 
cons t i tuen t area . In India which i s a federal s t a t e consis t ing 
if txventy tv'O s t a t e s the s t a t e s are e'fect?:' ' by -nd in turns 
a f f ec t the nat ional stream. Federal s t a t e r e l a t ions today 
apparent ly show almost totr^l disagreement bet',-een the centre 
and the non-congress s t a t e s . Sarkaria commission with examine 
the working of the c e n t r e - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s and recommend 
s u i t a b l e changes with in the present cons t i tu t iona l frame orK. 
iU 
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245. MALKAI^ I (KR) . Back t o regi©nalism-II: PartBErship of 
cen t re and s t a t e s . Statesman (Delhi), 1983, Fe'-;ru-=:rY 3 . 
Describes tha t a country of Ind i a ' s s ize -'.nd d ive r s i ty 
cannot be property administered from a s ingle romote c i t y . 
Telgu Desan i s a dramatic expression of indicrn t icn again 
much durbari p o l i t i e s , Examole can be excepted to spread, An 
Andhra Pradesh response i s a warning to the coring centre tha t 
At cannot go beyond the l e t t e r and s p i r i t of the cons t i t u t i on . 
I t cannot subvert the s p i r i t in the name of tha l e t t e r as 
i n t e rp re t ed by committed judges. If public ro.^";;ect "or the 
cen t re as in te rpre ted by committed judges. If -^ublic res-^ect 
for the" centEe is to be res tored the cetire must disolay qr:;ntar 
respec t for local sentiment s t a t e automon-;. If i t cannot bring 
i t s e l f to act v/ith r e s t r a i n t and digni ty the law must be 
am.onded to b^n defections and ensure the assemblies. 
246, RAO (Venugopal). Policing the motion : an nsoect of cent 
^ t a t e r e l a t i o n s . Hindu (Marrad), 1983, November 22, 
Describes t ha t the r is ing trend of regionalism 
assumes considerable importance in the l i g h t of current 
debates i s cent re s t a t e r e l a t i o n s . Problem i s c r i t i c a l to the 
future of the country since we have a fu l l throated any for 
grea ter autonomy for t e s t a t e s on one hand and growing viclenc* 
and lawlesuess derving support fron regionel i n t e r e s t s 
on the other . I t ••••/-•s because of the nat icnal en::)horir-
irrmediately after independence tha t the prospect of Pifferent 
p a r t i e s a t t a in ing pov/er at the centre and the s t - t^^ -/-s not 
s e r ious ly considare::"'.. t ha t such a development occurred cennot 
be construced s t ra igh ta ray are i n i t i a l to nat ional in ta rco t 
provided the seekers of pov;er are prepared to olay the vl^z 
of the game. I t i s the f a i l u t e to e s tab l i sh r ea l ty norPiS in 
the continuelng s t ruggle for p o l i t i c a l pc-.-.-er. 
247. REGIOMALISII. F.^triot, 1932, November 2. 
Describes t h a t p o l i t i c a l Par t i es have inv?-rtaP the 
dervice of adjustments in order to solve t h e i r ccnscence 
and belong c l a r i t y of thought among t h e i r follo^-ing v/hethcr i^  
i s an a l l i ance in soecial circumstances or :ea' a:"justm-3nt 
for the sake of e l e c t r a l gains in both c^se regional or other 
reac t ionary par t ies ovar a measure of rescectaa j l i f an--'' to 
t h a t extent defeat the secular and dem.ocratic ai.'as of the 
p a r t i e s v/lch j u s t i f y such arrangements, Po centra l or s t a t e 
au thor i ty hov.-ever sagacious i t may be can '-abkle the prd-lem,..-; 
successful ly v/ithout the support of a l l thOE= v;ho uohold 
na t iona l unit'^ and democrotic advance. 
ZM^ 
248. MOHINDRA (FD) and PRASHAR (A3). RcGd" for r -v i -v / ing 
G . n t r e - s t a t e . Tribune (Chandigarh) , 1?B3. February 5 . 
Descr ibes -hat t h e r e should be more adjustment and r e l a t -
t i o n in t h e t i e s betv/een t h e c e n t r e and t h e Abates. s t a t e s should 
have g r e a t e r freedom t o a c t v/ithin t h e framev^crk of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . Reddy vras c r i t i c a l of the v;ay the ?ubj-b 
government a c t i v i t e s , The s i t u a t i o n a r ' s i n g out o': A'cali 
a g i t a t i o n and e x t r e m i s t a c t i v i t i e s . Cutgoing gcvernor comnlained 
t h a t Darb-ra i ingh v/as not r e c e p t i v e t c nevr ideas ->nd suggast ic i 
Af te r a l l I v-as not t r y i n g t o promote any grou" or i n d i v i d u a l 
of my ovrn h e r e . :l n o l i t i c i a n should any wh'it ha does ?nd dc ••;h^ -
he sahs s"c th-i t t h e r e i s no c r e d i b i l i t y gao, E*unjab he r:aid h-^ c^  
or g l o r i o u s p a s t and t h e s t a t e had a s t r a t e g i c r o l e in t h e 
c o u n t r y ' s economy and defence . 
249 . RSDDY (GK) Centre s t a t e t i e s t c b e . Ilindu (Kedr-s) , I'^ '^^ Br 
February 8 . 
Descr ibes t h a t t h e c e n t r e i s concerned mor^ imm-:: d i e t s l y 
about t h e Akal i r e a c t i o n s i n c e t h e hard l imers rnong them 
might f n c t encouraged t o i n s i s t on an acceptance of a t l a a s t the 
subs t ance of t h e i r Anandour Sahib r a s c l l i t i o n or -t ->ny r.-.te 
t r y t o keep the i s s u e open in one from or the o tha r u n t i l t h e 
2S3i 
complition of the proposed review of the c e n t c e - s t - t e 
r e l a t i o n s . But the rea l f r i c t i on betv/een the centre pnd the 
s t a t e s has ar isen over the a rb i t r a ry use of a r t i c l e 256 to 
impose president r u l e . ?vny review of cent re sl.-.te r e la t ions 
v;ill inevi tably involve a through re exa'nination of f^is 
pernicious pract ice which has undermined the " o i r i t o- trie 
c o n s t i t u t i o n much more than any other action O-F the centr-^1 
government. 
:T,E3TSUCTURING FEDE::^AL C;DS:: 
250. FSD^hALU:; :.:':D national integration, oacular Democr 'cy, 
11,14, 1978 July, 13-15. 
In this article Dr, :3nehmonry -hek L-^:"!er (Lect. Urer i.n 
Pol. Science, 2.:'!. yahavidyallya, Itihuna - Distt l.oocly) . 
Argues for restrcturlng the ere-'ent federal order in the 
interest of notional integration. Fedral order should be 
restured in such a manner that the linguistic cultural 
coimiunities may be provided with the full opportunity to 
develop their ways of type in consonance v;ith the broader 
national life. This will enable the states to bac ::nc "ull 
efficient and responsible cooartners in the partcilatcry 
federalism national integration c-^n be achiz-v-rd onlv in such 
a oolitical climate. 
%4. 
PRICE EXPOI^T, A;:DII.:iA ::=RADE3:: 
251. CENTRE STATE relations. Indian Express, 103 3, Janucry 23. 
Describes thnt the centre , ould dc '.;ell to Icolc pos i t ive 
by at the Andhra suggestion and respond f r.v^our ~'~dy to the 
proposed ?tudy subsidising superior qucility riC'^ f:<r dci^.^stis 
consumr'tion, being d'ne in - i^ndhra Pra3sch does not nslcs 
aconomic sense T/sjan the effor t should be to s e l l i t abri-'•;•' 
and use the foreign exchange for development .^ur'^ose. There i 
no need to take a dim or alarmist view of the -'ecision if i t 
means greater administrot ive eff iciency and r e f l e c t a determin 
a t ion to promote the language o n l : . I t i s a said fac t t h a t v/hil 
the quesi:ion of language generates much h^at and v/orse v i r u t a l l 
nothing has been don-^  t o r e a l l y promote Indian lang^ir.ge. 
TALCHER CCKPLEX CRIoA. 
25 2. KirJI\^ TlA (Kishamoni) Centre 's apathy to Cris ~'s n-c-ds 
Janata 24, 10, 1969, rj^rch 30, 7 -3 . 
Describes th-r^t the centres atmost neglig-;nc3 to :-"avelO':^  
t h i s s t a t e to bring i t at oar vjith othsr develo 'e3 s t a t e 
wi l l remain as ?_ black chaper for the fut-^re gan^-r-tion povcr 
oo ten t i a l of the s t ^ -e i s ameriOous but i t i s a f- ':t tlT^t Cris-a 
i s unable t c u t i l i s e at the moment i t s employ so-.'er potent ia l 
Centre is a l so vary cold to Orissa ' s demand for a ccal b?sed 
f e r t i l i s e r olant at Talcher and Tslcher complex ••?1'ich has been 
emply proved to be ideal a project under the public sector. 
Similarly ferro silicion plPant between Binalagarh and talcher 
fertiliser plant oil refinary and sah othc-r industrie.-; can be 
ideally located at ?t3radip port about which he :'entre h-s becomc' 
calloun. 
VIOLATION OF L.:-.' :::-D cj^DS-?i u.P. 
253. BOLD CFALLSIIGE. Kagpur times. Times 1980, ^ebrur-ry 20. 
"Describes that presumably the chances of winnino over 
more political malcontents in U.P. and Bihar h-^ ve oe-n v;eighad 
more carefully in the light of the storms r.^ iaocl b^ ^ the happening 
in Narainpur and Parasbiha v/hile one may doubt the proprity of 
disolving a state assembly on the Prot j:t of ?. br3,-!k do-.-.Tn of 
lav7 and order in a corner of the state '-nd suggest tlr-t it ir 
open to the centre centre to direct the state gover"''i'aents to 
prevent such incidents of mass violation of lav; and o:--or v/here 
political consider,'tions ta/ce areceedence ovar every t^ .ing else 
and the clim7te appears to be congerial to t~ke tha "^ h^ moe nothir 
can prevent the congress 'I) from taking a politi',:ri.l decision 
similar to eh one the J-^ nata government took in 1977 v/hen the 
Congress party v/as routed in the elections. 
w& 
i'JEST BENGAL 
2 5 4 . PRANDA (Marcus F ) . C e n t r e - S t a t e p r o b l e m s . Link 11 , ?6 
1969 , A p r i l 20, 4 1 - 4 2 . 
D e s c r i b e s t h a t wes t Bengal l e a d e r s were n o t c c n s t r a n i " e d 
t o a c c e p t c e n t r a l government d i s c u s s i o n c o n c e r n i n g e i t h e r s t p t e 
m a t t e r s or c o n s t i t u t t i o n a l l y c e n t r e a l m a t t e r s even d u r i n g t h ~ t 
p e r i o d when t h e c o n g r e s s p a r t y gSxsESimaiTJs was i n ''^c.-er a t b o t h 
c e n t r a l and s t a t e l e v e l s . S t a t e government v^as a ' l e t o have i t -
way by m o b l i s i n g i t s s o c i a l b a s e i n s u p e o r t of i t s s t a n d a l t h -
ough i n one c a s e t h e c e n t r e c o u l d a c t v/ith one c o n s u l t i n g t h e / 
s t a t e , i n t h e s e c o n d c a s e t h e i s s u e i n v o l v e d r a f e r r e d t o -
c o n c u r r e n t s u b j e c t and i n t h e t h i r d t h e s u b j e c t no doub t f e l l i n 
t h e s t a t e l i s t b u t t h e r u l i n g p a r t y a t t h e c e n t r e and i n t h e 
s t a t e ha-d e v o l v e d a u n i f o r m p o l i c y f o r t h e c o u n t r y . In each 
of t h e t h r e e c a s e s t h e s t a t e government was g u ' d e d by i t s own 
v i e w t h e s t a t e i n t e r e s t . An i d e n t i c a l s i t u a t i o n p r e v i a l s t o d a y . 
RCLE OP COMMUNIST PARTY. 
255. CENTRE VERSUS States or Centre S ta tes , J -na ta , 33,10, 
April 16, 1-2. 
Describes t h a t the Sommunist heve confused end con "'licetee: 
the v/hole issue of cent re s t e t e re la t ione by prej :-ctinq theiryvie^ 
in such-a manner tha t unless they modify t he i r tone, s ty l e and 
content , we wil l be faced v;ith centre s t a t e confcrnata t icn . 
m. 
I t needs t o be pointed out to the communist tha t they have 
not very often demanded cent ra l intervent ion a'-oinst opiressiv( 
or unresponsive or unrepresentat ive s t a t e ocvernments. I t i.;: 
V ~ - , 
or f ac t t h a t there are time v/hen the suffering "ooole in a 
s t a t e took to the centre for pro tec t ion . After a l l v/hy i s i t 
t h a t school and college teachers in many state':; v/ant education 
t o be re ta ined in the cucurrent l i s t Janata party can take 
i n i t i a t i v e , b y inducing some of the s t a t e s ruled by i t to pass 
l e g i s l a t i o n clothing the lov-er un i t s a t d i s t r i c t v:ith s t a tu to r 
au thor i ty over f i e lds of adaninistration and development. 
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